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MacKinnon on Marx on Marriage and Morals:
An Otsogistic Odyssey'
MARC LNDER*
[Love, not... for the proletariat, but rather love for the sweetheart and in
particular for you, makes the man into a man again.
Karl Marx (age 38) to Jenny Marx (age 42) (his wife of thirteen years)
2
I. MAcKINNON ON MARX
A. Say It Ain't So, Challey
3
V a Marx was an MCP. Viewing the world through the distorting
% or of his hatred for his mother, he looked down on women
in general.4 Even on the eve of his fifieth birthday, five years after
his mother's death, he was still mercilessly deriding her failure to
have mastered spoken or written High German.' At the same time-
1868 was apparently a good year for misogyny-when he was at the
height of his intellectual powers, without the excuse of youth or
1. "[O]tsog": "a close-knit narrative that pays its respects to scholarship and dues to
pedantry;, also an exceedingly diversified (and thoroughly parenthesized*) piece of schol-
arship." ROBERT MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 275
(1965) ("*and heavily footnoted").
* © Marc Linder. Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. Like some sort of
intellectual Sam Carr (or his black lab), Gail Hollander "made me do it." Criticisms by Pat
Cain, John Houghton, Herb Hovenkamp, Julius Sensat, and Larry Zacharias prompted
revisions incorporated in this Article.
2. Letter from Karl Marx to Jenny Marx (June 21, 1856), in 3:8 KARL MARX [&]
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, GESAMATAUSGABE (MEGA) 30-31 (1990).
3. One of MAarxes family nicknames; Eleanor Marx-Aveling, Karl Marx: Lose Bliitter,
in MOHR UND GENERAL: ERINNERUNGEN AN MARX UND ENGELS 242, 244-45 (1982 [1895])
[hereinafter MOHR UND GENERAL].
4. ARNOLD KONZLI, KARL MARX EINE PSYCHOGRAPHIE 305, 309 (1966); LEWIS FEUER,
The Character and Thought of Karl Marx: The Promethean Complex and Historical
Materialism, in MARX AND THE INTELLECTUALS: A SET OF POST-IDEOLOGICAL EssAYS 9,34-
39 (1969 [1968]) (jejune psychobabblings).
5. "Wenn die Karell Kapital gemacht hdtte, statt etc.!" Letter from Karl Marx to
Friedrich Engels (Apr. 30, 1868), in 32 MARX [&] ENGELS, WERKE [MEW] 75 (1965) ('If
Karl had made capital instead etc.!' [of writing Kapital]). For examples of Henriette
Marxs difficulties with German, see her postscripts to the letters from her husband
Heinrich (and her own after his death) to their son when he was a university student
(Nov. 18-29, 1835, Mar. 1836, Sept. 16, 1837, Feb. 2, 1838, Feb. 15-16, 1838, Oct. 22, 1838,
May 29, 1840), in 3:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GEsAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) 292, 294-95, 320, 329,
330, 334, 347(1975).
452 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
senility, he stooped to the following banal humor: "Societal progress
can be measured exactly by the societal position of the beautiful sex
(the ugly ones included)."6 A self-proclaimed aficionado of obscure
smutty poetry in several languages, 7 he was also a prude--a combi-
nation of traits suggesting a disturbed relation to women.9 The kind
of role model he inculcated in his daughters can be gauged by his
responses to their requests for parlor-game "confessions": he listed
"weakness" as his favorite virtue in women (and, of course,
"strength" in men).10
Throughout his adult life he expressed contempt for women by
standing Maurice Chevalier on his head-no great feat after he had
done it to Hegel-and thanking "hayven for leetle" boys:" in 1851
and again in 1855 he complained to Engels that his wife had given
6. Letter from Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann (Dec. 12, 1868), in 32 MEW, supra note 5,
at 583. To be sure, Marx was making a joke, as emerges from the rest of the letter in
which he praised the National Labor Union in the United States for treating female
workers with complete parity. A week earlier Marx, after asking Kugelmann whether his
wife was active in the "great German ladies emancipation movement," expressed the con-
viction that German women needed to "begin to impel their men towards self-emancipa-
tion." Letter from Marx to Kugelmann (Dec. 5, 1868), in id. at 581. When Kugelmann in-
troduced Marx to his wife and daughter, Marx cut off Kugelmann's political conversation
by saying it was not for'"young ladies." Franziska Kugelmann, Kleine Zilge zu dem groplen
Charakterbild von Karl Marx, in MOHR UND GENERAL, supra note 3, at 252-53. Ironically,
Marx ended his friendship with Kugelmann over the latter's browbeating of his wife.
Letter from Marx to Engels (Sept. 18, 1874), in 33 MEW 116-17 (1966).
7. Letters from Marx to Engels (Oct. 19 and Nov. 7, 1867), in 31 MEW 368-69, 380
(1965) (relating story of sturdy fellow whom nuns in Russian nunnery had "ridden to
death" in twenty-four hours).
8. In his late forties he told the young man courting one of his daughters in no uncer-
tain terms that in his opinion the true love of one in love expressed itself in reserve, mod-
esty, and even shyness vis-&-vis his idol. Letter from Karl Marx to Paul Lafargue (Aug.
13, 1866), in 31 MEW, supra note 7, at 519. Recounting his sea voyage to Hamburg to
read the proofs of Das Kapital, Marx explained why one female passenger--"old nag with
toothless maw"-had caroused with him and other men instead of joining the other
women "vomiting in the ladies cabin": "this beauty" was charmed by an account of "sexual
obscenities of the savages" in Peru who roasted the afterbirth and served it as
"sweetbread" to visitors. Letter from Marx to Engels (Apr. 13, 1867), in id. at 288.
9. KONZLI, supra note 4, at 300-01.
10. 31 MEW, supra note 7 (illustration opposite 596). For some insight into the
psyches of these politically involved independent thinkers and their relationships to their
"extremely loving father," see THE DAUGHTERS OF KARL MARX: FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE
1866-1898 (1982). YVONNNE KAPP, ELEANOR MARX 27 (1972). Even a hostile critic
concedes that Marx was "[ain exemplary father." RALPH BUULTJENS, THE SECRET OF KARL
MARX. HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY AND MARXISM 60 (1985) [hereinafter THE SECRET OF KARL
MARX]; see also Ralph Buultens, What Marx Hid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1983, at A15.
11. "Vivat der kleine Weltbtirger! Il faut peupler le monde de gargons d'autant plus
que la statistique anglaise montre un exc~s de filles." Letter from Marx to Jenny Longuet
(Aug. 19, 1879), in 34 MEW 388 (1966) (congratulating her on the birth of his grandson
Edgar).
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birth to a girl and not to a boy;' 2 thirty years later, on hearing that
his oldest daughter had given birth to a boy, he informed her that he
preferred the birth of boys at "this turning point of history" because
they had "the most revolutionary period before them....
Fearing the loss of Engels' friendship because he had insensi-
tively asked for a loan instead of consoling Engels when the latter's
wife died, Marx blamed his own wife's eccentric excitability-using
the occasion to pontificate about women as "funny creatures" accus-
tomed to demanding the impossible. 4 He expressed appreciation for
a lifetime of devotion from his wife, who sacrificed a goodly portion
of her energy copying his illegibly written manuscripts for submis-
sion to publishers (the "happiest [days] of her life"), 5 by concluding
from her inability to keep within her household budget-the con-
straints of which were largely a result of his failure ever to have
done an honest day's work in his life's--that women were constantly
in need of a guardianship.' And even when he complimented his
wife, Marx was really tooting his own proprietary horn. Writing to
his wife from their hometown, Trier, where he was busy collecting
his inheritance from his recently deceased mother, Marx boasted
that every day people asked him about the "quondam 'most beautiful
girl of Trier' and the 'queen of the ball.' It is damn pleasant for a
12. Letter from Marx to Engels (Apr. 2, 1851), in 27 MEW 229 (1965); Letter from
Marx to Engels (Jan. 17, 1855), in 28 MEW 423 (1963).
13. Letter from Marx to Jenny Longuet (Apr. 29, 1881), in 35 MEW 186 (1967).
14. Letter from Marx to Engels (Jan. 28, 1863), in 30 MEW 319 (1964). An East
German hagiography of Marx agrees with Marx's criticism of his wife. LUISE
DORNEMANN, JENNY MARY, DER LEBENSWEG EINER SOZIALISTIN 190-92 (1982 [1968]).
15. KAPP, supra note 10, at 40; Jenny Marx, Kurze Umrisse eines bewegten Lebens, in
MOHR UND GENERAL, supra note 3, at 186, 203. Her work as his amanuensis was literally
the fruition of a longstanding fantasy. When the twenty-one year-old Marx was courting
Jenny Westphalen, she wrote him a letter explaining that since his last letter she had
imagined that he might have gotten into a dispute and a duel; night and day she saw him
wounded and bleeding, which vision, she confided, had not made her completely unhappy
because she also almost imagined that he had lost his little right hand; this thought in
turn made her blissful because she thought she could become indispensable to him and
"then you would always have me around you and keep loving me. Then I thought that I
would have been able to write down all your dear heavenly thoughts and become rather
useful to you." Letter from Jenny von Westphalen to Karl Marx (ca. 1839-1840), in 3:1
MAX [&] ENGELS, GESAAITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 5, at 338.
16. "1I could put an end to the matter tomorrow if I wanted to run a practical business
tomorrow instead of working for the cause." Letter from Karl Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann
(Oct. 9, 1866), in 31 MEW, supra note 7, at 529. A few years earlier he had asserted that
his effort to secure a job in a railway office had been thwarted by his illegible handwrit-
ing. Letter from Marx to Kugelmann (Dec. 28, 1862), in 30 EW, supra note 14, at 640.
Marx conceded his dereliction in warning Paul Lafargue, who was about to marry his
daughter Laura, not to ruin her life financially as Marx had his wife's. Letter from Marx
to Lafargue (Aug. 13, 1866), in 31 MEW, supra note 7, at 518-19.
17. Letter from Marx to Engels (July 22, 1869), in 32 MEW, supra note 5, at 343-44.
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man when his wife lives on in the fantasy of a whole city as
'enchanted princess.'"" To add crowning injury to insult, at a par-
ticularly trying time in his wife's life, when she was. off in Holland
begging his relatives for money to keep the family afloat, instead of
beginning his study of the history of economics, this self-professed
"strong-loined paterfamilias," 9 not the type to frequent a bordello, 0
apparently found nothing better to do than father a child with their
faithful servant, whom his mother-in-law had sent to them as a
present; Engels then obliged him once again by taking the rap.2'
B. MacKinnon's Disembedded Deconstruction of Marx
So far the score is Catharine MacKinnon 100, Carl22 Marx 0-
and MacKinnon has not even begun to play. Precisely because her
feminist critique of Marxism never even mentions Marx's alleged
conventionally patriarchal personal views and treatment of
women,2 her charge that Marx's social theory failed to rise above
18. Letter from Marx to Jenny Marx (Dec. 15, 1863), in 30 MEW, supra note 14, at
643. Yet even Buultjens concedes that "[w]ith his wife... Marx sustained a deep and
loving relationship." BUULTJENS, THE SECRET OF KARL MARX, supra note 10, at 58.
19. Letter from Marx to Engels (Feb. 3, 1851), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at 173.
20. In addition, in what medium could the immiserated Marx have paid? Perhaps he
could have paid in natura by reading from his unpublished works highlighting the
situationally most relevant passages such as: "Like the woman from marriage into
general prostitution, the whole world of wealth.., steps out of the relationship of
exclusive marriage with the private owner into the relationship of universal prostitution
with the community." Karl Marx, (konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem
Jahre 1844, in MEW, Supp. pt. 1, at 465, 534 (1968).
21. KDNZLI, supra note 4, at 325-35; KAPP, supra note 10, at 289-97. Ironically, Jenny
Marx's loving letter to Marx telling him of her travails confided to him that: "I know how
you and Lehnchen [their servant, Helene Demuth] will take care of them [the children].
Without Lehnchen I'd have no peace of mind here. She has it much too hard... " Letter
from Jenny Marx to Karl Marx (Aug. 1850), in 3:3 MARX [&1 ENGELS, GESADITAUSGABE
(MEGA) 622 (1981). The sole source of the story of Mars paternity is a typewritten copy,
partly corrected in pencil, of unknown origin, of an alleged letter from 1898 from Louise
Freyberger-Kautsky to August Bebel. That Marx may not have been the father after all
has been argued by HEINZ MONZ, KARL MARX: GRUNDLAGEN DER ENTWICKLUNG ZU LEBEN
UND WERK 359-61 (1973); FRITZ RADDATZ, KARL MARX: E NE POLITISCHE BIOGRAPHIE 205-
11 (1975); TERRELL CARVER, FRIEDRICH ENGELS: HIs LIFE AND THOUGHT 161-71 (1989).
BUULTJENS, THE SECRET OF KARL MARX, supra note 10, at 69-71; HEINZ F. PETERS, RED
JENNY: A LIFE WITH KARL MARX 104-05 (1986), fabricate dramatizations without stating
that they are fictitious.
22. MONZ, supra note 21, at illustration 10 opposite 208 (spelling on Marx's birth
certificate).
23. After the failure of the revolutions of 1848, when Marx argued that the
proletariat might have fifty years of struggle ahead of it, he and his wife-together with
many other refugees-abandoned their "vie de bohbme" and withdrew into the "life of the
bourgeois-honest philistine," if for no other reason than to create an "orderly, respectable
bourgeois life" or at least a semblance thereof for their daughters. Karl Marx, Sitzung der
Zentralbehrde yom 15, September 1850, in 8 MEW 597, 598 (1960); Jenny Marx, Kurze
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the prejudice of his era "that women naturally belong where they
are socially placed" gains in plausibility.'
MacKinnon goes on to argue that whereas for Marx, sex, as
situated in the natural "material substratum,'.., was not subject to
social analysis," by "[aipplying a marxist methodological critique to
feminist theory and practice, a feminist approach to consciousness is
identified which locates sexuality as central to women's social condi-
tion."25 Yet MacKinnon herself concedes that her feminist critique of
Marx "may seem.. .groping and comparatively primitive."26 Her
methodology underscores the disembodied character of her critique:
This chapter does not address the ways in which Marx's theories of social
life are, are not, or can be made applicable to women's experience or use-
ful for women's liberation. It addresses what Marx and Engels said about
women, women's status, and women's conditions. This book treats the
work of Marx as a whole, rather than dividing him into "old" and "young,"
but with the understanding that his work, like that of most people, did de-
velop and change over time.
27
This failure to contextualize is irreconcilable with and under-
mines MacKinnon's attempt to deconstruct Marx. 8 Instead, her ho-
listic approach turns out to be nothing but an undifferentiated col-
lection of quotations from the radically different periods of Marx's
development. 29 Although MacKinnon's dominance theory as a whole
has been faulted for its ahistorical and essentialist character, 30 an
enthusiastic reviewer's intimation that she is the feminist Marx3
might have nurtured the belief that at least her understanding of
Marx had not succumbed to ahistoricism. But MacKinnon's quick-
Umrisse eines bewegten Lebens in MOHR UND GENERAL, supra note 3, at 193, 200-01;
Letter from Marx to Kugelmann (Mar. 6, 1868), in 32 MEW, supra note 5, at 539.
24. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 13 (1989).
For a feminist critique of Marx based on a solid understanding of Das Kapital, see
CHRISTEL NEUsOll, DIE KOPFGEBURTEN DER ARBEITERBEWEGUNG ODER DIE GENOSSIN
LUXEMBURG BRINGT ALLES DURCHEINANDER (1985).
25. MACKINNON, supra note 24; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method
and the State ii (1987) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (Abstract) (no pagination).
26. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at x.
27. Id. at 255 n.1.
28. For more scholarly deconstruction of the early Marx from a socialist-feminist
perspective, see JAMES WINDERS, GENDER, THEORY, AND THE CANON 48-71 (1991).
29. For a contextualized and critical overview of the evolution of Marx's views, see
Hal Draper, Marx and Engels on Women's Liberation, in FEMiALE LIBERATION: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLITIcS 83-107 (Roberta Salper ed., 1972).
30. Angela Harris, Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theory, 5 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 189 (1989-90); Jeanne L. Schro6der, Feminism Historicized: Medieval
Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135,
1138 n.6 (1990).




and-dirty Marx-autopsy is particularly outmoded since serious
feminist scholarship has stressed that Marx's analysis of gender
relations can be understood only by observing both the strict distinc-
tion between his historical-empirical and conceptual-categorical
statements and the caesura in his work with regard to women,
which mark off changes in his conceptual apparatus and the
systematic construction of his theories.32 For her ahistorical polemic
MacKimnnon's only justification is presumably that it is adequate to
its subject since: "Nhatever one can say about Marx's treatment of
women, his first failing and best defense are that the problems of
women concerned him only in passing."33
The analysis here begins with MacKinnon's critique of Marx's
discussion of women (underground coal mine) workers in Capital
and then moves to an examination of the role of paternalism in
labor-protective legislation (§ I.0). Then, using as a point of transi-
tion MacKinnon's gratuitous throwaway remark about Marx's al-
leged veneration of monogamy (§ H.A), which unwittingly brought to
light a little-known chapter at the beginning of Marx's political
career, this Article shifts the focus away from MacKinnon and to-
ward nineteenth-century Prussian marriage and divorce law. It
begins by disintering the context of Marx's statement in the twenty-
four year-old's political diatribe against the founder of German legal
positivism, Gustav Hugo. After introducing Hugo (§ II.B), the Article
discloses the context of Marx's attack-the debate about Prussian
divorce law reform in the 1840s (§ 1I.0). In order to appreciate the
cultural understandings that informed that controversy, it is also
necessary to explore the attitudes and theories of classical German
idealist philosophy about women and marriage (§ 1.D). There fol-
lows a critical analysis of Marx's gonzo-journalistic assault on Hugo
as a stand-in for the Minister of Justice and head of the Historical
School of Law, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, whom the king had
commissioned to rechristianize the Prussian law of divorce (§ II.E).
The discussion of Marx's own major but little-known journalistic
contribution to the debate on marriage and divorce in 1842 empha-
sizes the interpretive difficulties presented by texts that were sub-
ject to strict government censorship and threatened censorship
(§ H.F). If, in the end, the young Marx's views of marriage lagged be-
hind his contemporaneous analysis of the roots of rural poverty, it
turns out to be for reasons other than those MacKinnon has articu-
lated (§ 11.G).
32. See, e.g., URSULA BEER, GESCHLECHT, STRUKrUR, GESCIficHrE: SOZIALE KoNsmImu-
ERUNG DER GESCHLECHTERVERHALTNISSE 48-49 (1991 [1989]).
33. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 19.
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C. Anti-Paternalistic Championing of Nineteenth-Century Women
Miners
[Tihe worker's motives, desires, pride, cruelties, consciousness, will, his-
torical existence are absorbed into the system of production. The concrete-
ness of his presence there is registered by the immediacy of his presence
in Capital.... So, too, the most intimate extension of personhood, the
family, continually enters bodily into the text; for like all other attributes
of the worker, his or her children and spouse are present in the factory,
field, or mine .... 34
Even when discussing direct capitalist exploitation of female
wage laborers, MacKinnon charges that Marx inevitably turned "a
problem of exploitation" into "a problem of morality"-"When menwork, they become workers, Marx's human beings. When women
work, they remain wives and mothers, inadequate ones"-a view
Marx shared with "contemporary 'pro-family' conservatives."35
Although he usually abjures moral critique as a bourgeois fetish, Marx
displays moral sensitivities on women's work. Abhorring the "moral deg-
radation caused by capitalistic exploitation of women and children," Marx
observes: "Before the labour of women and children under 10 years of age
was forbidden in mines, capitalists considered employment of naked
women and girls, often in company with men, so far sanctioned by their
moral code, and especially by their ledgers, that it was only after the pass-
ing of the Act that they had recourse to machinery." It is unclear how nu-
dity is profitable. When men are exploited, it is a problem of exploitation;
when women are exploited, it is a problem of morality.3 6
What Marx in fact wrote was that "capital found the method of
using up [vernutzen] naked women and girls, often bound together
[zusammengebunden] with men, in coal and other mines" in accor-
dance with its morals and ledgerY.3  Going even further, in the
French edition of Capital Marx inserted at the end of the sentence
quoted by MacKinnon the sarcastic phrase: "and suppressed these
capitalist marriages."8 Only in some sort of MacKinnonite Lake
Wobegon-where all the men were above-average male chauvinist
pigs but all the women were even stronger-would Marx have
34. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD
266 (1987 [1985]).
35. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 17, 256 n.10.
36. Id. (quoting 1 MARX, CAPITAL 399, 393-94(1967)).
37. 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE (2d ed. 1872), in
11:6 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMfTAUSGABE (MEGA) 383 (1987). The second edition was the
last published during Marx's life.
38. 1 KARL MARX, LE CAPITAL, in 11:7 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA)
336 (1989 [1872-75]). Marx stated that the French edition "poss6de une valeur
scientifique inddpendante." Id. at 690.
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shown his true sexist colors presumably by failing to express his
horror at the possibility of women's sexually abusing or raping the
men by taking advantage of the involuntarily close and inescapable
contact.39 In the real world, a thirty-seven year-old human "beast] of
burthen,"40 Betty Harris, testified: "I have a belt round my waist,
and a chain passes between my legs, and I go on my hands and feet."
Her situation was exacerbated when she was pregnant or when her
miner-husband, for whom she pulled coal, beat her for not being
ready on time.4 1 No wonder that after Parliament prohibited female
labor underground in 1842, "[tlhose who supported the pit brow
lasses, even the most ardent of nineteenth-century suffragists, de-
plored women's work in coal mines and did not urge its resump-
tion."
42
But beneath the heavy-handed sarcasm MacKinnon's indict-
ment of Marx is not that he chauvinistically saw women as weak
where they were really strong, but rather that for him: 'Women are
more exploitable than men, not just more exploited, their character
a cause rather than a result of their material condition."
Consequently Marx did not understand "that working-class women
are specially exploited by capital-and with proper support and
organization might be able to hold out for higher wages, better con-
ditions, and fight mechanization.... Presumably MacKinnon
39. On apparently nonconsensual sexual intercourse in the mines, see CHILDREN'S
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS 32-33 (15 Parl. Pap.
1842); MICHAEL POLLARD, THE HARDEST WORK UNDER HEAVEN: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
THE BRITISH COAL MNER 59-60, 71 (1984). Even Jane Humphries, ... .The Most Free
From Objection..." The Sexual Division of Labor and Women's Work in Nineteenth-
Century England, 47 J. ECON. HIsT. 929, 938-40 (1987), who emphasizes the "cant-filled
discussion of morality," concedes that women in the mines "were most at risk" to sexually
"abusive treatment" where they worked "outside the family system."
40. MICHAEL FLINN, 1700-1830: The Industrial Revolution, in 2 THE HISTORY OF THE
BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY 335 (1984) (quoting the Ninth Earl of Dundonald, himself a mine
owner, in 1793).
41. CHILDREN'S EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, APPENDIX TO FIRST REPORT OF
COMMISSIONERS (MINES), pt. II at 230-31 (18 Parl. Pap. 1842). For woodcuts showing
women at this work, see id. at 31, 61, 165.
42. ANGELA JOHN, BY THE SWEAT OF THEIR BROW: WOMEN WORKERS AT VICTORIAN
COAL MINES 52 (1980). On the background of the statute, see Alan Heesom, The Coal
Mines Act of 1842, Social Reform, and Social Control, 24 HIST. J. 69 (1981). On the more
inspiring experiences of twentieth-century female underground coal miners in the United
States, see Marat Moore, Hard Labor: Voices of Women from the Appalachian Coalfields,
2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 199 (1990).
43. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 18. Despite this charge, MacKinnon does refrain
from accusing Marx of having supported the bourgeois political-cultural campaign to ban
employment of women in underground mines in order "to organise pit village women as a
means of educating pit village men in the lessons of morality and order." ROBERT COLLS,
THE PITMEN OF THE NORTHERN COALFIELD: WORK, CULTURE, AND PROTEST, 1790-1850, at
133-34 (1987). What Marx (and Engels) in fact shared with their contemporaries was the
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means "with proper support" from men. Yet even feminist analysis
has argued that under the labor market conditions of the nine-
teeenth century, proletarianization of additional family members
such as wives in overstocked trades was futile and did not increase
total family wages. 4
In ridiculing Marx, MacKinnon refers to a passage in Capital in
which Marx cited at great length the evidence furnished to a par-
liamentary committee inquiry on mines by male miners on the em-
ployment of women:
45
Marx's only comment in his own voice is that the apparent concern of the
questioners for these women is a cloak for their financial self-interest....
Actually, what the male miners say supports women's exclusion from this
work-a viewpoint inconsistent with the motive of material interest Marx
attributes to them.... One can only conclude that Marx is able to under-
stand the concern of the bourgeois questioner as inimical to his own, so at-
tributes it to material interest even when it conflicts with material inter-
est.
4 6
By conflating the bourgeois questioners' material interest with that
empirical overestimation of the extent of married women's participation in the wage labor
force; "their programmatic response to the situation, to their eternal credit, placed them
squarely at odds with conservatives and with most of the labour movement as well."
Wally Seccombe, Patriarchy Stabilized: The Construction of the Male Breadwinner Wage
Norm in Nineteenth-Century Britain, 11 SOc. HIsT. 53, 69 n.11 (1986). Without taking a
position on the issue, Marx criticized the ambiguity of a socialist party program demand
for limitation of women's work on the ground that it could be interpreted as calling for the
exclusion of women from industries that were harmful to the 'female body" or "immoral
[sittenwidrig] for the female sex." Marx added inconclusively that if the authors meant
the latter, they should have said so. Karl Marx, Randglossen zum Programm der
deutschen Arbeiterpartei, in 19 MEW 15, 31 (1962 [1875]).
44. Jane Humphries, Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working-Class
Family, I CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 241, 252-53 (1977). Humphries concedes that: "The
tragedy is that action could not be controlled on a class basis, but had to be regulated sys-
tematically on the basis of female labour, and theoretically of married female labour, so
reinforcing sex-based relations of dominance and subordination." Id. at 253. Nevertheless,
she argues, male workers did not necessarily gain at the expense of women workers and
family wages rose when women were banned from underground work. Even John Stuart
Mill, the greatest nineteenth-century philosophical advocate of gender equality, shared
this belief. GAIL TuLLOCH, MILL AND SExUAL EQUALITY 29 (1989).
45. MacKinnon incorrectly characterizes the report as "on the employment of women
as colliers in mines." MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 256 n.17. Although a small part of
the testimony was devoted to women, the charge went to the operation of acts for the
regulation and inspection of the mines, with the bulk of the evidence focused on accidents
and safety. REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON MINES iii (12 Parl. Pap. 1865, C. 398).
Moreover, as Marx noted in the passage she cites, Parliament had prohibited the
employment of women in underground mines twenty-four years before the report. See
generally, IVY PINCHBECK, WOMEN WORKERS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 240-70
(1930); JOHN, supra note 42.
46. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 256 n.17.
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expressed in the testimony of the male miners, to whom Marx at-
tributed no motives whatsoever, MacKinnon's argument does not
even rise to the level of incoherence: she is simply (undialectically)
confused.
Marx's interstitial comment was that after all the information
that they elicited about the moral condition of women, finally the
"secret" of the bourgeois questioners' "'sympathy" for widows and
poor families emerged: women were being paid wages only half those
of men.47 In later testimony, which Marx did not cite, General
Francis Dunne, an M.P. on the committee,48 had the following collo-
quy with a collier: "And the object of employing women is to make it
cheaper to the proprietor?-Yes, I believe it is."49 Several other wit-
nesses testified to the same effect, adding that no man would work
for such wages.5 The sympathy to which Marx was alluding was
directed at the exclusion of women from mining. Thus the unnamed
interrogator who elicited the testimony Marx quoted turns out to
have been Henry Fawcett, a professor of political economy at
Cambridge, who enjoyed little professional esteem in Marx's eyes.51
In his very popular contemporary economics textbook Fawcett
adopted a position that should be congenial to MacKinnon, opposing
all state regulation of adults' employment conditions.,2 This view
was congruent with the testimony of a mine inspector, who objected
to state interference with anyone's decision to earn his or her bread
by labor.5
Marx's imputation of material interest to the questioners
and/or the employers did not at all conflict with their material inter-
est-in women's miserably low wages. Thus instead of this passage's
being yet another instance of Marx's obsession blocking his view of
women as workers, MacKinnon's confused interpretation illustrates
her own obsession: "The exclusion of women from these jobs.., is
in the material interest of male workers, converging with a denial of
material self-interest by the bourgeois employer through an affirma-
tion of his sexism."-1
In fact,. mine owners by and large had not even contested the
47. MARX, supra note 37, at 472-73 n. 321. On wages, see 2 JOHN NEF, THE RISE OF
THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY 167-68, 189 (1932) (women often paid nothing for helping
their husbands).
48. DOD'S PARLIAMENTARY COMPANION 181 (33d Year, 1865).
49. REPORT FROMI THE SELECT COMM. ON MINES, supra note 45, Q. 2999 at 87.
50. Id., QQ. 2323-26 at 68, QQ. 6837-38 at 206, QQ. 7410-12 at 229, Q. 7423 at 230.
51. See, e.g., 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL, in 23 MEW 638-39 (1962 [18671).
52. HENRY FAWCETT, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 225-31, 600-01 (7th ed, 1888
[1863]).
53. REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMI%!. ON MINES, supra note 45, Q. 7344 at 226
(testimony of Joseph Dickinson).
54. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 256 n.17.
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statutory prohibition of female underground employment a quarter-
century earlier in 184215 "because the women in the mines were em-
ployed and paid by the miners and not by the owners."56 Because the
male miners controlled the women, who were often their wives,
daughters, or sisters, and their wages, and did not compete with
them for the same jobs, feminist scholars who have struggled with
the sources have articulated the paradox that male miners sought to
abolish a system that operated in their favor and to replace it with
one that increased their hours and work. Conversely, owners of
larger and more capital-intensive mines favored exclusion of women
both because it impeded operation of smaller mines that relied on
female labor and promoted the rationalization of capitalist man-
agement by eliminating adult males as inside contractors who su-
pervised their female relatives and instating formal and real sub-
sumption of all workers under capital.8
MacKinnon's hatchet job on Marx, which is executed with all
the textual and historical sensitivity of someone who has picked up
a translation-and not even the most accurate one at that59 -of
Capital, hunted down references to women, and spontaneously
reacted to them from her own particular perspective, leaves no trace
of the fact that because underground women workers "found them-
selves at the centre of a deep-rooted and complex controversy.., the
debate about their right to work must be viewed both in the light of
the shocking conditions to which women and girls had been sub-
jected underground and also in the context of the problems posed by
55. An Act to Prohibit the Employment of Women and Girls in Mines and Collieries,
1842, 5 & 6 Viet., ch. 99, § I (Eng.)
56. J. L. HAMMOND & BARBARA HAIMOND, LORD SHAFTESBURY 80 (1939 [1923]).
57. See Jane Humphries, Protective Legislation, the Capitalist State, and Working
Class Men: The Case of the 1842 Mines Regulation Act, FEMINIST REV., Spring 1981, at 1,
15-16; Angela V. John, Letter to Editor, FEMINIST REV., Autumn 1981, at 106, 107; Jane
Mark-Lawson & Anne Witz, From "Family Labour" to "Family Wage"? The Case of
Women's Labour in Nineteenth-Century Coalmining, 13 SOC. HIST. 151, 161-62, 172-73
(1988) (in coalmining areas where family labor prevailed, male hewers may not have in-
itially favored excluding women, perhaps because of concomitant capitalist subordination,
but may have done so later); HARRIET BRADLEY, MEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S WORM A
SOcIOLoGIcAL HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL DrvISION OF LABOUR IN EMPLOYMENT 110-11
(1989). See also A. J. Heesom, The Northern Coal-Owners and the Opposition to the Coal
Mines Act of 1842, 25 INT'L REV. SOC. HIST. 236, 236-40 (1980) (some male miners may
have opposed exclusion of women for material reasons). For contemporary evidence that
at least some miners opposed exclusion, see 65 PARL DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 119 (1842)
(remarks of Londonderry). A year after passage of the Act, one M.P. spoke of the
desirability of a male's earning a wage sufficient to support his family. 69 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (3d ser.) 444 (1843) (remarks of Hume).
58. Mark-Lawson & Witz, supra note 57, at 165-68.
59. The best English translation is 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976).
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their enforced exclusion from this work in the 1840s."6" Had
MacKinnon attended to this political context in which Marx as a
very political animal found himself,61 perhaps she would have won-
dered herself whether prohibiting women from the "unbelievably
hard and damaging to the health 6 2 work of carrying 120 pounds of
coal on their backs "climbing up steep, winding staircases...
[airmed with a short stick and a candle held between their teeth...
for eight or ten hours without a rest" 63 as mere helpers to fathers,
husbands, and brothers was a sexist measure or one towards which
the male miners held "complex and... contradictory"'attitudes.
64
Marx's focus on women's extraordinarily low wages was of a
piece with his general awareness of the peculiar capitalist exploita-
tion of women and of its relationship to their peculiar exploitability.
As an example of how even in developed capitalist societies the re-
dundancy of labor brought about by the introduction of machinery in
certain industries could so depress wages below the value of labor
power that its use was not profitable in others, Marx noted that even
in his day women in England were occasionally still used instead of
horses for pulling in the construction of canals "because the labor
required for the production of horses and machines [is] a mathe-
matically given quantum, whereas that for the maintenance of
women of the surplus population is beneath all calculation."65
MacKinnon charges that in Marx's discussion of the appropria-
tion of female labor made possible by the adoption of machinery,
"[tihis theorist.., could see the work women do in the home only as
free labor, when the only sense in which it is free is that it is un-
paid."66 Apart from the fact that Marx stepped out of his role as
60. JOHN, supra note 42, at 60.
61. In the midst of correcting the galley proofs of the first volume of Capital, Marx
expressed his outrage over capitalists' lobbying to hobble legislation that would have put
an end to "torture" for non-adult male workers and explained that he would combat the
move through the International. Letter from Marx to Engels (June 22, 1867), in 31 MEW,
supra note 7, at 305-06. Even as principled a critic of Marx as Popper certified that "his
burning protest against these crimes, which were then tolerated, and sometimes even de-
fended, not only by professional economists but also by 6hurchmen, will secure him for-
ever a place among the liberators of mankind." 2 K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND
ITS ENEMIES 122 (1973 [1945]). Since the aforementioned letter to Engels also contains
Mars ardent hope "that the bourgeoisie will think of my carbuncles its whole life," per-
haps his outburst had more material than ideal origins.
62. FLINN, 1700-1830: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 40, at 335.
63. JOHN, supra note 42, at 22. See also THOMAS ASHTON & JOSEPH SYKES, THE COAL
INDUSTRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 24-25 (1929).
64. JOHN, supra note 42, at 40, 32.
65. MARX, supra note 37, at 383.
66. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 16. MacKinnon's sarcasm reaches its highpoint
when she speculates that Marxs major criticism of capital's usurpation of women's for-
merly "free labor" in the household was that "dinner was not ready on time." Id. She fails
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"theorist" and into that of popularizer and propagandist in inserting
much of the empirical-historical material into the first volume of
Capital,67 his discussion is a tad more sophisticated than
MacKinnon gives him credit for. In analyzing this subjection of
women to "forced labor for the capitalist" "under the immediate
subordination of capital," Marx recognized that the value of labor
power was determined not only by the labor time required to main-
tain the individual adult worker, but also that of the worker's fam-
ily. Where mechanization "throws" the whole family on to the labor
market, it spreads the value of the man's labor power-over the whole
family and thus devalues it: by being able to buy the labor power of
four workers, the capitalist may have to pay more than for that of
the head of the family, but he appropriates much more surplus labor
in proportion to the wages. 8 Moreover, Marx emphasized that
women's reproductive labor was not "free." Since "certain functions
of the family" such as taking care of children "cannot be completely
suppressed, the mothers of the families who are confiscated by capi-
tal must more or less hire replacements.... The reduced expendi-
ture for domestic labor corresponds therefore to increased expendi-
ture of money. The costs of production of the worker family therefore
grow and balance the increased income."6 9
to note the ironic overlay of Marx's comments on this subject. He referred to a report on
the condition of workers in cotton manufacturing districts in England, who were
unemployed as a result of the American Civil War, that detailed how working women fi-
nally had the necessary leisure to breast feed their children instead of poisoning (that is,
pacifying) them with opiates and to learn to cook. Marx's commented laconically:
"Unfortunately this art of cooking fell in a moment when they had nothing to eat." MARX,
supra note 37, at 384 n.120. In her dissertation, MacKinnon actually quotes this passage
without seeing the irony. MacKinnon, supra note 25, at 31-32.
67. See TONY SMITH, THE LOGIC OF MARX'S CAPITAL: REPLIES TO HEGELIAN
CRITICISMS 124-37 (1990).
68. MARX, supra note 37, at 384-85; 18 JORGEN KUCZYNSKI, DIE GESCHICHTE DER
LAGE DER ARBEITER UNTER DEm KAPITALIsMUJS: STUDIEN zuR GESCHICHTE DER LAGE DER
ARBEITERIN IN DEUTSCHLAND VON 1700 BIS ZUR GEGENwART 88-90, 98-100 (1963). But see
Michblle Barrett & Mary McIntosh, The 'Family Wage"." Some Problems for Socialists and
Feminists, CAPITAL & CLASS, Summer 1980, at 51, 64:
Marx implies that the level of the male wage did previously reflect the costs of
subsistence of the labourer's wife and her substitutes. This, however, seems
open to doubt. The existence of wage differentials from the earliest period of the
transition to capitalism and apparently relating to minimum subsistence needs
of men and women, suggests that the wage has never... been determined as a
family wage. And if it never had been a "family wage" reflecting a family-based
calculation of costs of reproduction, it is inappropriate to argue that the em-
ployment of women and children would necessarily lower the value of labour
power.
69. 1 MARX, supra note 37, at 385 n.121. In fact, wives who perform wage labor
spend fewer hours on housework than non-wage working wives but face even longer total
work weeks. See Heidi Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political
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Contrary to MacKinnon's claim that Marx one-sidedly viewed
women from a moral perspective, 0 he also persistently moralized
about the fact that the social system had turned both fathers and
mothers into slave traders of their children as workers just as he
demanded mandatory limits on working hours "not only against
manufacturers, but also against the workers themselves":71 "It is
not, however, the abuse of parental power which created the direct
or indirect exploitation of immature workers by capital, but rather it
is on the contrary the capitalist mode of exploitation which has
made parental power, through abolition of the economic basis corre-
sponding to it, into an abuse. 2 Moreover, MacKinnon's claim that
Marx confused the cause and effect, the form and content of women's
exploitation under capitalism is irreconcilable with her acknowl-
edgment that Marx found it self-explanatory that, under postcapital-
ist conditions, the cooperative labor of women and men outside the
household would become "the source of humane development." 3 Her
further assertion that for Marx "[tihe woman who works outside the
home is a class enemy by nature"74 verges on the grotesque given
Marx's insistence on the emancipatory function of women's partici-
pation in socially organized production and his progressive role in
Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366, 377-86 (1981).
70. She suggests'that what most bothered Marx about women's wage labor was that
rather than selling their own labor power, their husbands sold them. MACKINNON, supra
note 24, at 16. Here MacKinnon overlooks the self-reinforcing relationship among the eco-
nomic base, the legal superstructure, and consciousness. In Germany, for example,
husbands were, as late as 1957, entitled to terminate their wives' employment contracts
without notice; until 1977, wives were entitled to work outside the home only insofar as
such employment was compatible with their marital and familial duties. BGB §§ 1356,
1358.
71. Letter from Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann (17 Mar. 1868), in 32 MEW, supra note
5, at 540, 541; MARX, supra note 37, at 385, 467.
72. MARX, supra note 37, at 468. By the same token, Marx actually advocated the
industrial employment of children of both sexes starting at the age of nine-subject to
strict regulation of hours and safety conditions-in connection with school as "one of the
most powerful means of transforming today's society." Karl Marx, Randglossen zum
Programm der. deutschen Arbeiterpartei, in 19 MEW, supra note 43, at 32; Karl Marx,
Instruktionen far die Delegierten des Provisorischen Zentralrats zu den einzelnen Fragen,
in 16 MEW 190, 193-94 (1962 [1866]) [hereinafter Instruktionen].
73. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 19. MacKinnon misquotes the passage from Marx,
which reads "huimane" not "human." MARX, supra note 37, at 468.
74. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 18. In the undiluted conspiratorial version, this
charge ran as follows: "Marx... favored protective labor legislation to shield women from
the worst ravages of industrial exploitation so that they would be better able to perform
their domestic labors. Socialists... have supported protective labor legislation for
women. The effect of socialist chivalry is to keep women from being able to compete for
jobs on the same terms as men.... Consequently... men are also assured an adequate
supply of reproductive and carnal servants." ANDREA DWORKIN, Sexual Economics: The
Terrible Truth, in LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE: WRITINGS 1976-1987, at 117, 121 (1988
(1976]).
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educating the German Social Democrats as to the need for equal
treatment of women workers.
75
MacKinnon returns to these themes in a more modern context
by criticizing labor-protective laws for women as having "demeaned
all women ideologically" while they "contributed to keeping some
women from competing with men at the male standard of exploita-
tion. This benefited both male workers and capitalists.... They
were a victory against capitalism and for sexism." Whereas such
legislation was "paternalistic," "[pirotecting all workers was not
considered demeaning by anyone. 76 Curiously, MacKinnon ignores
the so-called social feminist movement of the 1920s, which pushed
for minimum wage laws for women by means of an industrial equal-
ity-through-difference strategy. These feminists eschewed the epi-
thet "paternalism," instead viewing different treatment as empower-
ing women to achieve equality. Here gender politics make strange
bedfellows as MacKinnon finds herself aligned with perhaps the
most reactionary justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ever to rule on
such laws.7 8 In his dissent from the case that triggered MacKinnon's
75. For the fruits, see AUGUST BEBEL, DIE FRAU UND DER SOZIALISMUS (1973 [1879]).
See generally MEcHTHLD MERFELD, DIE EMANZIPATION DER FRAU IN DER SOZIALISTISCHEN
THEoRIE UND PRAxIS 52 (1972); WERNER THONNESSEN, FRAUENEMANZIPATION: POLITIK
UND LITERATUR IN DEE DEUTSCHEN SOZIALDEMOKRATIE ZUR FRAUENBEWEGUNG 1863-1933,
at 11-27 (1969). By way of contrast, even after World War I an eminent German economic
historian bemoaned the economic emancipation of the working-class housewife because it
meant that both spouses lost their autonomy when she too came under "the yoke of the
enterprise." KARL BtCHER, BEITRAGE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSGEScHICHTE 296-99 (1922).
76. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 165-66. For a different view, see Angela Coyle,
The Protection Racket? FEMINIST REV., No. 4, 1980, at 1; THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
WOMEN AND SOLDIERS: THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 379-80
(1992). Even Hartmann, who believes that patriarchal male workers have driven gender
segmentation more than capitalists and expresses Schadenfreude when capitalists use
low-paid women against men, concedes that the question of the motives of various groups
vis-h-vis exclusionary protective legislation on behalf of women is "thorny." Heidi
Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, & Job Segregation by Sex, 1 SIGNS 137, 166-68, 154
n.43 (Supp. 1976). For a feminist critique of MacKinnon's undifferentiated denunciation
of protective legislation as "male," see Female Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 68 (1985) (contribution by Ellen DuBois). For an
empirically nuanced analysis of the impact of such laws on women's position in the labor
market that is at variance with MacKinnon's claims, see Claudia Goldin, Maximum
Hours Legislation and Female Employement: A Reassessment, 96 J. POL. ECON. 189
(1988); Jeremy Atack & Fred Bateman, Whom Did Protective Legislation Protect?
Evidence from 1880, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER
SERIES ON HISTORICAL FACTORS IN LONG RUN GROWTH (No. 33, 1991).
77. Sybil Lipshultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse, 1908-1923, in AT THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 209 (Martha Fineman & Nancy
Thomadsen eds., 1991 [1989]). On the resurgence of this result-equality (as opposed to
rule-equality) model as a feminist strategy, see MARTHA A. FINEMIAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 3-52 (1991).
78. Women's rights campaigns have historically been marked by "peculiar alliances"
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attack, Justice Sutherland remarked, in one of his-typical denuncia-
tions:
Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for makiig a restriction
applicable to the wage contracts of all working women from which like
contracts of all working men are left free. Certainly a suggestion that the
bargaining ability of the average woman is not equal to that of the aver-
age man would lack substance. The ability to make a fair bargain, as eve-
ryone knows, does not depend upon sex.
79
Earlier he had written for the Court in striking down a minimum
wage law for women and children that:
[W]e cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, re-
quire or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract
which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men .... To do so would
be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend of
legislation, as well as that of common thought and usage, by which woman
is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be given
special consideration or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual
and civil relationships.
s0
Contrary to MacKinnon's claim that no one deemed universal
protection demeaning-which is most clearly refuted by the opposi-
tion to social security old-age pensions-reactionaries like
Sutherland could plausibly regard protective legislation for workers
in general as a form of impermissible class legislation only in the
same way in which abstract advocacy of freedom of contract con-
structs protective legislation for women workers as sex discrimi-
nation because it interferes with women's "equal right to
Starve."81 MacKinnon therefore exposes herself to Frances Olsen's
in the United States. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, for example, southern racists and
anti-labor conservative Republicans supported the ERA and the inclusion of sex
discrimination in Title VII. CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON AccouNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF
WOMEN's ISSUEs, 1945-1968, at 9-38, 176-81 (1989 [1988]).
79. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 413 (1937).
80. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923). Yet the next year
Sutherland upheld a New York law prohibiting the night-time employment of women in
restaurants on the ground that "there would seem to be good reason for... thinking" that
women's "more delicate organism" would cause them to suffer the harmful consequences
of the "loss of a restful night's sleep" more than men. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292,
294 (1924). For an effort to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent positions, see
Lipshultz, supra note 77, at 219-25. See generally Joan Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of
Equality: The Women's Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 1905-1923, J. Aiv. HIST. 188 (1991).
81. Lipshultz, supra note 77, at 224. See generally Hal Draper & Anne Lipow,
Marxist Women and Bourgeois Feminism, in THE SOCIALIST REG. 1976, at 179, 185 (Ralph
Miliband & John Saville eds., 1976). The argument in the text presupposes that the
special legislation for women in fact addresses a special female need; as an example, the
Japanese Labor Standards Law provides for menstruation leave for women. Roodoo
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critique of disembodied antipaternalists, whose, pretense of "an
equality between people that does not actually eist... may facili-
tate continuation of actual inequality-for example, .by'encouraging
an unrealistic faith in freedom of contract." 2 MacKinnon's position,
which is homologous to contemporary arguments against a manda-
tory minimum wage or special protection for migrant farm work-
ers,83 overlaps with that of nineteenth-century free-marketeers who
"regard[ed] the liberty to compete for employment upon unfavorable
terms as a valuable right,"' state interference with which they
deemed emasculatory---an insulting attempt to put the laborer
under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his man-
hood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States." 5
At precisely the same time that courts in the United States
were launching this anti-paternalistic attack, Engels articulated
this socialist position on protective legislation for female workers:
That the working woman needs special protection against capitalist ex-
ploitation as a consequence of her special physiological functions, seems
clear to me. The English female champions of the formal right of women
to be as thoroughly exploited by the capitalists as men are also largely di-
rectly or indirectly interested in the capitalist exploitation of both sexes. I
concede that I am interested in the health of the coming generation more
than the absolute formal equal entitlement of the sexes during the last
years of life of the capitalist mode of production. A real equal entitlement
of man and woman can according to my conviction come true only when
the [on the basis of male domination developed capitalist] exploitation of
both by capital is eliminated and private housework is transformed into a
public industry.
5 6
jooken hoo, Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 67. Feminist opponents of special protective
legislation before the New Deal did in fact approve of the freedom of contract reasoning.
SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925, at
72-75 (1987).
82. Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on
Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1522 (1986). See also
Raymond Munts & David C. Rice, Women Workers: Protection or Equality?, 24 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 3, 11-12 (1970).
83. See generally MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND MINIMUM WAGES:
REGULATING THE EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 65-123
(1992).
84. ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 124 (2d. ed. 1965 [1917]).
See also SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAmE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF
CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865-1901, at 159-62 (1969 (1956]).
85. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886). For further examples ofjudicial
resistance to a "system of state paternalism" treating workers as wards of the govern-
ment despite the fact that "[i]t is our boast that no class distinctions exist in this country,"
see State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 353 (Mo. 1893); Kansas v. Haun, 59 P. 340, 345,346 (Kam
1893).
86. The passage reads in the original:
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This issue has once again become the focus of intense debate in
connection with employers' so-called fetal vulnerability policies
resulting in the quasi-blanket exclusion of women from certain jobs
exposing workers to hazardous substances. The U.S. Supreme Court
recently ruled that neither employers nor the courts but only the
woman herself has the right to make "[diecisions about the welfare
of future children" or to "decide whether a woman's reproductive role
is more important to her and her family than her economic role." 7 If
scientific evidence proved that exposure of women to airborne lead
concentrations does harm fetuses, Engels might have disagreed with
this opinion to the extent that it appears to privilege women's
autonomy absolutely.88 Instead, he might well have agreed that
although conferring on capitalist employers the sole right to make
these kinds of decisions would have been even worse, the Supreme
Court's opinion "revealed... the impoverishment of the language of
individual rights and the inadequacy of liberal feminism to insure
the health and security of both women and men."8 9 Both he and
Marx did advocate enforcement by the state of compulsory labor
standards against the shortsightedness and ignorance of individual
workers of both sexes-provided that the excluded workers were not
required to bear the costs one-sidedly."5
DaB die arbeitende Frau infolge ihrer besondern physiologischen Funktionen
besondern Schutz gegen kapitalistische Ausbeutung bedarf, scheint mir klar.
Die englischen Vorkimpferinnen des formellen Rechts der Frauen, sich ebenso
grfindlich von den Kapitalisten ausbeuten zu lassen wie die Mdnner, sind auch
groBenteils direkt oder indirekt bei der kapitalistischen Ausbeutung beider
Geschlechter interessiert. Mich, ich gestehe es, interessiert die Gesundheit der
kommenden Generation mehr als die absolute formelle Gleichberechtigung der
Geschlechter wdhrend der letzten Lebensjahre der kapitalistischen
Produktionsweise. Eine wirkliche Gleichberechtigung von Frau und Mann kann
nach meiner Vberzeugung erst eine Wahrheit werden, wenn die [auf Basis der
Mannerherrschaft entwickelte Kapitall Ausbeutung beider durch das Kapital
beseitigt und die private Hausarbeit in eine iffentliche Industrie verwandelt ist.
Draft of letter from Friedrich Engels to Gertrud Guillaume-Schack (ca. July 5, 1885), in
36 MEW 341 (1967) (phrase in square brackets crossed out in draft).
87. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 1210 (1991).
88. The logic of this anarcho-liberal position also characterizes the argument that a
woman's right to submit to exposing herself (and her fetus) to dangerous substances at
her place of employment is justified because autonomy-enhancement also drives the deci-
sion to allow women to smoke and drink during pregnancy. Mary E. Becker, From Muller
v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1242 (1986).
89. Ruth Rosen, What Feminist Victory in the Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at
A17 (nat. ed.). For undocumented assertion to the contrary, see SALLY KENNEY, FOR
WHOSE PROTEcTION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 332 (1992) ("Because feminists did not seek equal rights for
men and women to poison their offspring, but sought equal access to a workplace free
from hazards... ").
90. See Karl Marx, Instruktionen, supra note 72, at 194; Becker, supra note 88, at
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II. MARX ON MARRIAGE AND MORALS
A. The Immature Marx on Monogamy
After disposing of Marx as an economic analyst, MacKinnon
remarks that although Marx saw a "progressive potential" in the
spread of female wage labor, the mixing of the sexes at the work-
place under capitalism was for him "'a pestiferous source of corrup-
tion and slavery."'' Immediately after this quotation from Capital
MacKinnon states that:
Sex in marriage was another thing, however: 'the sanctification of the
sexual instinct through exclusivity, the checking of instinct by laws, the
moral beauty which makes nature's commandment idea in the form of an
emotional bond-[this is] the spiritual essence of marriage.'
92
When and where did Marx make this claim? Uninterested in
context, MacKinnon does not say. In providing a source, she mis-
spells two of the three words of the title: "Chapitre de [sic] marriage
[sic]." What is this racy-sounding French-language tract?
MacKinnon offers no precise source because she does even not pur-
port to have read it; instead, she quotes the passage (inaccurately)
from a book reprint of a journal article by Juliet Mitchell. 3 Mitchell
in turn had cited a French edition of some of Marx's works without
any further details as to when it was written or where it had ap-
peared or what it was. 4
So what was this Chapter on Marriage? The introduction to
that French edition, which appeared in 1946, shed some light on the
question. The Chapitre du marage, it turns out, was part of an
article, Manifeste philosophique de l'6cole de droit historique, which
Marx had written in German in 1842 for publication in a newspaper;
this particular part was deleted by the censors; the manuscript in-
cluding the unpublished segment was discovered by a professor J.
1268. In his appellate dissent, Richard Posner overlooked these aspects in assuming that
an employer operates a factory in a "civilized, humane, prudent, ethical" manner where it
exposes workers to levels of airborne lead injurious to workers in nonreproductive ways.
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 906 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 1196
(1991).
91. MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 18-19 (quoting 1 MARX, CAPrrAL at 489-90, 377).
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 257 n. 19: ("Karl Marx, 'Chapitre de marriage,' quoted in Juliet Mitchell,
'omen: The Longest revolution,' in From Feminism to Liberation, ed. Edith Hishino
Altbach (London: Schenkman, 1971) p. 107 n.9"). In fact the quote is not in a footnote but
at 107. Mitchell's translation does not use the word "idea" but "ideal." The quote first
appeared in Mitchelrs article in NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 40, Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 11, 22.
94. 1 KARL MARX, OEUVRES COMPtS, ED. MOLITOR OEUVRES PHILOSOPHIQUES 25.
Juliet Mitchell, supra note 94. Although Mitchell does not state the year of this
publication, she too appears to have cited the wrong page.
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Hansen. The reason that Mitchell referred to it as Chapitre was
presumably that it appeared only in the introduction of the French
translation although its proper placement in the article was indi-
cated.9 The French translation of the passage that Mitchell (and
after her MacKinnon) quoted ran as follows:
la sanctification de l'instinct sexuel par l'exclusivit6, le refrbnement de
l'instinct par les lois, la beaut6 morale qui iddalise le commandement de la
nature en motif de liaison spirituelle-l'essence spirituelle du ma-
96riage .... s
Although the French edition did not explain what the Chapitre
du mariage was a chapter from, it did offer a German source for the
text and background material. Chapitre (that is, Kapitel von der
Ehe) was not published until 1927 when it appeared in the first
volume of the first projected critical-historical complete edition of
the works of Marx and Engels.97 The editor, Ryazanov, noted that
Professor Joseph Hansen had succeeded in the 1920s in locating the
original manuscript in Cologne including the section deleted by the
censors, which he had made available to Ryazanov. 98 In fact,
Ryazanov never saw the manuscript because the "owner" of the
manuscript did not permit Hansen, who was the director of the
Historical Archive of Cologne, to make a copy of it; instead, Hansen
prepared a copy by hand. Because the manuscript has never sur-
faced,99 no one other than Hansen has ever been able to vouch for
the authenticity, let alone the existence, of the Chapter.
Assuming arguendo that Marx was in fact the author of the
Chapter on Marriage in the article that he later treated as an or-
phan,' 0 what was it a chapter of? It turns out that "Chapter" re-
ferred not to a chapter of a book by Marx, but to one in someone
else's book.' ' That other author was Gustav Hugo. How it came to
95. 1 KARL MARX, OEuVRES PHILOSOPHIQUES x-xi (J. Molitor trans., 1946) (intro-
duction written by Bracke (A.M. Desrousseaux)). As a result of a typographical error, the
year of publication of Marx's article is given as "1942."
96. Id. at xi.
97. 1:1 pt. 1 KARL MARX [&] FRIEDRICH ENGELS, HISTORIScH-KRiTISCHE GESAMTAUS-
GABE 255-57 (David Ryazanov ed., 1927). [hereinafter MEHG]
98. Id. at xlix. It is unclear how the editors of Marx's works know that the censors
rather than Marx deleted these passages; the deletion was not visible in the newspaper.
RHEINIscHE ZEITUNG, No. 221, Aug. 9, 1842, Supp., at 1, col. 2. In an otherwise thorough
account, A. McGovern, Karl Marx's First Political Writings: The Rheinische Zeitung 1842-
1843, in DEMYTHOLOGIZING MARXISM 19, 30 (Frederick Adelman ed., 1969), is unaware
that the section on divorce was deleted before publication.
99. 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) 1017 (1975) (apparatus volume).
100. See infra § II.E.
101. In fact, not even in that book were the sections on marriage grouped as a
"chapter."
[Vol. 41
19931 MACKINNON ON MARX
pass that Marx began his journalistic career'0 2 with a biting com-
mentary on a turn-of-the-century university law textbook has not
been adequately appreciated in the literature on German law or
Marx.
B. Gustav Hugo=--The First Legal Trasher?
Hugo, whom his most illustrious student, the young Heinrich
Heine, praised for being so boring that his two-hour lectures im-
proved the poet-law student's health by scaring off all mental exer-
tion, 0 3 was a professor of law at Gtttingen for more than a half-
century-from the time of the French Revolution until his death in
1844.104 Hugo has recently been called "the single most important
Romanist lawyer of the decade [the 1790s], and one of the most im-
portant lawyers in Germany for decades after."' Another historian
of ideas has hailed "Hugo's... pioneering efforts [for having] estab-
lished the direction of nineteenth-century German legal thought. 0 6
Despite such influence, however, Hugo's major work on jurispru-
dence, his Textbook on Natural Law, which Marx attacked in 1842,
was, according to a conservative contemporary, not adopted at other
universities because-and here Hugo may have been a precursor of
102. Even a hostile biographer attested that "lilt is one of Marx's minor titles to fame
that he was the first noteworthy German journalist." EDWARD CARR, KARL MARx: A
STUDY IN FANATICISM 118 (1938 [1934]). Ironically, even a Stalinist hagiography failed to
accord Marx this honor. KARL BrIrEL, MARX AS JOURNALIST (1953).
103. "[M]it H. Heines Gesundheit bessert es sich erstaunlich! Und dies verdanke ich
dem ledernen, schweinsledernen, doppelschweinsledernen Ritter Hugo, der von meinen
[sic] Kopfe tiglich 2 Stunden alle Geistesanstrengungen verscheucht." Letter from
Heinrich Heine to Rudolf Christiani (Feb. 29, 1824), in 20 HEINRICH HEINE,
SAKuLARAusGABE: BRIEFE 1815-1831 146 (1970). The next year, after Hugo, as dean of
the law faculty, in conferring a degree on Heine had compared his poetry to Goethe's,
Heine defended him against the contemptuous remarks of the Hegelian Eduard Gans
(under whom Marx later studied the Prussian General Code), calling "Hugo... one of the
greatest men of our century." Letter from Heine to Moses Moser (July 22, 1825), in id. at
206. See Franz Finke, Gustav Hugos Laudatio auf Heine, 7 HEINE-JAHRBUCH 12 (1968).
Heine immortalized Hugo by making an oblique humorous reference to him in the
Harzreise; 6 HEINRICH HEINE, HISTORISCH-KRITISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE 88 (M. Windfuhr
ed., 1973 [1824]).
104. For biographical accounts, see 0. Mejer, Gustav Hugo, der Begrainder der
historischen Juristenschule: Eine Gdttinger Erinnerung, 49 PREUBISCHE JAHRBOCHER 457
(1879); 0. Meyer, 13 ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE BIOGRAPHIE 321 (1881). In addition to the
literature cited below, see Arno Buschmann, Ursprung und Grundlagen der geschichtli-
chen Wissenschaft: Untersuchungen und Interpetationen zur Rechtslehre Gustav Hugos
(diss. U. Miinster 1963). Marx's father-in-law studied under Hugo in the 1790s. MONZ,
supra note 21, at 323.
105. JAMES WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROtAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA:
HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE 87 (1990).
106. PETER REILL, THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE RISE OF HISTORICISM 188
(1975).
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Critical Legal Studies-it did not lend itself to teaching young peo-
ple, who were driven "crazy" by Hugo's critique of all possible indi-
vidual legal propositions.0 7
Hugo himself anticipated that his contemporaries would find it
difficult to pigeon-hole him politically. In a notice of the first edition
of his Textbook on Natural Law in 1798, he speculated on the confu-
sion that would befall reviewers: 'Is the author supposed to be an
aristocrat?... Does one wish to make him into a democrat, a
Jacobiner, a true ultrar6volutionnaire?" 1°0 And at the very end of his
long career he was still boasting that before St. Simon and the com-
munists he had in all the editions of that Textbook written most
about the abolition of private property.0 9
Posterity lived up to his expectations. One of his conservative
contemporaries charged that from Hugo's analysis "one would al-
most regard bourgeois society as a conspiracy of the rich for the op-
pression of the poor." 10 Later generations of scholars have also not
known quite what to make of Hugo. Wilhelm Roscher, for example,
the founder of the German historical school of economy, who at-
tested that Hugo's ingenious paradoxes had sparked reexamination
of dogmas that had hardened into economic axioms, conceded that it
was not always easy to tell where seriousness ended and irony be-
gan."' For the better part of two centuries legal historians have puz-
zled over how "the co-founder of the great bourgeois legal science of
the 19th century" could simultaneously subscribe to what they vari-
ously describe as "socialist," "communist," and "ultracommunist"
views." The author of a Nazi-era monograph on Hugo was still as-
tounded that Hugo's Textbook on Natural Law at times read like "a
work of agitation from the stormiest period of grave social strug-
gles.""' The most balanced presentations, more as reflections of the
107. AUGUST REHBERG, POLITISCH-HISTORISCHE KLEINE SCHRIFIEN, in 4 SAharmcHE
SCHRIFTEN 106 (1829). On Rehberg's view of Hugo, see KLAUS EPSTEIN, THE GENESIS OF
GEimAN CONSERVATISM 579-82 (1975 [19661).
108. 1 [GUSTAV] HuGo, BEYrRGE ZUR CIVILSTISCHEN BOCHERKENNTNID: 1788...
1807, at 368 (1828).
109.3 [GUSTAV] HUGO, BEYTRAGE ZUR KENNTNI3 CIVILISTISCHER BOCHER SEIT 1788:
LETZTER BEYTRAG 8-9 (1844).
110. REHBERG, POLuTIScE-HISTORIsCH KLEINE SCHRIFTEN, supra note 107, at 115.
111. WILHELM ROScHER, GESCHICHTE DER NATIONAL OEKONOMIIK IN DEUTSCHLAND
913 (1874). Marx's contempt for Roscher was boundless; see, e.g., KARL MARX, ZUR KRITIK
DER POLMSICHEN OKONOMIE (MANUSKRnPT 1861-1863), in 2:3, pt. 4, MARX [&] ENGELS
GESAMITAUSGABE (MEGA) 1500 (1979).
112. Theodor Viehweg, Einige Bemerkungen zu Gustau Hugos Rechtsphilosophie, in
FESTSCHRIFr FOR KARL ENGISCH ZU1 70. GEBURTSTAG 80, 88 (1969); 3:2 ERNST
LANDSBERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 23 (1910); FRITZ VON
HIPPEL, GUSTAV HUGOS JURISTISCHER ARBEITSPLAN: EiN BEITRAG ZUR WIEDERGEWIN-
NUNG JURISTISCHER ARBEITsEunHET 42 (1931).
113. HEINRICH WEBER, GUSTAV HUGO: Vom NATURRECHT ZUR HISTORISCHEN SCHULE:
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state of scholarly bewilderment than as explanations, speculate that
rather than having been inspired by socialism, Hugo was in the
aporetical philosophical tradition, which found the world puzzling,"'
or a "cosmopolitan, skeptical, independent spirit.""5
The relationship between Hugo and the Historical School of
Law has also been in dispute for the better part of two centuries.
This issue is of particular importance here because Marx specifically
characterized Hugo's Textbook of Natural Law as the source, phi-
losophy, and Old Testament, and Hugo himself as the forebear and
creator of the Historical School of Law."6 Yet Friedrich Stahl, the
anti-rationalist and anti-natural law creator of a conservative
Christian state theory, whom Marx considered both the official
Prussian state philosopher in 1842 and in the tradition of Hugo," 7
expressly disavowed Hugo as part of the Historical School on the
ground that his Textbook on Natural Law lacked any understanding
of the role of the ethical (sittlich) individuality and purpose of the
V6lker or of the continuity and tradition of legal development."
8
Later scholars, too, have been much more skeptical of the lineage
postulated by Marx." 9 Thus, for example, Ernst Landsberg, the
author of a standard many-volumed history of German legal
thought, took the position that Hugo had founded modem legal
science as a historical-empirical discipline by destroying the old
natural law doctrine, but had not been the founder of the Historical
School in the narrow sense. The latter intellectual movement, which
came to the fore in the wake of the French Revolution and
EIN BEITRAG ZURG ESCHICHTE DER DEUTsCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 34 n.1 (1935).
114. F. EICHENGRON, DIE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE GUSTAV HUGOS: EIN GEISTESGE-
SCHICHTLICHER BEITRAG ZUM PROBLEM VON NATURRECHT uND REcHTsPosrrIsmUs 101
(1935).
115. GIULIANO MARINI, L'OPERA DI GUSTAV HUGO NELLA CRISI DEL GIUSNATURALISMO
TEDESCO 148 (1969).
116. Karl Marx, Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtsschule, in 1:1
MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) 191, 192 (1846).
117. Denkschrift betreffend die Unterdrikckung der "Rheinischen Zeitung," in 1:1
MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), at 392, 401 (1843) (Marx was probably
author); Marx, supra note 116, at 198. On Stahl, see HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND
REVOLUTION: HEGELAND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY 362-74 (1966 [1941]).
118. FRIEDRICH STAHL, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS: GESCHICHTE DER RECISPHILO-
SOPHIE 585 (3d ed. 1854 [1829]).
119. Savigny's polite praise for Hugo at the time of the celebration of the fiftieth
anniversary of Hugo's doctorate does not weigh heavily. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,
Der zehente Mai 1788, in VERPfISCHTE SCHRIFTEN 195, 197-98 (1850 [1838]). For more
modern statements of Hugo's achievement, see Taranowsky, Leibniz und die sogenannte
duflere Rechtsgeschichte, 72 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTE
(GEIMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG) 190, 207 (1906); JAN SCHRODER, WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE
UND LEHRE DER "PRAKTISCHEN JURISPRUDENZ" AUF DEUTSCHEN UNIVERSITATEN AN DER
WENDE ZUM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 158-59 (1979).
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i [apoleonic turbulence, sought to transfix the past: These romantic-
rationalist essential components of the organic growth of a
X blksgeist were, however, alien to Hugo, whose explanatory histori-
c al framework recognized exclusively individual tangible factors. 2 '
For all its devotion to historical sources, the Historical School of
Iaw drew a rigid line between historical evolution and conscious
development; the kinds of cultural institutions in which the tradi-
tions of community life were passed down made the enactment of
legislation superfluous. The School's traditionalism shared with
Enlightenment rationalism "the fiction of the existeice of a natural
ran whose fixed original nature provided the standard for what was
reasonable or unreasonable, possible or impossible in social institu-
t ions." But in contrast to the rationalists' belief that "man's original
rLature could express itself consistently, and be ruled by reason,
Hugo believed that man's original nature was such that no rational
crganisation of social life was possible upon it as a basis." Hugo's
Extreme and reactionary historicism was only the obverse of the
ppeal to and insistence on the absolute validity of abstract ethical
Heals outside of a specific socio-economic context.
121
In Hugo's so-called natural law, which abandoned the evalu-
ation of the substantive justice of law in favor of the determination
cf its mere positive existence, the swing from the extreme of juridical
1ogicism to that of juridical empiricism took firm root. 22
Consequently, Hugo's critique of rationalist supra-positive natural
law and his alternative positivist model of an empty and empirically
infinitely expansible form of law to be filled with contents by means
of a historically oriented juristic anthropology'2 left the practical
120.3:2 LANDSBERG, supra note 112, at 40-47, 207-212. For similar opinions, see
Landsberg, Zur ewigen Wiederkehr des Naturrechts, 18 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND
WIRTScHArSPHILosoPHE 365, 367 (1924/25); Heinrich Singer, Zur Erinnerung an
Gustav Hugo, 16 GRONHUTS ZEITscHRIFr FOR DAS PRIVAT- UND OFFENTLICHE RECHT 273,
282 (1889); Gunnar Rexius, Studien zur Staatslehre der historischen Schule, 107
HISTORISCHE ZEITsCHRIFr 496, 505-09 (1911). In developing a sociological framework for
understanding ideological generations, Mannheim speculated that Hugo may have
avoided the irrationalist turn of the Historical School he founded because, unlike Savigny
and his generation, Hugo did not experience the German war of liberation is his youth.
IARL MANNHEhI, Das Problem der Generationen, in WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE (1964 [1928]).
WHITMAN, supra note 105, at 91, can interpret Hugo as a romantic by using the term in
the sense of non-practice-oriented. In this sense, the positions of Savigny and Hugo would
be reversed. See f., Das Wollen der historischen Schule und ihr Vollbringen, HALLISCHE
JAHRBfcHER FOR DEUTSCHE WISSEN SCHAFr UND KUNST, No. 203, at col. 1617, 1620 (Aug.
24, 1838); HEINZ WAGNER, DIE POLITISCHE PANDEKTISTIK 122-26 (1985).
121. SIDNEY HOOK, FROM HEGEL TO MARX: STUDIES IN THE INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT OF KARL MARX 137, 142 (1936).
122. CHRISTOPH SCHEFOLD, DIE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE DES JUNGEN MARX 16 (1970).
123. See JUrgen Blihdorn, Naturrechtskritik und "Philosophie des positiven Rechts"
zur Begriindung der Jurisprudenz als positiver Fachwissenschaft durch Gustav Hugo, 41
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judgment of law in a precarious position. Thus Hugo emphasized
that his objections to legal relations that until then had been almost
universally accepted were merely designed to demonstrate that they
could all be quibbled over-that is, there was not a single one that
was not contrary to someone's freedom or founded on chance or
strength. By the same token, however, such reasoning did not mean
that "one could not live in them with a good conscience." " Precisely
because legal truths were not "a priori, pure, universal, necessary, or
given in (sound) reason," but merely "a posteriori, empirical, differ-
ent according to time and place, contingent, to be learned from one's
own and others' experience of facts, historical," they were supported
only by the individual's duty of conscience to enter into a juridical
state of affairs (rechtlicher Zustand) "if others want it and to submit
to it no matter.., how very much it might deviate from that which
would be in complete conformity with the highest demands of rea-
son... ."' Hugo succinctly captured the contrast between the outgo-
ing rationalist natural law thinking and the positivist legal revolu-
tion 1 6 that he was propelling: "Whereas all philosophizing rests on
inquiry, on thinking for oneself, on independence from others' pre-
scriptions, the whole legal field [alles Juristische] is a matter of
learning, of submitting to that which just happens to be." 27
Against the background of this program of quietistic confor-
mity, even anti-Marxist legal scholars were constrained to agree
with Marx's assessment that, for all his pour 6pater le bourgeois
provocations, inevitably Hugo "the revolutionary made peace with
the rulers of this earth" because the effort to vindicate meta-
norms-and the concomitant refusal to accept any and every
prevailing social order-would have engendered anarchy.2 1 Indeed,
Hugo, in a passage in the preface to his Textbook that Marx did not
cite, programmatically confirmed Marx's interpretation by lecturing
his critics who had reproached him alternatively for objecting to
TLJDSCHRIFTVOOR RECHTSGESCHIDENIS 3, 8, 15-17 (1973); Viehweg, supra note 112, at 86-
87; Ernst Landsberg, Kant und Hugo: Philosophisches und Civilistisches von 1800 und
1900, 28 GRONHIuTS ZEITsCHRIFT FOR DAS PRIvAT- UND OFFENTLICHE RECHT 670, 673
(1901).
124. HUGO, supra note 108, at 376.
125. 1 [GUSTAV] HUGO, LEHRBUCH EINES CIVILISTISCHEN CURSUS: LEHRBUCH DER
JURISTISCHEN ENCYCLOPADIE 19-20 (8th ed. 1835).
126. Austin, who studied in Bonn in the 1820s, read and is said to have been influ-
enced by him. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 98-99 (1967 [1923]);
WLLAM L. MolusoN, JOHN AUSTI 20, 61-62 (1982). :
127.2 [GUSTAV] HUGO, LEHRBUCH EINES CiVILISTISCHEN CuRSus: LEHRBUCH DES
NATURRECHTS, ALS EINER PHILOSOPHIE DES POSITIVEN RECHTS 1 {4th ed. 1819 [1798]).
128. WEBER, supra note 113 at 36; Rexius, supra note 120, at 507-09; VON HIPPEL,
supra note 112, at 45-46. These authors agreed with Marx objectively regardless of
whether they had read his attack on Hugo (as, for example, von Hippel had).
1993] 475
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
everything in positive law and defending everything: could they not
see that "precisely the former is the means and condition of the lat-
ter"?1
29
By the same token, however, Hugo's skepticism vis-h-vis vari-
ous social institutions had a critical side to it that invites interpreta-
tion as an approach not neatly captured by Marx's derision as mere
profanation of everything that is sacred to sittlich people and a
glorification of and resignation before the irrational for the purpose
of consolidating its positivity.1" 0 Thus Marx completely neglected the
attention that Hugo devoted to the system of private property-
which according to Hugo was "not necessary"13--and its structural
consequences for the poverty of the masses. The exclusive use and
control that private laws conferred often caused many individuals
and society as a whole to suffer, especially where the thing pos-
sessed was of greater importance to them than to the person who
happened to own it and who was more concerned about the prece-
dent that violation of this particular right might establish for other
rights. Hugo emphasized the poverty, hunger, and poor health that
poor people suffered in part because of the "disgusting" work-such
as child labor at machines and cleaning chimneys-that they had to
perform to survive.'3 2 Nor did the political sphere permit the poor to
overcome their economic disadvantages: the best constitution was of
no help, the rich could turn the administration of justice into yet
another means of oppression, while the crimes of the poor were pun-
ished more severely than those of the rich.13 Hugo asked rhetorical
questions that classical political economy was not yet ready to pose
such as: What good was freedom to a poor person whom no one was
willing to employ? To some extent orthodox economics is still unwill-
ing to draw the conclusions that Hugo drew two centuries ago with
regard to the disadvantageous labor market conditions of those
whose poverty requires them to transact urgent business: "No con-
stitution can be good where there are many who are ready to sell
129. HUGO, supra note 127, at xiv. See also 2 [GUSTAV] HUGO, BEYTRAGE ZUR
CIVIMSTICtEN BUCHERKENNTNIB: 1808 ... 1827, at 653 (1829). (legal philosopher must
contest everything in order to justify everything). In this sense, the claim that Marx
"largely misunderstood or caricatured the conservatism of the Romanist lawyers" is
incorrect. WHITMAN, supra note 105, at xii.
130. Marx, supra note 116, at 192.
131. HUGO, supra note 127, at 134.
132. Id. at 116-17, 120-21. Hugo also attended to the cultural consequences of pov-
erty: "Poverty is the strictest ban on books." Id. at 123. Reporting on the lament that im-
morality in the lower classes was fueled by boys' and girls' sharing the same bed, he
commented caustically that prohibiting it was doubtless easier than giving the poor more
beds. Id. at 125 n.3.
133. Id. at 126.
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themselves and others who can make use of it."1M
Hugo's juristic anthropology proceeded from the assumption
that animality was the foundation of reason inasmuch as the latter
could not prescribe anything that was incompatible with the former;
moreover, animality was universal whereas some people lacked rea-
son. 13 As applied to the sexual instinct (Geschlechtstrieb), animality
rested in part on a need that, however, neither occurred in all people
nor, if not satisfied, could easily become mortal.13 As an example,
presumably, of animality in action, Hugo adduced the following
Kant-like scenario: 'The female sex can to some extent be used for
the satisfaction of the sex drive without in the least participating in
the enjoyment. Herein too may lie a physical reason for jealousy."3 7
At this point, however, Hugo's discussion of women took an
abrupt turn away from Kant and virtually all other enlightenment-
era lawyers and philosophers and toward the irreverent inversions
of convention in which Hugo apparently delighted. Significantly,
Marx passed over in silence all of Hugo's paradoxes that either
raised serious social questions or suggested forward-looking posi-
tions at which Marx himself had not yet arrived. Instead, for polemi-
cal purposes Marx focused on the more scurrilous aspects of Hugo's
skepticism such as his defense of slavery as provisional law. Hugo
began his discussion of marriage by asserting that marriage was
much less essential and in accordance with reason than philoso-
phers believed.' The fact that in marriage a person, especially the
woman, "was treated by the other as a means for the satisfaction of
his needs" showed that it was "not always unsittlich to treat the
body of another person as a means to an end, as... Kant himself
misunderstood the term." What was unreasonable about marriage
was that "the satisfaction of the sexual instinct is legally permitted
even where it is contrary to the perfection of the spouses, or of the
children expected therefrom, or of the whole because too many chil-
dren are produced, who now become a burden to the whole, and
either themselves must perish, or however cause others to perish."3 9
To the extent that a marriage license was also a license to procreate
without regard to the ensuing social costs (or, in some cases, even to
134. Id. at 130, 133. A leading labor economist has asserted that because "[i]ncreas-
ingly, people are being paid for the disutility of their work," professors will be paid less
and the supply of farm workers will dry up. CLARK KERR, The Prospect for Wage and
Hours in 1975, in LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SOcIETY 203, 219 (1964
[1958]).
135. HUGO, supra note 127, at 52.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at 71 n.2. On Kant's view of women, see infra § II.D.
138. HUGO, supra note 127, at 276.
139. Id. at 279.
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the private costs to the persons involved), Hugo did point to an irra-
tionality inherent in a social system-but especially in an absolutist
state-in which the link between private copulation and public
population was subject to no overall planning designed to adjust the
needs of the former to the latter.
What appeared even "more dubious" to Hugo was the ban on
sex outside of marriage. In a phrase that piqued Marx, Hugo argued
that such a limitation was contrary to reason because it presupposed
omniscience especially when one obligated oneself to satisfy one of
the most impetuous instincts of nature only with one -certain person
and only when that person also feels it or at least "is accommodating
enough to lend himself or herself to it... ."14' Even worse was the
compulsion not to abstain from sex embodied in § 694 of the mar-
riage provisions of the Prussian General Code, which made
"obstinate and continual refusal of the marital duty" a ground for
divorce. For Hugo this was "the most wrongheaded application of
compulsion" because "if it is to be more than gross animal enjoy-
ment," sex-as Friedrich Engels later agreed"--depended on one's
physical condition and "the affection of the heart"; yet who could
promise both ahead of time and judge them in another? Prosaically
anticipating Bertolt Brecht's poetic complaint, 42 Hugo asked: "Is
there anything more outrageous than when husband and wife liti-
gate against each other over the frequency of intercourse?""" In
addition to having identified an absurdity in the Code, Hugo pro-
posed an alternative set of arrangements. One was "completely free
love, in which the sex drive would thus be left completely to the
conscience of each, like friendship and every other intimacy ...."
The other involved the creation of public institutions subject to
public law for the satisfaction of this drive and especially for pro-
creation.' Ironically, elements of these proposals-such as treating
childless marriages as friendships outside the scope of legal regula-
tion or socialization of the costs of reproducing the next generation-
later became acceptable to Marx the socialist.'45 Yet in 1842 Marx
chose not even to mention them.
Two further points regarding women's- status within marriage
raise the possibility that Hugo may not have been the fanatic reac-
140. Id. at 280. Hugo used the gender-neutral German term "person."
141. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, DER URSPRUNG DER FAMILIE, DES PRIVATEIGENTHUMS UND
DES STAATS, in 21 MEW 25, 83 (1962 [1884]).
142. BERTOLT BRECHT, Uber Kants Definition der Ehe in der Metaphysik der Sitten,
in 9 GESAMWELTE WERKE 609 (1968).
143. HUGO, supra note 127, at 283-84.
144. Id. at 284-85.
145. See Thilo Ramm, Die kiinftige Gesellschaftsordnung nach der Theorie von Marx
und Engels, in 2 MARXISMUSSTUDIEN 77, 98 (1957).
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tionary painted by Marx. Unlike the German idealist philoso-
phers, 46 Hugo rejected the notion that reason itself prescribed hus-
bands' domination over their wives; whether that regime or spousal
equality was more reasonable was largely a function of that to which
a people had become accustomed.' Although Hugo confused the
issue in principle by framing custom as the basis of reason, in this
particular case he injected some realism into the discussion by im-
plying that beneath lofty philosophical notions of reason often
lurked a mere codification of that which happened to be the prevail-
ing custom. Hugo also stepped out of the role of skeptic into that of
critic by characterizing as "disgusting" the judicial practice of mak-
ing a wife's trip the ground for legal separation: "if our... customs
were not better than our law, marriage, on which our entire social
state is supposed to be built, would be a very rotten pillar."
1 48
As his work came to be surpassed by the founders of the
Romantic current of the Historical School of Law, in particular by
Savigny, 1 Hugo's writings degenerated into a pathetic and almost
clownish solipsistic self-apologia. His review, for example, of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right was superficial (literally: devoting a paragraph
to the book's two title pages) and polemical, containing no analysis
of Hegel's theory; a third of it was devoted to Hegel's passing men-
tion of Hugo in an introductory section.50 There Hegel had empha-
sized that historical explanation and justification of a legal rule
(Rechtsbestimmung) should not be conflated with the meaning of
valid justification per se. From this distinction between genesis and
validity it followed for Hegel that such rules could be shown to de-
rive in a perfectly well founded and consistent manner from existing
legal institutions and yet be non-lawful (unrechtlich) and unreason-
able.' 5 ' Hegel promptly responded to Hugo's review by asking the
reader to judge the unworthiness of Hugo's "gossip-twaddle."52
146. See infra § II.D.
147. HUGO, supra note 127, at 289-90.
148. Id. at 333 n.4.
149. FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZErr 378, 381 (2d ed.
1967).
150. 1821 GOTINGISCmE GELEHRTE ANZEIGEN 601. Hugo was, however, not totally
without humor in seeking some connection between the book's dual title pages and
Hegel's dialectic. According to JOHANNES MERKEL, GUSTAV HUGO 18 (1900), Hugo
admitted that he had not even made the effort to acquaint himself with Hegel's natural
law theories.
151. GEORG WILHELI FRIEDRICH HEGEL, GRUNDLIN]EN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES
RECTS § 3, at 22-28 (1967). Hegel's marginal notes to this section in his own copy of the
book scorned Hugo's anti-theoretical approach. Id. at 305-06. Although Hegel had in mind
Hugo's textbook on the history of Roman law, Hugo's positivistic evaluation of contempo-
rary institutions also formed the focus of Marx's critique.
152. 7 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, WERKE 521-22 (1969) ("Klatschgewisch-
1993] 479
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Unable to refrain from rising to the occasion, eight years later Hugo
reprinted his review, this time adding a weighty paragraph devoted
to unmasking Hegel's userof "D." before his name on the title page as
an illicit transmogrification of his master's degree into a doctorate.'"3
The two towering figures in German Marxist philosophy have
interpreted Hugo's contribution to jurisprudence quite differently.
For Georg Lukdcs the bourgeoisie in its revolutionary period took as
its point of departure that the formal equality and universality of
law, its rationality, was also able to give content to the law. The
bourgeoisie refused to recognize the basis for the validity of a legal
relationship in its mere facticity. This thought was so pervasive that
even the conservative opponents of the revolutionary bourgeoisie
were constrained to develop an alternative natural law doctrine.
After the partial victory of the bourgeoisie, a critical-historical ver-
sion of natural law permeated both camps according to which the
content of law was purely factual and could not be comprehended by
formal legal categories. Of the demands of natural law, only the
notion of a gapless structure of the formal legal system remained.
"Thus the primitive, cynical-skeptical struggle against natural law
that the 'Kantian' Hugo began at the end of the 18th century re-
ceives a 'scientific' form." Hugo's naive-cynical positivistic frankness
expressed the coming structure of law in bourgeois society: "When
'critical' jurists assign the exploration of the content of law to his-
tory, sociology, law, etc., they are in the final analysis doing nothing
else than what Hugo had already demanded: methodically abandon-
ing the capacity to be based on reason [vernunftgemdfle
Begriindbarkeit], the substantive rationality of the law."'54
Ernst Bloch, writing two generations later, took a somewhat
more conciliatory view of Hugo than did Lukdcs. Bloch agreed that
natural law was already on shaky ground once bourgeois society was
no longer convinced of its ability to generate principles that were
absolutely necessary and rationally derivable. In the wake of
Thermidor, Hugo, a "soi-disant Kantian," caused the downfall of
both the construction and the ideal of natural law. The turning away
from the a priori construction of natural law was fruitful for re-
search in legal history by casting law as subject to change and the
expression of socioeconomic and power relations. But the abandon-
ment of the ideal, associated at the outset with Hugo's "reactionary
cynicism a posteriori," was not so much an elimination of a priori
es"). See generally Hanns Ritter, Eine polemische Erklirung Hegels zur Rechtsphilo.
sophie, 5 HEGEL-STUDIEN 31 (1969).
153. HUGO, supra note 129, at 465 n.1.
154. GEORG LUKACS, GESCHICHTE UND KLASSENBEWUTSEIN: STUDIEN OBER
MRKISTISCHE DIALEKTIK 119-20 (1923).
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constructions as of the revolutionary impulse that judged existing
law from the standpoint of "reason a priori." It was replaced by
"completely empty construction," which was much less critical of
legal facts than the allegedly unworldly natural law approach had
been of legal facts under the absolutist regimes. 155
C. Divorce Law in Germany
156
Because Marx's critique of Hugo was an outgrowth of the de-
bate over the reform of Prussian divorce-law reform in 1842, it will
be impossible to make sense of it without understanding the evolu-
tion of divorce law in Germany from the end of the eighteenth to the
middle of the nineteenth century. Although the Prussian Code
(Allgemeines Landrecht fir die Preuischen Staaten [ALR]) 157 was
scarcely a non-sexist model, it did represent an advance over previ-
ous European legislation. 5 ' In particular its divorce provisions,
which went into effect in 1794, were, with the exception of the short-
lived regime of the French Revolution, 5 ' arguably the most liberal
and "women-friendly""' in the world not only at the time of enact-
ment but into the twentieth century: 6' "Almost a century earlier
155. ERNST BLOCH, NATURRECHT UND MENSCHLICHE WORDE 103, 106 (1985 [1961]).
Another way of characterizing Hugo's twofold impact is that he had a corrosive effect on
natural law while adapting Kantian formalism to historical empiricism. ANTONIO NEGRI,
AL ORIGINI DEL FORMALISMO GIURIDICO 370 (1962).
156. For an overview, see Evelyn Kuihn, Die Entwicklung und Diskussion des
Ehescheidungsrechts in Deutschland: Eine sozialhistorische und rechtssoziologische
Untersuchung (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hamburg).
157. Many of the marriage and divorce provisions of the ALR were prefigured in the
"Project des Corpus iuris Fridericiani" and edicts reaching as far back as 1749. See
EDUARD HUBRICH, DAs RECH'r DER EHEscHEiDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 179-86 (1891).
158. See SUSANNE WEBER-WILL, DIE RECHTLICHE STELLUNG DER FRAU Th PRiVAT-
RECHT DES PREUIISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN LANDRECHTS VON 1794 (1983).
159. The preamble to the French decree of 1792, a pure expression of the natural
law-contractualist-eudemonian view of marriage, referred to the importance of enabling
the French to enjoy ease of divorce resulting from individual freedom and characterized
marriage as "only a civil contract." The decree provided, inter alia, for divorce by mutual
consent and by unilateral allegation of incompatibility of tempers or character. Dgcret qui
determine les causes, le mode et les effets du divorce, Sept. 20, 1792, § I art. 2-3, 4 Duv. &
Boc. 476, 477. These provisions were abolished by the Loi sur l'abolition du divorce, May
8, 1816, 20 Duv. & Boc. 379. See generally JAMES TRAER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1980).
160. For a feminist historical appreciation of the marriage provisions of the ALR, see
UTE GERHARD, VERHALTNISSE UND VERHINDERUNGEN: FRAUENARBErr, FAMIUE UND
RECHTE DER FRAUEN IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 154-89 (1981 [1978]). The law as well as the
public discussion of law reform were paternalistic in both senses inasmuch as women
were constitutionally excluded from the debate.
161. See WOLFRAm MOLLER-FREIENFELS, EHE UND RECHT 120-34 (1962); Anders
Agell, Grounds and Procedures Reviewed, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 53, 54-55 (Lenore Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992).
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than in England and France... the Prussian woman was granted
not only a moral, but also a legal claim to the faithfulness of her
spouse."1 62 And in 1896, as the German parliament was in the proc-
ess of repealing the divorce provisions of the ALR in the new Civil
Code, August Bebel, the leader of the German Social Democrats,
praised the ALR for being "too liberal" for the majority of parliamen-
tarians even after a hundred years.'63
In addition to specifying fault-based divorce grounds such as
"malicious desertion" and "obstinate and continuous refusal of the
marital obligation," the ALR provided for divorce -of "[clompletely
childless marriages ... on the basis of mutual agreement...."'"
Sanctioning divorce based on the spouses' will marked a qualitative
break with the Christian conception of the marriage as pactum
supra partes.'5 And although in some settings some women have
opposed easier divorce as an isolated measure on the ground that it
might cause them to lose certain economic guarantees associatedwith marriage,166 in nineteenth-century Prussia non-upper-class
women filed the large majority of divorce suits. 167 The ALR was
marked by a further egalitarian feature: a woman's sexual impulses
were acknowledged in that she had the same entitlement to satisfac-
162. MARIANNE WEBER, EHEFRAU UND MUTrER IN DER RECHTSENTWICKLUNG: EINE
EINFOHRUNG 336 (1907).
163. 4 STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE tYBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DES REICHSTAGS, IX.
LEGISLATURPERIODE, IV. SESSION 1895/97, at 2938B (1896).
164. ALR, pt. 2, tit. 1, §§ 677, 694, 716 (1794). According to ERNST WOLF ET AL.,
SCHEIDUNG UND SCHEIDUNGSRECHT: GRUNDFRAGE DER EHESCHEIDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND
34 (1959), "childless" in § 716 was interpreted very restrictively to mean not only current
childlessness but also that no children were expected. Yet even where couples had
children, courts still had discretion to order divorce in cases of unilateral repugnance. 4
FRANZ FORSTER, PREuBIsCHEs PRIvATREcHT 106 (7th ed. 1897).
165. See DIETER SCHWAB, GRUNDLAGEN UND GESTALT DER STAATLICHEN
EHEGESETZGEBUNG IN DER NEUZEIT BIS ZUmI BEGINN DES 19 JAHRHUNDERTS 242-43 (1967).
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, even before the new Civil Code (BGB) ousted
the liberal divorce provisions of the ALR, the German Supreme Court ruled that making
the continuation of marriage depend on the will or the subjective uncontrollable
discretion of the spouses was contrary to the essence of marriage. Consequently the court
concluded that the recent development of marriage law had abandoned that ground of di-
vorce. 15 RGZ 40 188, 191 (1886). The BGB adopted Savigny's conception of marriage as a
sittlich legal order independent of the will of the husband and wife. See infra; Paul Mikat,
Zur Bedeutung Friedrich Carl von Savignys fir die Enwticklung des deutschen
Scheidungsrechts im 19. Jahrhundert, in FEsTSCHRIFT FOR FRIEDRICH WILHELi BOSCH
ZUMI GESBURTSTAG 671, 693 (Walter Habscheid et al. eds., 1976).
166. Ernst Schachtel, Das Recht der Gegenwart und die Autoritit in der Familie, in
STUDIEN "BER AUTORIrAT UND FAmILIE: FORSCHUNGSBERICHTE AUS DEM INSTITUT FOR
SOZIALFORSCHUNG 587, 593-95 (1936).
167. Dirk Blasius, Birgerliche Rechtsgleichheit und die Ungleichheit der
Geschlechter: Das Scheidungsrecht im historischen Vergleich, in BORGERINNEN UND
BORGER: GESCHLECHTERVERHALTNISSE IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 67, 75-78 (Ute Frevert ed.,
1988).
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tion of the "marital obligation" and the same right to sue for divorce
and to satisfy her sexual instinct lawfully if her spouse refused to
comply. 168
To be sure, the Code was based on an instrumental model in
which divorce was permissible in order to fulfill certain purposes, in
particular procreation, which transcended the individual relation-
ship; yet the marriage provisions in the ALR also addressed the
pursuit of individual happiness by expressly making "mutual sup-
port" an independent basis of marriage.169 The ALR, while not reach-
ing as far as the eudemonistic-liberal principle of termination by
either party at any time, was nevertheless "the earliest of modern
divorce laws which embodied this 'principle of breakdown' that had
been postulated by the thinkers of the Enlightenment as every indi-
vidual's inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness, but which has
been consistently condemned by religious, especially Roman
Catholic, conservatives as being incompatible with the ideal of
Christian marriage."170 This relatively modem character of Prussian
divorce law is startling given the enormous differences between late-
eighteenth-century absolutist-mercantilist and contemporary socie-
ties and the fact that the specifically Prussian natural law of the
ALR emerged as a compromise from the crisis of feudalism in strug-
gle with capitalist forms of development.' 7' Although a product of
King Frederick H's particular adaptation of the Enlightenment, the
Code's divorce provisions also represented the confluence of natural
law contract theory and the state's population policy. 72 The latter
found clear expression in a royal cabinet order that preceded the
promulgation of the ALR in which Frederick II stated that divorces
168. HEINRICH DORNER, INDUSTRIALISIERUNG UND FAMILIENRECHT: DIE AUSWIRK-
UNGEN DES SOZIALEN WANDELS DARGESTELLT AN DEN FAMILIENMODELLEN DES ALR, BGB
UND DES FRANZOSISCHEN CODE CIVIL 56-59 (1974). Husbands, especially in peasant
families, in fact rarely afforded their wives an opportunity for orgasm. HEIDI ROSENBAUM,
FO MEN DER FAMINE: UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUM ZUSAMMENHANG VON FAMILIENVERHALT-
NISSEN, SOZIALSTRUKTUR UND SOZIALEM WANDEL IN DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT DES
19. JAHRHUNDERTS 86-87 (1982).
169. ALR, pt. 2, tit. 1, § 2; WEBER-WILL, supra note 168, at 60.
170. MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 10-11, 294
(1972).
171. See UWE-JENS HEUER, ALLGEmEINES LANDRECHT UND KLASSENKAMPF (1960);
EPSTEIN, supra note 107, at 372-87.
172. In this they differed from the sociolegal structuring of the family by two later
ideologically anti-liberal-capitalist societies-Nazi Germany and the German Democratic
Republic-which sought to deprivatize marriage by eliminating the contractual roots and
redirecting the relationship toward avowedly societal goals: See BERND ROTHERS, DIE
UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG: ZUM WANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIAL-
ISMUS 400-03 (1973 [1968]); GUNNAR HEINSOHN & ROLF KNIEPER, THEORIE DES FAMILIEN-




should not be made so difficult as to hinder population growth:
whereas spouses who were constantly embittered against each other
would not produce any children, if they divorced and the woman
married another man, children would issue after all.' This policy
was reflected in a catch-all provision of the divorce law, which, while
not, "as a rule," permitting divorce based merely on an allegation of
aversion to the spouse not keyed to one of the statutory grounds,
authorized judges to terminate "an unhappy marriage" where the
aversion was so vehement and deeply rooted that no hope remained
of "reconciliation and achievement of the purposes of matrimony."
74
By the 1840s, the principles of enlightened Frederician divorce
law had become unacceptable to the conservative political-restora-
tionist and rechristianizing tendencies of King Friedrich Wilhelm
IV.' 5 In seeking to reestablish pre-Enlightenment traditions, he
found the romantic Historical School of Law congenial. It was there-
fore no coincidence that the same day-February 28, 1842-that he
appointed that School's undisputed leader, Friedrich Carl von
Savigny, Prussian Minister of Justice in charge of the Ministry for
Law Revision, 6 he also issued a cabinet order demanding a revision
of the ALR in order to remove those of its "principles contradicting
the doctrines of Christianity." As guidelines for Savigny's Law
Revision Commission the king signaled an intention to restrict the
number of grounds for divorce. 17 This political and clerical restora-
tion coalesced in efforts at reforming marriage law in which a supra-
individual form of social order was to replace the individualistic
concept underlying natural law contract doctrine. To the extent that
the late-eighteenth-century conception of marriage combined indi-
173. HUBRICH, supra note 157, at 185-86 (citing Royal cabinet order of May 22, 1783).
The same spirit pervaded the very first paragraph of the marriage code, which character-
ized the bearing and raising of children as the main purpose of marriage. ALR, pt. 2, tit.
1, § 1. Based on this order (and later under the ALR too), courts authorized divorces even
if the spouses had children where there was no hope of reconciliation. HUBRICH, supra
note 157, at 186, 200.
174. ALR,-pt. 2, tit. 1, § 718a.
175. Friedrich Engels, Friedrich Wilhelm IV., K6nig von Preufien, in 1 MEW 446
(1964 [1842]). Even as early as the 1820s and 1830s his father, Friedrich Wilhelm III, had
set in motion preliminary reform plans guided by the same religious goals. See 2 ADOLF
STOLZEL, BRANDENBURG-PREUBENS RECHTSVERWALTUNG UND RECHTSVERFASSUNG 517-19
(1888); HUBRICH, supra note 157, at 222; Mikat, supra note 165, at 680-81. On the
religious background of the debate over divorce, see Douglas Klusmeyer, Jr., Between
Church and State: Prussian Marriage Law from the German Enlightenment Through the
Foundation of the Second Empire (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University).
176. GESETZ-SAMMLUNG FOR DIE KONIGLIdHEN PREUDISCHEN STAATEN 83 (1842).
177. STOLZEL, supra note 175, at 531; DIRK BLAsiUs, EHESCHEIDUNG IN




vidual-psychological elements with rational planning by the abso-
lute state, it tended to deny the autonomy and autonomous value of
marriage, which the new Christian-institutional conception was
designed to overcome. This rebirth of institutional thinking about
marriage was aimed at both the regulatory perfectionism of the ab-
solutist police state and the liberal neutrality that declared religion
and morality private. By investing marriage with a moral-religious
dimension, the restorationist view denied the competence of the
legislator as well as of the individual marriage contract partners to
construct the institution of marriage according to notions of expedi-
ence. 17
8
As an indispensable foundation of the state, marriage, in
Savigny's view, was not to be patterned after pecuniary contracts,
and thus had to remain independent of individual decision-making.
Moreover, in the Christian era the sittlich elevation of the female
sex was tied to monogamy, which however had to be legally secured
against degeneration. Savigny was concerned that people, particu-
larly in the lower classes, frequently embarked upon marriage frivo-
lously or in contemplation of easy divorce. A reformed divorce law,
by putting them on notice that their arbitrary will was subject to
severe restraints, would discourage many marriages that were
doomed to failure from the outset. 71 Savigny also played a key role
in placing on the agenda the forms of extreme patriarchy that
Fichte 80 had advocated but that the ALR had not adopted. Thus at
the same time the divorce draft was being debated, Savigny submit-
ted a revised draft of the penal code, which provided for much
harsher penalties for women than men for committing adultery. The
grounds were stereotypical: the woman's blame was greater because
her importance "lies mainly in sittlich and sexual purity," loss of
which destroyed her dignity.'8"
The process of secularization raised the question of the dissolu-
178. Stephan Buchholz, Preu/iische Eherechtsreform im Vormdirz (1830-1844): Bin
OCberbliek, in VORTRAGE ZUR GESCHICHTE DES PRIVATRECHTS IN EUROPA 150, 151-52 (Ius
COMMUNE, Special Issue No. 15, 1981) [hereinafter Buchholz, Preussische Eherechts-
reform]; Stephan Buchholz, Savignys Stellungnahme zum Ehe- und Familienrecht: Fine
Skizze seiner rechtssystematischen und rechtspolitischen Uberlegungen, 8 IUS COMMUNE
148, 149-50 (1979) [hereinafter Buchholz, Savignys Stellungnahme].
179. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, Darstellung der in den Preu3ischen Gesetzen
ilber die Ehescheidung unternommenen Reform, in 5 VERMISCHTE SCHEIFrEN 222, 238-39,
246, 271 (1850 [1844]). But see RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 246-50 (1992) (policy of
encouraging companionate marriage can with almost equal plausibility imply a policy of
forbidding divorce or granting it at will on specified grounds).
180. See infra § II.D.
181. 2 REVISION DES ENTWURFS DES STRAFGESL-ZUCHES VON 1843, at 162-63
(Mininster of Justice von Savigny, Minister of Law Revision ed., 1845), reprinted in
GERHARD, supra note 160, at 451.
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bility of marriage, which even the Prussian form of the enlighten-
ment answered by assimilating that relationship to contract. As the
emerging opposition between the state and the individual began to
oust the family in the beginning of the nineteenth century as an
intermediate formation, the interior of the family was subject to
dissolution in favor of individual-personal rights. Whereas the
authoritarian-bureaucratic state tended to use contract-centered
marital and family law as a means of placing the individual in its
service, the conservative restoration abandoned the transient-hu-
man aspect as the standard for marriage; instead individuals were
now to orient their sittlich volition toward the normative demands of
an supra-individual institutional social existence. Savigny, however,
opposed efforts to incorporate family relations into the private-law
conceptual apparatus of individual wills. Instead, he advocated a
supra-temporal yet secular structuring of the key question of mar-
riage law-the relationship between the institutional side of mar-
riage and the spouses' individual freedom-which differed from the
rechristianizing model of Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, whose long-
term struggle against marital contract theory and liberal divorce
was nourished by the alliance of a movement of pietistic renewal
and conservative notions of ordering society through estates.
182
Much of the debate surrounding the new draft law took place in
the columns of the Rheinische Zeitung, for which Marx had begun
writing political commentaries in May 1842. A lead news article in
late July reported that the opposition that Savigny's proposals had
encountered even in higher civil servant circles was animating
doubts about the fruitfulness of the Historical School in the area of
practical jurisprudence; consequently, the draft marriage law, even
though it may have been attributable less to the Historical School
than to allied groups, would also meet with considerable opposi-
tion."'83 Later reports suggested that the draft had been prepared by
a high judicial official-Privy Councillor Gerlach-with close ties to
the royal house and feudal-conservative circles.' His modern pietis-
tic convictions left clear marks in the proposed divorce law, which he
saw as performing the same restorationist function vis-a-vis the
ALR's "hostility to church, marriage, and law in general" as the
182. Buchholz, Savignys Stellungnahme, supra note 178, at 149-78; STEIPHAN
BucHHoLz, EHERECHT ZWISCHEN STAAT UND KIRCHE: PREUfISCHE REFORMVERSUCHE IN
DEN JAHREN 1854-1861, at 5-15 (1981). Gerlach and his brothers had been largely
responsible for placing divorce law reform on the agenda of the king and crown prince
already in the 1830s. STOLZEL, supra note 175, at 516-18.
183. RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 209, July 28, 1842, at 1, Col. 1.
184. See generally HANS SCHOEPS, DAS ANDERE PREUDEN 9-142 (1952); 1 ERNST
LUDWIG VON GERLACH, AUFZEICHNUNGEN AUS SEINEm LEBEN UND WIRKEN 1795-1877, at
320-21 (Jakob von Gerlach ed., 1903).
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Napoleonic Code vis-A-vis the 'revolutionary license" of the French
decree of September 20, 1792.185
To hammer away at the ideological underpinnings of the ALR
proved to be a principal tactic in support of the draft. Georg Puchta,
arguably the leading conceptual formalist among the pandectists,
chose this rhetorical route in his polemical contribution.'86 Harking
back to the aforementioned mercantilistic demographic basis of the
ALR provisions, Puchta charged that the monopoly of private-law
principles in that vision of marriage could be reconciled only with
the state's interest in increased population. Since, his Swift-like
argument ran, that interest was best promoted by completely un-
shackling divorce, the state qua breeder should logically eliminate
divorce procedures altogether since no children were produced dur-
ing that time and a more fruitful marriage was delayed.
187
Because Savigny sought to free the issue of marriage from the
constraints of the transient political models grouped about the old
conservatives' central concept of the "Christian state," his views did
not resonate with them. In part because the extreme views of
Gerlach-for whom the middle ages were "the ideal realization of
social and state life" I1Lwhich went beyond Savigny's and even the
king's, prompted so much public opposition, the reform was
aborted.1 89 A further reason for the conservatives' failure to narrow
185. Id. at 316. Gerlach's brother Leopold wrote to him in July 1842 that the
marriage draft law would be the first statute in a century that, expressly acknowledging
the gospel, would penetrate into the innermost family relations and touch and be felt by
all. Id. at 311. It was not so much the Code as the loi Bonald of 1816 that marked the real
restoration in French divorce law. See DORNER, supra note 168, at 128-69.
186. Although Puchta defended the draft, he was opposed to Gerlach's efforts to
introduce religion into law: "Dearest friend! when you sit up in the dark of night, and and
mould your state and your law, do you not hear the communists next door carpentering
and digging, separated from you only by a thin wall?" Letter from Puchta to Gerlach (Feb.
16, 1844), in Materialien zur preuplischen Eherechtsreform im Vormdrz in NAcHTRICHTEN
DER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN IN GOTTINGEN AUS DEM JAHRE 1961, Philologisch-
Historische Masse 500, 502 (1961).
187. Georg Puchta, Zur Vorbereitung eines Urtheils iiber den Ehescheidungsentwurf,
in FLIEGENDE BLAwrER DES TAGES: 1 DIE EHESCHEIDUNGSFRAGE 13 (1843). A reviewer
noted that the original demographic justification of a more liberal divorce law was not the
only possible one in support of the private-law character of marriage. K[arl]. N[auwerck].,
Review of F.G. Puchta, Die Ehescheidungsfrage, RHEINTSCHE ZEITUNG, No. 38, Feb. 7,
1843, Supp., at 1, Col. 1. Interestingly, the censor reported to the Ministry of the Interior
that he passed this review because its anticlerical polemic would cause Catholics to hate
the paper. 1 RHEINISCHE BRIEFE UND AKTEN zuR GESCHICHTE DER POLITISCHEN
BEWEGUNG 1830-1850: 1830-1845, at 429 (Joseph Hansen, ed. 1967 [11919]) [hereinafter
RHEamNCHE BREFE uND AKTEN].
188.4 FRANZ SCHNABEL, DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE Im NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERT:
DIE RELiGIOSEN KRAFTE 487 (1951).
189. VON GERLACH, supra note 184, at 327; RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 217, Aug. 5,
1842, at 1, Col. 1; RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 234, Aug. 22, 1842, at 1, Col. 2; Ein Wort
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the grounds for divorce in the 1840s is that Savigny and his collabo-
rators underestimated both the resistance of public officials' and
the degree to which the ALR had congealed into a piece of cultural
reality deeply embedded in popular consciousness. 19' The king was
unwilling to take Gerlach's warning not to yield to public opinion;
his reaction, however, was to tighten the censorship of the liberal
press that had so effectively galvanized that opinion.
192
Although conservative reformers failed to enact changes in the
substantive divorce provisions, in 1844 they did succeed in tighten-
ing divorce procedures which shaped the real world of divorce and
privileged marriage as a political favored norm. The two most sig-
nificant revisions were the appointment of a public prosecutor to
represent the public interest in every matrimonial court and a man-
datory clerical attempt at reconciliation as a precondition for filing
suit for divorce.'93
D. German Transcendental Philosophy's Chauvinist Stereotyping
of Women and Marriage: La cr~me des DWEM
In order to put Marx's views on women and marriage in their
intellectual context, it is also necessary to present the views of
German idealist philosophy-principally, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel-
whose conceptual frameworks exercised enormous influence over
educated public opinion in nineteenth-century Germany.'19
fiber Ehescheidungen, RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 240, Aug. 28, 1842, at 1, Col 1; RHEIN-
ISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 258, Sept. 15, 1842, at 1, Col. 2; HUBRICH, supra note 157, at 222;
Buchholz, Savignys Stellungnahme, supra note 178, at 165-66; Buchholz, Preu3ische
Eherechtsreform, supra note 178, at 157-58.
190. Historians have assumed that a disgruntled privy councillor was the source of
the leak of the draft law to the Rheinische Zeitung; despite considerable effort, the gov-
ernment never identified the source. 5 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE, DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE
111 NEUNZEHNTEN JARHIUNDERT 251 (7th ed. 1920); HERmANN KONIG, DIE RHEINISCHE
ZEITUNG VON 1842-43 IN HIRER EINSTELLUNG ZUR KULTURPOLITIK DES PREUSSISCHEN
STAATES 15 (1927).
191. Even as staunch an enemy of the ALR as von Treitschke conceded this point;
TREMISCHKE, supra note 190, at 250-54.
192. Divorce reform was also part of Gerlach's other agenda-reasserting the king's
absolute power vis-A-vis the diets of the estates. See Ludwig von Gerlach, Pro memoria,
die Eherechtsreform betreffend, in Hans Liermann & Hans-Joachim Schoeps (ed.),
Materialien zur preu/3ischen Eherechtsreform im Vormdirz, in NACHRICHTEN DER
AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFrN IN GOTrINGEN AUS DEM JAHRE 1961, Philologisch-
Historische Masse 489, 525-34 (1961); STOLZEL, supra note 175, at 538-47.
193. Verordnung Uber das Verfahren in Ehesachen, §§ 4, 10 Gesetz-Sammlung fMr
die K6niglichen PreuBischen Staaten at 184, 185 (June 28, 1844); BLASIUS, supra note
177, at 53, 60-61, 64-67.
194. See generally Ute Frevert, Bilrgerliche Meisterdenker und das
Geschlechterverhdltnis: Konzepte, Erfahrungen, Visionen an der Wende vom 18. zum 19.
Jahrhundert, in BORGERINNEN UND BORGER: GEsCHLECHTERVERHALTNISSE IM 19. JAHR-
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Kant's views of marriage are most widely known for his bru-
tally reductionist characterization of it in the Metaphysics of Morals
as "the union of two persons of different sex for the lifelong posses-
sion of their sexual properties."'95 Less well known is the framework
that Kant created for analyzing this relationship. He processed his
radical reification of personhood and sex 96 through a new "daring"
legal category that he devised late in life to merge a personal right
with that to a thing: "This right is that of the possession of an exter-
nal object as a thing and the use of the same as a person." The new
right entailed "treating persons in a similar way to things, to be sure
not in all points, but nevertheless to possess them and to deal with
them in many relationships as things."'97 Kant considered a contract
of marriage as prescribed by the laws of pure reason where man and
woman wanted to enjoy each other's sexual properties mutually:
For the natural use which one sex makes of the sexual organs of the
other is an enjoyment for which one part surrenders itself to the other. In
this act a person makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right
of humanity to its own person. Only under the single condition is this pos-
sible, that, inasmuch as the one person is acquired immediately by the
other as thing, the latter mutually acquires the former; for in this way the
person regains himself and again creates his personality. But the acquisi-
tion of a member in another human is at the same time acquisition of the
whole person-bedause the latter is an absolute unity... That, however,
this personal right is yet at the same time as of a thing [auf dingliche Art]
is founded thereon, because if one of the spouses goes astray or has sur-
HUNDERT 17 (Ute Frevert ed., 1988); CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 168-81
(1988); Susan Mendus, Kant: 'An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bourgeois'? in WOMEN IN
WESTERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: KANT TO NIETZSCHE 21 (Ellen Kennedy & Susan
Mendus eds., 1987); Joanna Hodge, Women and the Hegelian State, in id. at 127; Lawrence
Blum, Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective, 12 CANAD. J. PHIL.
287 (1982); EVA KELLNER-MANGER, MANN UND FRAu IM DEUTsCHEN IDEALISMUS: DIE IDEE
DER PERSONLICHKEIT IM KAMPF MIT DEM METAPHYSISCHEN BEGRIFSPAAR FORM UND
STOFF (1937). On Kant's influence in particular, see URSULA JAUCH, IMMANUEL KANT ZUR
GESCHLECHTERDIFFERENZ: AUFKUREmSCHE VORURTEILSKRITIK UND BOEGERLICHE GE-
scHLsc~s-voRMUNDscHAFT 33 (1980 [1988]).
195. "[D]ie Verbindung zweier Personen verschiedenen Geschlechts zum le-
benswierigen Besitz ihrer Geschlechtseigenschaften." IhMANUEL KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK
DER SrITEN, in 8 IMmANUEL KANT, WERKE 390 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1956 [1797]). It
is plausible that the frankness that, for example, Kant and Hugo displayed with regard to
sexual matters was appropriate to the preindustrial family in which the physical aspect of
sexual acts was emphasized and "their sensibility is not yet shown to be influenced by the
marriage atmosphere of the bourgeoisie, which has become eroticised as a result of its
economic relief-or by its taboos." DORNER, supra note 168, at 56.
196. Jauch alone appears to adhere to the Kant-struck construct according to which
rather than having brutalized bourgeois marriage, Kant was in fact subjectively
problematizing the reification and commodification to which women were subjected.
JAUCH, supra note 194, at 152-53, 161, 164, 177.
197. KANT, supra note 195, at 481, 388-89, 482.
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rendered itself into someone else's possession, the other is entitled at any
time and without fail to bring the spouse back into his power likewise as a
thing.
198
Kant's first illustration of his invention was the phrase "my
wife" as opposed to "this is my father." Whereas the latter desig-
nated merely a physical relationship, the former signified "a special,
namely legal relationship of the possessor to an object (even if it
were a person), as thing." 99 Significantly, the non-familial example
that Kant used to explicate this hybrid right was that of a farm
worker living in the master's house (Gesinde) who, having been
contractually "acquired" by the master, surrendered his person to
the master's possession and consented to do any permissible act for
the welfare of the master's householdY.29  Kant thus analogized the
relationship between wife and husband to that between seller and
buyer of the thing labor power so structured that the latter can use
the former's labor as a thing and yet deal with the worker as a per-
son.
20 '
Kant's reification of emotional-sexual relationships also had
distinct roots in his detached understanding of sex as
"cannibalistic" 20 2 and something of which one must be "ashamed
198. The passage reads in the original:
Denn der natirliche Gebrauch, den ein Geschlecht von den Geschlechtsorganen
des anderen macht, ist ein GenuB, zu dem sich ein Teil dem anderen hingibt. In
diesem Akt macht sich ein Mensch selbst zur Sache, welches dem Rechte der
Menschheit an seiner eigenen Person widerstreitet. Nur unter der einzigen
Bedingung ist dieses m6glich, daJ3, indem die eine Person von einem anderen
gleich als Sache erworben wird, diese gegenseitigjene erwerbe; denn so gewinnt
sie wiederum sich selbst und stellt ihre Pers6nlichkeit wieder her. Es ist aber
der Erwerb eines GliedmaSes am Menschen zugleich Erwerbung der ganzen
Person,-weil diese eine absolute Einheit ist.... DaJ3 aber dieses persbnliche
Recht es doch zugleich auf dingliche Art sei, griindet sich darauf, weil, wean
eines der Eheleute sich verlaufen, oder sich in eines anderen Besitz gegeben
hat, das andere es jederzeit und unweigerlich, gleich als eine Sache, in seine
Gewalt zuriickzubringen berechtigt ist.
KMANT, supra note 195, at 390-91 (the word "person" in German does not reveal gender).
199. Id. at 482 n.*.
200. Id. at 484-85. On the Gesinde's customary one-year obligation, which was
statutorily enforcible, see Karl Griiunberg, Agrarverfassung: Begriffliches und Zustand-
liches, in 7 GRUNDRISS DER SOZIALOKONOMIK 131, 166 (1922).
201. UMBERTO CERRONI, MARXUND DAS ODERNE RECHT 45, 229-30 (Frank Zechmeister
trans., 1974 [1962]), stresses this point but overlooks Kant's narrow notion of wage labor;
Kant exempted day laborers who did not live in the master's house, were hired to perform
specific work, and could leave the master at any time without the latter's having a right
to "capture" him. Letter from Kant to Christian Schiltz (July 10, 1797), in 12 KANT'S
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 180, 182 (1902).
202. As an example Kant mentioned the phrase "'to want to eat one up for love' (of
which the kiss is a kind of attempt)...." Immanuel Kant, Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre,
in 20 KANT's GEsAhMELTE SCHIFrEN 441, 462, 464 (1942 [1797]). Kant was also
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because it is in itself really beneath the dignity of humanity"; result-
ing from the necessities of reproduction, it had to be left to "animal
instinct" rather than reason. °0 His approach attained an even more
extraordinarily instrumental character in his unpublished
Relections on the Philosophy of Right. There he excepted the sexual
members from the natural arrangement that every person has abso-
lute use of all his parts; for although they too belong to the person,
insofar as they are to be used, another person must be given the
right to do so. Thus as constructed by Kant in the language of the
law, each person retains the property without use (dominium direc-
turn) of his or her own sexual member while granting the other
beneficial ownership (dominium utile) of the same." 4 This concep-
tion has prompted commentators to liken Kant's view of sex as
"dehumanizing exploitation" to Marx's analysis of wage labor.2"5
More generally, Kant argued, humans are by nature the objects
of others' desires and in turn are in need of others "as tools and
themselves an object or tool for others' desires." That this drive
causes humans to be subordinated to others "degrades humanity
and brings it closer to animality than any other characteristic."
Moreover, instead of offering a way out, masturbation would be
preoccupied with the health consequences of sex for men such as "being infected with
impure juices" or dismemberment. Id. at 462, 463. Overexertion also lurked in the
background: "Whether, with maw [Maul] and teeth, the female part through
impregnation, and childbirth which perhaps result and is fatal for it, or the male however
is consumed by the exhaustions stemming from the demands of the wife on the husband's
sexual capacity... one part is with regard to the other, in this mutual use of the sexual
organs, really a thing that can be used up (res fungibilis) .. " Such a contract would be
unlawful. KANT, supra note 195, at 483-84. Pateman's interpretation of Kant's
construction of marriage as the husband's unilateral possession of the wife's body fails to
deal with Kant's fears, which imply mutual rights. PATEMAN, supra note 194, at 171-72.
203. Kant, supra note 202, at 463-64. "Sexuality-especially masturbation and
intercourse with women-is disgusting to Kant." HARTMUT BOHME & GERNOT BOHmE,
DAS ANDERE DER VERNUNFT: ZUR ENTwIcKLuNG VON RATIONALITATSSTRUKTUREN AM
BEISPIEL KANTS 452 (1983). See also ROGER SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY
335 n.19 (1990 [1989]) ("Kant certainly had a low opinion of sexual intercourse even
within marriage.... It is hard to avoid concluding that he would have preferred that
Nature had provided some alternative method of procreation"). Kant may have found it
unnecessary to discuss this issue at length because the overtowering German rationalist
philosopher, Wolff, had already done so. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, VERNONETIGE GEDANKEN VON
DEM GESELISCHAFTLICHEN LEBEN DER MENSCHEN, in 1:5 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, GESAMMELTE
WERKE §§ 16-39, at 10-26 (4th ed. 1975 [1736]).
204. Immanuel Kant, Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie, in 19 KANT'S GESAMMELTE
SCHRIFTEN, No. 7580 at 460 (1934).
205. SUSAN SHELL, THE RIGHTS OF REASON: A STUDY OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY AND
POLITIcs 152 (1980). See also C[arl A.]. Emge, Dos Eherecht Immanuel Kants, 29 KANT-
STUDIEN 243, 245 (1924): "Use of a capacity means... something like valorization of
labor power in the sexual field. Kant however pays no more attention to this attribute of
his concept so that we are spared the-current-view of marriage as an institute of labor
law!"
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"even worse"-because it involves using oneself as a mere means of
the satisfaction of animal drives. Kant's solution to the problem of
the self-degradation that results from subordinating oneself to an-
other by making him or her the object of one's appetite is mutual
degradation; "the miracle of transforming the thing into a person"
2 6
entails making oneself and one's member someone else's "property,"
and thus into "community property."2 7 Implausible as a sublation of
a moral dilemma, Kant's practical imperative---'I would not want to
be a member of any community that would not want to possess my
member'20 5-lacked even the virtue of gender neutrality: he specified
the "relationship of community occupancy [Inhabung in
Gemeinschaft] ... as an unequal society (whose members are subor-
dinated to (not coordinated with) each other) since.., the wife be-
longs to the husband."2 9
This unorthodox conception of marriage was a product of Kant's
old age. Kant's more specific views on women, which he promoted
during the entire last third of the eighteenth century, were forged in
a period genre that developed a catalog of sex-polarized psychologi-
cal characteristics thought to correspond to physiological ones.
Unlike earlier patriarchal discourse on gender contrasts, which
206. G. Solari, La "dottrina kantiana del matrimonio, 31 RMSTA DI FILOSOFIA 1, 21
(1940).
207. Kant, 19 KANT'S GESAMMEL'rE SCHRIFTEN, Reflection No. 7879, supra note 204,
at 543; KANT, supra note 195, at 558. In an alternative formulation, Kant asserted that by
virtue of such mutuality, "I have reoccupied myself...." Immanuel Kant,
Moralphilosophie Collins, in 27: 1 KANT'S GESAMIMELTE WERKE 237, 388 (1974 [1784-85]).
For an (unconvincing) explanation of Kant's resolution of the antinomy of giving oneself
away as a thing without becoming a thing, see ADAA1 HORN, IMMANUEL KANTS ETHISCH-
RECHTLICHE EHEAUFFASSUNG: ENE RECHTFERTIGUNG SEINES EHERECHTS 19-20, 26
(1936).
208. This modem reformulation appears to conform to Kant's practical imperative:
"Act so that you use humanity, both in your person and in the person of every other, al-
ways at the same time as end, never merely as means." IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG
ZURMETAPHYSIKDERSrITEN, in 7 WERKE 61(1956 [1785]).
209. Kant, 20 KANT'S GESAMIELTE SCHRIFrEN, supra note 203, at 457. Christian
Wolff had at least recognized in principle that with regard to those matters that the wife
understood better than the husband, he was obligated to follow her advice. WOLFF, supra
note 203, § 58, at 43. Such considerations make it difficult to accept the claim that
precisely with regard to marriage, "Kant's critical humanistic philosophy, based on
empiricism and reason," should be contrasted with the "rational, dogmatic, in part still
theologically influenced enlightenment." HORN, supra note 207, at 45. Kant's approach
perversely suggested the permissibility of divorce: Since one could not be prevented from
"throwing oneself away with regard to sexual intercourse," one therefore had the right to
"tear up such pactum and is not bound" by it. Kant, 19 KANT'S GESAIOItELTE SCHRIFTEN
No. 7866, at 540. One recent commentator actually cites Kant's view as a needed
corrective of feminism: sex is "an instance of general inhumanity of man (i.e. human
beings in general) towards man." HOWARD WILLIAI s, KANT'S PoLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 118
(1983).
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tended to be rooted in discussions of estates and social positions and
the virtues appropriate to them, the new genre shifted the locus of
contrasting sex characteristics to within men and women. This inte-
riorization and universalization was associated with the transition
from the large work-centered family to the bourgeois family, in
which monetized work was transferred outside of the household
together with the husband.21
Kant devoted eighteen pages of an early tract on beauty
(women) and the sublime (men) to such an ex cathedra cataloging
suffused with the most blatant normative sex-role stereotypes.21' At
one of the high points, he observed that a woman whose head is full
of Greek or who discusses mechanics, could just as well wear a beard
because it would perhaps more recognizably express the mien of
profundity for which she is competing.212 His later marginal
Comments to this work at times read like fortune-cookie aphorisms.
Several representative examples will suffice: "A pregnant woman is
obviously more useful but not so beautiful. Virginity is useless but
pleasant." "The woman seems to lose more than the man because in
her the beautiful features cease in men however the noble ones re-
main. The old woman seems to be worth nothing."113 In response to
Hume's belief that a woman who knew nothing of Greek or Roman
history could not entertain intelligent company, Kant pointed out
that Hume had, neglected the fact that women were not there to
serve men in sustaining reflection, but rather to recover from it.
214
A certain continuity marked Kant's views throughout his ca-
reer. Three decades later he classified women by nature with ser-
vants, employees, and all others who lacked the income-generating
property that alone conferred civil autonomy (biirgerliche
Selbstdndigkeit); Kant therefore excluded all of them from active
citizenship. 2 5 The ostensibly empirical remarks in his late work on
210. See Karin Hausen, Die Polarisierung der "Geschlechtscharaktere'--Eine Spiegel-
ung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben, in SOZIALGESCHICHTE DER FAMILIE
IN DER NEUZErr EUROPAS 363, 367-75 (Werner Conze ed., 1976).
211. For an argument that this work represented a (successful) effort to pay tribute
to high society in K6nigsberg for having admitted him to it and was merely a compromise
compilation of views of great currency, see JAUCH, supra note 194, at 112-14.
212. IMMANUEL KANT, BEOBACHTUNGEN OBER DAS GEFOHL DES SCHONEN UND
ERHABENEN, in 2 IMMANUEL KANT, WERKE 821, 852 (1960 [1764]).
213. IMMANUEL KANT, BEMERKUNGEN IN DEN "BEOBACHTUNGEN OBER DAS GEFOHL
DES SCHONEN UND ERHABENEN" 97, 94 (Marie Rischmiiller ed., 1991 [1760s]). The editor
of this new edition prefers to characterize them as associations; id. at xi-xv.
214. Immanuel Kant, Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen iiber das Gefihl des
Schinen und Erhabenen, in 20 KANT'S GESAMMELTE SCHRIFPEN, supra note 202, at 183.
215. KANT, supra note 195, at 432-33; Immanuel Kant, Ober den Gemeinspruch: Das
mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht far die Praxis, in 11 IMMANUEL KANT,
WERKE 127, 151 (1957 [1793]).
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philosophical anthropology, which formed a new phase in the evolu-
tion of the aforementioned genre of gender discourse, are so densely
packed with unmistakable place- and time-bound prejudices as to
read embarrassingly like an Enlightenment-era Ann Landers col-
umn.216 Thus whereas the man loves domestic peace, the woman
does not shy away from domestic war, which she conducts with her
naturally loquacious and eloquent tongue with which she disarms
the man.1 7 Kant also knew that a wife develops contempt and even
hatred for a husband who does not beat her for flirting with other
men because it shows that he is willing to abandon her to others "to
gnaw on the same bone."215 Because nature wants the woman to be
sought, her taste in men's beauty (as contradistinguished from their
strength to protect women) cannot be so fastidious-otherwise she
would have to be the suitor and the man the rejector, which would
lower the value of her sex in his eyes.2 19 Finally, in an anthropology
lecture a few years earlier, Kant shared this insight with his (male)
students: "All women are inclined to stinginess, and if they give
something, then it is either something that they do not at all need or
that does not cost them anything. Here, too, one must admire the
excellent arrangement of nature, which has intended that that part
of the human race that earns nothing not be generous."2 0
Fichte carried on in the same vein where Kant left off.l2l In his
book on natural law written contemporaneously with Kant's late
works, Fichte, too, was fixated on the gender-specific natural polar
216. Kant's view of the stereotypical gender-specific polar distribution of intellectual,
moral, and emotional characteristics appears to have been strongly influenced by JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMaLE OU DE L'tDUCATION (1762). Rousseau derived the father's
primacy in the family both from the woman's periodic inaction caused by menstruation
and the husband's need to inspect his wife's conduct in order to insure that the children
whom he is forced to acknowledge and to feed are his; having nothing similar to fear, the
wife did not have the same right. Jean Jacques Rousseau, De l'Economie politique, in 2
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU 237, 239 (C. Vaughan ed., 1962
[1755]). For a much more subtle discussion of this point, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 570-73 (1967 [1740]).
217. IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGIE IN PRAGIMIATISCHER HINSICHT, in 12
IMIANUEL KANT, WERKE at 649 (1956 [1798]).
218. Id. at 650 n.*.
219. Id. at 652-53. See also Dr. Chesmar, Der Entwurf des btirgerlichen Gesetzbuches
far das Gro/herzogtum Hessen, RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 205, July 24, 1842, Supp., at 1,
col. 1. This argument, socio-biologically clothed and without reference to Kant, runs
throughout Posner's Sex and Reason.
220. Immanuel Kant, Anthropologia, in DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN HAUPTvORLESUNGEN
IMMANUELKANTs 339-40 (Arnold Kowalewski ed., 1965 [1791]).
221. For a very high decibel-level but low-yield account of Fichte's views on women,
see HANNELORE SCHRODER, DIE RECHTLOSIGKEIT DER FRAu IM RECHTSSTAAT: DARGE-
STELLT AM ALLGEMfEINEN PREUI3ISCHEN LANDRECHT, AMi BORGERLICHEN GEsETzBUcI UND
AN J.G. FICHTES GRUNDLAGE DES NATURRECHTS 83-190 (1979).
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distribution of activity and passivity. Because the character of rea-
son was absolute self-activity, it was not against reason that the
first sex seeks the satisfaction of its sexual instinct, "Since it can be
satisfied by activity: but it is simply against reason that the second
resolve on the satisfaction of its as a purpose because it would then
be making a mere suffering [Leiden] into a purpose. 22 Whereas
men could admit to having a sexual instinct without forfeiting their
dignity, women could not; for the same reason, a man could court a
woman but never a woman a man. She would be depreciating herself
because a woman's rejection of a man means merely that she refuses
to subject herself to him-which is tolerable. But it would be intol-
erable for a woman to be rejected by a man because it would be tan-
tamount to telling her that he does not want to accept the subjection
that has already occurred. Fichte mocked some women's claims of
equal entitlement to seek a spouse by challenging them to try it:
"This is just the same as if it were examined whether people did not
have every much as right to fly as birds. But let us rather drop the
matter of right until someone really does fly."
2 3
In light of his view that no "unspoiled" woman is activated by a
sexual instinct, but only by love, that is, "her natural instinct to
satisfy a man,"214 it was only consistent for Fichte to conceptualize
marriage as a hierarchical relationship: "In the concept of marriage
lies the most unlimited subordination of the woman to the will of the
man; not for a juridical, but rather for a moral reason. She must
subordinate herself for the sake of her own honor. -The woman
does not belong to herself, but to the man."21 By the same token,
since Fichte imagined people as entering into marriage by their own
free will, he upheld (the ALR's provision for) divorce by mutual
consent where the woman's love and the man's magnanimity were
destroyed.226
In his Philosophy of Right Hegel clearly articulated in the
1820s the transition from the contract-based individualistic will
theory of marriage to a moral-institutional conception.
Characterizing marriage as an ethical (sittlich)227 relationship, Hegel
222. JOHANN FICHTE, GRUNDLAGE DES NATURRECHTS, in 3:2:1 JOHANN GOTrLOB
FICHTE's SAMMTLICHE WERKE 306-07 (J. Fichte ed, 1845 [1796]).
223. Id. at 309. This tradition of show-sl'pping peremptory dismissal of women
found its counterpart in America's greatest judge: " who believe in force (mitigated by po-
liteness) have no trouble-and if I were sincere and were, asked certain whys by a woman
should reply, 'Because Ma'am I am the bull." Letter from Holmes to Laski (Mar. 7, 1928),
in 2 HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASK 1916-1935, at 1035 (1953).
224. FICHTE, supra note 222, at 311.
225. Id. at 325.
226. Id. at 336-37.
227. As used by Hegel, Sittlichkeit "refers to moral obligations I have to an ongoing
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rejected three one-sided views that had dominated the
Enlightenment: (1) the natural-law emphasis on the physical, in
particular sexual, aspect; (2) Kant's conceptualization of marriage as
a civil contract, which degraded it as a form of mutual use; and (3)
the notion of marriage as exclusively a love relationship, which was
incompatible with Sittlichkeit because of its subjectivity and contin-
gency. For Hegel, then, marriage was "lawfully moral love [rechtlich
sittliche Liebe]"22 in which the civil-contractual aspect was subordi-
nated to the religious aspect: marriage as a "divine, substantial un-
ion is something elevated above my convenience and my arbitrary
will."229 The objective aspect of marriage derived from the agreement
of the partners to give up their natural and individual personalities
in order to create a new personal unity in which self-limitation and
self-consciousness liberated them."3 In language that Marx adopted
virtually verbatim in his attack on Hugo, Hegel saw the sittlich
aspect of marriage in the spouses' consciousness of their love, confi-
dence, and commonality; as a result, the natural instinct, which was
destined to be extinguished in its satisfaction, was diminished, and
the "spiritual bond in its right as the substantial aspect" as elevated
above the contingencies of the passions was set off as indissoluble.231
It is this spiritual coalescence that sublated the contractual stand-
point. 2 Despite this new focus, which made marriage an sich indis-
soluble, Hegel was aware that because marriages could not entirely
eliminate the element of sentience (Empfindung), they were poten-
tially dissoluble, although he urged the state to vindicate the right of
Sittlichkeit over convenience (Belieben) by making the possibility of
dissolution more difficult. 3 Finally, for Hegel marriage formed the
substantial basis of the relation of the state to the individual be-
cause isolated individuals were too unreliable and vacillating.
community of which I am part," whereas Moralitdt is "an abstract formal notion of obliga-
tion" holding of people as universal rational wills. In Hegel's doctrine, because morality is
fulfilled in a community, Sittlichkeit transcends Moralitit. CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 376-
77 (1977 [1975]).
228. HEGEL, supra note 151, § 161 Zusatz, at 310.
229. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS: DiE VORLESUNG VON 1819-1820
IN EINER NACHSCHRIFT 133 (Dieter Henrich ed., 1983).
230. HEGEL, supra note 151, § 162, at 310-11.
231. Id. § 163, at 313.
232. "Marriage ... is precisely this, to take as its point of departure the contract
standpoint of the autonomous personality in its individuality in order to sublate it." Id.
§ 163 at 313.
233. Id. § 163 Zusatz, at 314-15. In his lectures on the phenomenology of nature and
spirit, Hegel was much more tentative in this regard, even mentioning depopulation as a
consideration that legislation had to take into account in regulating divorce. GEORG W.F.
HEGEL, JENAER REALPHILoSOPHIE 227-29 (1967). In his 1819/20 lectures he conceded that
in the case of"the total alienation offeelings... a separation must be able to take place."
HEGEL, supra note 229, at 141.
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Moreover monogamy was "one of the absolute principles on which
the Sittlichkeit of a community rests .... I
Although Hegel thus appears to have moved beyond the limita-
tions of both the natural-law and Kantian conceptions of marriage,
his romantic-dialectic view was expressly freighted with the same
stereotyped gender inequalities that marked the former pair. Hegel
acknowledged that the man, on account of his greater autonomy
outside of the relationship and in particular of his field of sittlich ac-
tivity in the state, was more indifferent to the woman's character;
the "girl," on the other hand, found her sittlich determination essen-
tially only within the marriage. 5 Much more so than Kant or
Fichte, whose remarks on women at their best sounded like drawing
room chatter, Hegel sought to confer philosophical dignity on men's
contempt for women by integrating those prejudices into his general
conceptual framework. Thus the mental and intellectual aspects
falling on the male side of the characterological ledger enabled men
to lead dual lives in personal autonomy and free universality and
objectivity in the state, science, and art and in struggle and labor
with the external world;' 6 women, in contrast, remained embedded
in concrete individuality and feeling, which limited them to the
sphere of merely subjective Sittlichkeit within the family. Bereft of
the universal and ideal, women, while capable of being educated,
"are not made" f6r the higher sciences or philosophy. "Everything
great that has been produced in the world, all epochs in the external
as well as internal world history, have been produced essentially by
men. Of no woman can it be said on the whole that she was epoch-
making in world history."3
7
It was precisely the failure of philosophers such as Kant to dis-
234. HEGEL, supra note 229, at 141; HEGEL, § 167, supra note 151, at 320.
235. HEGEL, supra note 151, § 162, at 312 (Hegel's marginal comments), § 164 Zusatz,
at 317-18. At the age of twenty-five, Jenny von Westphalen, who was being courted by
Marx, appeared to be as much a Hegelian as he: "The girl's love is different than the
man's, and it must be different. The girl can of course give the man nothing else but love
and herself and her person just as she is completely undivided and eternally. In
customary relations the girl must also find her complete satisfaction in the man's
love...." Jenny von Westphalen to Marx (ca. 1839-1840), in 3:1 MARx [&] ENGELS
GEsAMiTAUSGABE, supra note 5, at 337.
236. Marx's wife remained a Hegelian in later life, using almost precisely this lan-
guage to explain why women had a harder time: "The man, he strengthens himself in the
struggle with the external world, invigorated in the face of enemies..., we sit at home
and darn socks." Letter from Jenny Marx to Wilhelm Liebknecht (May 26, 1872), in 33
MEW, supra note 6, at 702.
237. HEGEL, supra note 151, §, 166 and Zusatz, at 318-19; HEGEL, PHILOSOPHIE DES
RECHTS, supra note 229, at 137, 138; see also GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
PHANOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES 326-28, 340 (1952 [18071) [hereinafter HEGEL,
PHANOMENOLOGIE. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, in THREE ESSAYS
425, 496 (1952 [1869]) ("A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction.").
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tinguish between the merely contingent-conventional and the dic-
tates of reason that made them vulnerable to Hugo's historicist criti-
cisms of apriorist legal philosophy. Against the background of this
programmatic and systemic misogyny at the loftiest peaks of
Western philosophical reason and intellect, the mature Marx's epi-
sodic references to women in Capital can best be characterized as
egalitarian.
E. Marx's Critique of Hugo
The immediate occasion for Marx's polemic against Hugo and
the Historical School of Law was King Friedrich Wilhelm IV's ap-
pointment of Savigny as Prussian Minister for Legislation on
February 28, 1842 and the king's order of the same day demanding
the reform of the marriage provisions of the ALR so as to remove
those principles contradicting Christian doctrine.238 Marx's first
reference to his piece on the Historical School of Law came in a let-
ter two months later to Arnold Ruge, in which Marx wrote that he
was almost done with four articles, which he would send Ruge for a
publication (Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und
Publicistik) edited by the latter. In addition to The Philosophical
Manifesto of the Historical School of Law, the other three were
entitled On Religious Art, On the Romantics, and The Positive
Philosophers. All, Marx added, hung together substantively. 3 9 Only
238. See supra § II.0; VON TREITSCHKE, supra note 190, at 155-57; 1:1:1 MARX [&]
ENGELS, HIsToRISCH-KRMSCHE GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 97, at 1. Mehring may have
been the source of the erroneous account that the occasion was the golden jubilee of
Hugo's Promotion on May 10, 1842. 1 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN VON KARL MARX UND
FRIEDRICH ENGELS 1841 BIS 1850: VON MARZ 1841 BIS MARZ 1844, in AuS DEM LITER-
ARISCHEN NACHLASS VON KARL MARX, FRIEDRICH ENGELS UND FERDINAND LASSALLE 184,
326 (Franz Mehring ed., 1902). That celebration had in fact taken place on May 10, 1838
(which was also the day on which Marx's father died). As examples of the incorrect
account, see AUGUSTE CORNU, 1 KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS: LEBEN UND WERK:
1818-1844, at 280-81 (1954); HORST SCHRODER, FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY:
GESCHICHrtE UND RECHTSDENKEN BEM tIBERGANG VOM FEUDALISMUS ZUM KAPITALISMUS
IN DEUTSCHLAND 223 (1984). MECHTHILD MERFELD, DIE EMANZIPATION DER FRAU IN DER"
SOZIALISTISCHEN THEORIE UND PRAXIS 31 (1972), mistook Mars article for a book review
of a book by Hugo entitled Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtsschule.
DICK HOWARD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC 30 (1972), mentions
Savigny's appointment but not the divorce draft law as the occasion for Marx's article.
LouIs DUPle, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM 68 (1966), further confused
matters by referring to "Leo Hugo," probably conflating Hugo and Heinrich Leo, another
of Marx's targets. Marx, 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 116, at 198.
LEONARD WESSELL, KARL MARX, ROMANTIC IRONY, AND THE PROLETARIAT: THE
MYTHOPOETIC ORIGINS OF MARXISM 158 (1979), undertakes an analysis knowing only that
Marx attacked "a certain Gustav Hugo."
239. Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (Apr. 27, 1842), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at
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the article on the Historical School of Law was ever published (or
perhaps written)-but not in the Anekdota. But the focus of an
article that Marx did publish there the following year on Prussian
censorship shows that at the heart of his political-intellectual con-
cerns at the time were the ideological foundations of Friedrich
Wilhelm IV's Christian-Germanic restoration. 0 It was apparently
the public discussion of the first results of Savigny's secret divorce
law draft in June and July of 1842 that caused Marx to write the
article that summer based on the aforementioned preliminary stud-
ies.24
Marx published his article in the Rheinische Zeitung, to which
he began contributing in May and of which he became editor-in-chief
on October 15, 1842. The newspaper, the full title of which was the
Rhenish Newspaper for Politics, Trade, and Industry, had just begun
publication on January 1. Later characterized by Engels as the be-
ginning of the modern newspaper press in Germany, 2 the paper
was a joint effort between radical Young Hegelians and "represen-
tatives of the prosperous Rhenish bourgeoisie... in the attempt to
combine speculative philosophy and practical economic interests
into a single liberal organ of the Rhenish middle classes. "Ms Marx's
piece, which was published anonymously in the supplement to the
Rheinische Zeitung on August 9, 1842, only five months after
Savigny's appointment, was a transparently oblique attack on
Savigny as the leader of the Historical School of Law in order to
discredit him in his role as Code revisor. The preceding discussion of
the appropriateness of classifying Hugo as a member, let alone the
founder, of what became known as the Historical School of Law
raises a question as to the intellectual and political fairness of
Marx's polemical use of Hugo as a stand-in for Savigny-especially
since as late as 1840 each criticized the other's view of marriage.2"
240. Karl Marx, Bemerkungen tiber die neueste preuflische Zensurinstruktion, in 1:1
MAX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 116, at 97 (1843); 1:1:1 MARX [&]
ENGELS, HISTORISCH-KRITISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE, supra note 97, at xlix.
241. 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GEAMTAUSGABE, supra note 116, at 1016.
242. Friedrich Engels, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany, in 11 KARL
MARx & FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 18 (1978 [1851]).
243. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GEIAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
TRADITION 285 (1972 [1957]). See generally KONIG, supra note 190, at 1-27. On Marx and
the Rheinische Zeitung, see WILHELM KLuTENTRETER, DIE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG VON
1842/43 IN DER POLITISCHEN UND GEISTIGEN BEWEGUNG DES VORMARz 68 (as 10:1
DORTMUNDER BEITRAGE ZUR ZEITUNGSFORSCHUNG, 1966). On Marx's association with the
newspaper, see FRANZ MEHRING, KARL MARX: GESCHICHTE SEINES LEBENs 42-61 (1979
[1918]). ISAIAH BERLIN, KARL MARY: HIS LIFE AND ENVIRONMENT 72-74 (2d ed. 1963
[1939]), provides a factually erroneous account of Marx and the Rheinische Zeitung.
244. 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 346
n.a. (1840); Hugo, review of SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS, in 1840
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That question may, however, be beside the point if Marx in fact
intended his attack as methodological parody.245 He suggested just
such an interpretation by observing at the outset that by taking its
fondness for returning to the literary sources to the extreme, the
Historical School "expects the navigator to sail not on the stream,
but on its source"; consequently, it could have no objection to Marx's
returning to its sources-Hugo's Textbook on Natural Law. Marx
preferred this approach for another (probably disingenuous) reason:
because Hugo created the philosophy before the School developed,
there was none to be found in the School proper."46 More plausibly,
Marx shunned a direct confrontation with the new minister of jus-
tice-and his former law professor-for general political reasons and
in order to avoid offending the censor.247
In an important sense, then, Marx was using a rhetorical ploy:
by turning Savigny's own historical-hermeneutical method against
him, Marx was able to show what absurd conclusions disembodied
intellectual history could generate. Without disavowing their own
foundations, Savigny and his followers would then be unable to
repudiate the results of Marx's polemic. In order to explain the bla-
tant incongruity between Savigny, the romantic organicist, and the
"frivolous" "skepticism" of Hugo, the "rou6," which made it seem
implausible that Savigny actually shared Hugo's specific views,
Marx asserted that "it truly takes only little critique" to see that all
the moderns had done was gussy up Hugo's raw "animalistic" as
"organic." Whether it in fact took little or much critique, Marx truly
offered only little if any critique; yet whether Hugo's denial of the
existence of reason in sittlich-legal institutions such as marriage
was synonymous with the moderns' appeal to a higher positive rea-
son, Marx at least articulated-even if he did not substantiate-the
credible claim that "Hugo's Natural Law [w]as the German theory of
the French ancien rgime," which suited the restorationist legisla-
tive goals of Friedrich William IV and Savigny.248 This argument
GOTTIGISCHE GELEHRTE ANzEIGEN 1011, 1022-26. In another unmistakable reference to
Savigny, Marx asserted that "the most famous historical jurist" had recently celebrated
Hugo as the creator of the Historical School. Marx, supra note 116, at 192. As already
noted, Savigny's praise had in fact been faint.
245. Such parody could have been modelled after Bruno Bauer's contemporaneous
anonymous left-Hegelian critique masquerading as pietism. DIE POSAUNE DES JONGSTEN
GERICHTS BER HEGEL DEN ATHEISTEN UND ANTIcHRISTEN: EIN ULTIMATUM (1841).
246. Marx, Dos philosophische Manifest, supra note 116, at 191.
247. As a law student in Berlin, Marx was registered for Savigny's course on the
pandects in 1836 and studied his works closely. 1 GESATMELTE SCHRIFTEN VON KARL
MARx uND FRIEDRICH ENGELS 1841 BIS 1850, supra note 238, at 11; Letter from Marx to
his father, Heinrich Marx (Nov. 10, 1837), in MEW, Supp., pt. 1, supra note 20, at 3, 5, 9.
248. Marx, supra note 116, at 191, 194, 197, 198. Mehring, too, asserted that in order
to last in the age of classical literature and philosophy, the Historical School of Law had
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sufficed to confer intellectual and political integrity on Marx's first
foray into journalistic philosophy. 9
That, despite these methodological subtleties, The Philosophi-
cal Manifesto, which Sidney Hook in his Marxist period considered
"one of the most penetrating and suggestive criticisms of the meth-
odological presuppositions of the historical school of law,' 0 was also
a quick-and-dirty politically expedient polemic, suggests that the
piece was a harbinger of Marx's intellectual adventures. To begin
with, although Hugo was obviously an easy object of ridicule, Marx
made it even easier for himself by studiously omitting any reference
to the many views expressed by Hugo that not only did not fit
Savigny's legislative profile, but in some important respects tran-
scended even Marx's own radical-democratic position in 1842. This
approach was facilitated by Marx's practice of convicting Hugo out of
his own mouth through extensive extracts unaccompanied by any
substantive commentary by Marx. Both the selectivity and the fact
that the quotations were inadequately integrated into Marx's intro-
ductory programmatic remarks meant that they failed to support
the conclusion that Hugo's successors lacked "the vocation to be the
legislator of our time."25'
How Hugo reacted to-or whether he was even aware of-the
pillorying to which Marx subjected him is unknown.2 2 Indeed, it is
even unclear whether Marx knew that Hugo was still alive. After all,
by 1842 Hugo had been so overshadowed by Savigny and the
Historical School of Law that a book that appeared that year prema-
turely referred to him as the "'already deceased law teacher."M
Marx began his general analysis of Hugo by permitting himself
the ironic license of attributing to Hugo a misinterpretation of Kant
according to which it follows from our inability to know the true that
we let whatever is untrue pass for completely valid wherever we find
it. Marx claimed that this (non-existing) principle underlay Hugo's
method of seeking to prove not that the positive is rational, but
to camouflage the "naive brutality" of its founder, Hugo. 1 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN VON
KARL MARXANDFRIEDRICH ENGEiS 1841 BIS 1850, supra note 238, at 326-27.
249. A year and a half later Marx charcterized the Historical School of Law as one
that "legitimates the basesness of today by the baseness of yesterday." Karl Marx, Zur
Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung, in 1 MEW, supra note 175, at 378,
380.
250. HOOK, supra note 121, at 142.
251. Marx, supra note 116, at 197. This phrase was of course a reference to Savigny's
anti-codification book of 1814.
252. In the last year of his life Hugo had heard of a "very unfriendly description" in
the radical Hallische Jahrbicher or Deutsche Jahrbcher. 3 (GUSTAV] HUGO, BEYTRAGE
ZUR KENNTNIm civiusTiscHER BcHER SEIT 1788: LETZTER BEYTIAG 30 (1844).




rather that it is not rational. Furthermore, if the point was to prove
that the positive is valid because it is positive, then it was necessary
to prove that the positive is valid not because it is. rational-and
what better way to achieve that goal than by showing that the irra-
tional is positive and the positive not rational?" 4
The logic here is not compelling. If all Hugo was trying to do
was to establish the priority and supremacy of the positive, it was a
matter of indifference whether the positive was rational, irrational,
or arational. Hugo may in fact have been the absolutist toady Marx
(and others) cast him as, but whatever service he rendered the rul-
ing powers by profaning the rationality of sacred institutions and
then honoring their empirical historicity"' occurred not by virtue of
his sophistication as a philosopher of law. Unlike Kant,256 he offered
no subtle moral-philosophical grounding for compulsory acquies-
cence in unreasonable laws ("submit to that which is positive within
your four walls").Y Although Hugo may have been untrue to his
master Kant by launching an empirical attack on the rational basis
of law, and although such an undertaking may have overlapped with
the later romantic-organicist current of the Historical School, merely
mocking Hugo's "smug industriousness" in pulling it off was no sub-
stitute for a critique. An adequate critique of Hugo would have
consisted in showing either that the institutions were in fact ra-
tional or that Kant's version of natural law was immune to empirical
refutation.
Marx's approach appears to have been dictated by his disgust
at Hugo's value-neutrality ("the skin rash is as positive as the
skin"). 5  In one of his characteristic rhetorical inversions, Marx
contrasted the Enlightenment's skepticism of the rationality of exist-
ing society (Vernunft des Bestehenden) with Hugo's skepticism of the
254. Marx, supra note 116, at 192.
255. Id. Unlike Hugo, the greatest debunker of reason and natural law, Hume,
conceded: 'Tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary." HUME, supra note
216, at 484.
256. Immanuel Kant, ZTber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein,
taugt aber nicht fir die Praxis at 155-58; KANT, supra note 195, at 307, 437-43. On Kant's
diremption between external acts, which are subject to an externally compelled legal duty
in the sphere of legality, and internal sentiments (Gesinnung), which are subject to a self-
compelled ethical duty in the sphere of morality, see KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS,
DIE DEUTSCHE IDEOLOGIE, in 3 MEW 176-78 (1958 [1846]); FRANZ NEUMANN, DIE
HERRSCHAFr DES GESETZES: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM VERHALTNIS VON POLITISCHER
THEORIE UND RECHTSSYSTEM IN DER KONKURRENZGESELIscHAFT 167-69 (Alfons Sallner
trans., 1980 [1936]); FRANZ NEUMAN, On the Limits of Justifiable Disobedience, in THE
DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY
149, 155 (1964 [1952]); BLOCH, supra note 155, at 85-86.




existence of reason (Bestehen der Vernunft).29 Marx failed, however,
to articulate and counterpose his own reason-based institutions. The
most interesting example was Hugo's so-called defense of slavery,
which Marx excerpted without any commentary whatsoever. The
gist of it was that slavery was as good positive law as some private-
law institutions; without using the talismanic class terms, Hugo
contrasted the situation of a slave whose rich owner would not bene-
fit from permitting him to starve with that of a poor person whose
fellow citizens used him only as long as he was useful.20 At the age
of twenty-four Marx apparently believed that all right-thinking
people would be horrified by such irreverence; only later would this
trope of the slaveholding South and its sympathizers 261 prompt Marx
to discourse on the world-historical significance of the changing
forms of surplus labor extraction. 62
Marx appears, therefore, to have operated on the unspoken
assumption that Hugo and abstract idealism differed not so much in
principle as in "the specific things they declare to be good or evil."26 3
And surprising as it may seem, the future revolutionary chose of all
things to defend marriage as an institution inspired by reason. It is
precisely this strategy that demonstrates how hopelessly unmarxist
Marx was at this time. Marx opened his discussion of Hugo's views
on marriage-the censors' deletion of which, was not visible in the
Rheinische Zeitung-with a sarcastic remark on how Hugo found the
satisfaction of the sexual instinct within marriage convenient. Marx
then quoted Hugo's claim that Kant had not understood that it was
not always unsittlich to use another person's body as a means to
achieving one's own end. In light of Kant's already reified conception
of marriage, which drained it of any recognizably human content,
Hugo's elimination of Kant's implausible philosophical defense of its
rump claim to morality left marriage an institution of unrelieved
oppression of women programmatically satisfying Andrea Dworkin's
criteria of sexual subordination. 26 As against this radicalized sexist
animality, Marxs romantic glorification of monogamy, which so
259. Id. A half-century later, Engels, as an aid in identifying Marx's anonymous
articles in the Rheinische Zeitung, instructed an editor to look out for Marx's style-
"short, antithetically pointed sentences." Letter from Engels to Richard Fischer (Apr. 18,
1895), in 39 MEW 471 (1968).
260. Marx, supra note 116, at 194.
261. See, e.g., GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL!, reprinted in ANTE-BELLUM 97,
125-26 (Harvey Wish ed., 1960 [1857]).
262. 1 MARX, DAS KAPITAL, in 23 MEW, supra note 51, at 231, 270 n.90. On Marx's
attitude toward authors like Fitzhugh, see EUGENE GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE
SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 174-84 (1971 [1969]).
263. See HOOK, supra note 121, at 144.
264. Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, Equality, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15-16 (1985) (hierarchy, objectification, submission, and violence).
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amused MacKinnon, takes on additional contextual significance:
"[Tihe sanctification of the sexual instinct through exclusivity, the
subduing of the instinct by laws, the sittlich beauty which idealizes
the dictate of nature into an aspect of spiritual union-the spiritual
essence of marriage-that is precisely what for Mr. Hugo is dubious
about marriage."265
An obvious question that Manes point raises is why, given his
advocacy of an anti-contractualist, spiritualist conception of mar-
riage that coincided with the model underlying the restorationist
divorce law draft, the censor would have wanted to cut this section?
This question becomes even more difficult to answer given Marx's
decision to shore up his own pedestalization of monogamy with a
quotation from Benjamin Constant, whom he happened to be read-
ing at the time.266 Constant, a French politician, philosopher, novel-
ist, and well-known lover of Madame de Stadl, added a distinctly
sexist-mystical dimension to Marx's gender-neutral romanticism:
It is in renouncing for a single man this mysterious reserve, whose divine
rule is imprinted in her heart, that the woman dedicates herself to this
man, for whom she suspends, in a momentary abandon, this modesty,
which never leaves her; for whom alone she draws aside the veils which
are otherwise her sanctuary and adornment. Hence the intimate confi-
dence in her husband, result of an exclusive relation, which can exist only
between her and him without her immediately feeling sullied; hence in
this husband the gratitude for a sacrifice and this mixture of desire and
respect for a being who, even while sharing his pleasures, still seems only
to yield to him; hence everything that is orderly in our social order.
267
That Marx quoted Constant, one of Europe's best known
"sentimental libertines,"26 as an authority for the idealization of
prudery raises a question as to whether The Philosophical Manifesto
was intended as satire; in the alternative, perhaps some compas-
sionate censor did Marx a favor by suppressing these passages. In
order to place Marx's effuisive enthusiasm for Constant's exaltation
265. Marx, supra note 116, at 195.
266. In 1842 Marx made copious excerpts from Constant's book surrounding but not
including the passage Marx cited in his attack on Hugo. Karl Marx, Exzerpte aus
Benjamin Constant, De la religion, in 4:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESANTAUSGABE (MEGA)
347 (1976). A half-century earlier Constant had contested Kant's claim that one has a
duty truthfully to answer a murderer's question as to the whereabouts of one's friend
whom he was pursuing. Immanuel Kant, Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu
hiigen, in 8 IMMANUEL KANT, WERKE, supra note 195, at 637. STEPHEN HOLMES, BENJAMIN
CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 106-09 (1984).
267. Marx, supra note 116, at 195-96; Marx was quoting from 1 BENJAMIN
CONSTANT, DE LA RELIGION, CONSIDERtE DANS SA SOURCE, SES FORMES, ET SES D9VELOPPE-
MENTS 172 (1830).




of female chastity in the service of subjugation-which he even
embellished by misquoting26L-in the context of Marx's own political-
intellectual development, it is noteworthy that Constant was well
known in Germany at that time as a staunch opponent of state so-
cioeconomic intervention on the ground that unshackling the moral
and creative energies of bourgeois individuals was the greatest
source of social progress. Indeed, Constant's advocacy of a night-
watchman state served German capitalists in the 1830s and 1840s
as intellectual justification of their opposition to labor protective
legislation."' And the self-same Marx at that time articulated the
following distinctly anti-Marxist view on law: "Laws are ... the posi-
tive, shining, universal norms in which freedom has gained an im-
personal, theoretical existence independent of the arbitrary will of
the individual. A statute book is the bible of freedom of a people."2 '
This conception of the law may have borne the same relationship to
Marx's later state- and class-power oriented views of social legisla-
tion 272 as did his early view of marriage to whatever his mature view
may have been.
Although Marx in his "pre-socialist period"273 and pre-Marxist
writings obviously still clung to a number of conventional notions
concerning women and marriage, his theoretical views on marriage
underwent rapid change in the direction of a historical approach.27 4
In the same vein, two years later Marx shifted his focus to the
"masterful characterization of marriage" by another Frenchman, the
utopian socialist Fourier. In particular Marx cited Fourier's
(objectively anti-Kantian) discussion of the commodification of pro-
spective wives and of the marriage trade as one in which two prosti-
tutions equalled a virtue. Marx emphasized that for Fourier female
269. Marx transformed (and italicized) Constant's "organisation sociale" into "ordre
sociale" and rearranged the sentence. 1 CONSTANT, DE LA RELIGION, supra note 267, at
172. Or perhaps Joseph Hansen copied the quotation incorrectly.
270. See LOTHAR GALL, BENJAMIN CONSTANT: SEINE POLITISCHE IDEENWELT UND DER
DEUTSCHE VoRMARz 295-311 (1963); Guy DODGE, BENJAMIN CONSTANTS PHILOSOPHY OF
LIBERALISM: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND RELIGION 137-42 (1980).
271. Karl Marx, Die Verhandlungen des 6. rheinischen Landtags, Erster Artikel:
Debatten ilber Preffreiheit und Publication der Landstdndischen Verhandlungen in 1:1
MEGA at 121, 150 (May 12, 1842).
272. See, e.g., Marx, Instruktionen, supra note 72, at 194 (on class struggle basis of
child labor legislation).
273. Letter from Engels to Fischer (Apr. 18, 1895), in 39 MEW, supra note 259, at
471.
274. 6konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, in MEW, Supp.
pt. 1, supra note 20, at 465, 534-35. See generally, Draper, supra note 29, at 85-86. But see
GERHARD, supra note 160, at 173; MERFELD, supra note 75, at 31-51 (Marx's agreement
on issue of marriage with those who were otherwise his political opponents can be
explained only by common denominator of patriarchalism).
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emancipation was the natural measure of universal emancipation.27 5
In one of the first serious appraisals of Marx's piece on Hugo,
Sidney Hook noted that it "has been... strangely neglected by pro-
fessional scholars." 75 Not only has this gap in scholarship begun to
close in the past half-century,27 7 but a controversy has evolved en-
compassing two polar-opposite interpretations: while Marxists have
tended to see Marx's newspaper article as mere half-Hegelian-baked
bourgeois ideology,278 a number of non-Marxists have in recent years
come to regard it as embryonic mature Marxism.
Marx's rejection of Hugo's positivism for its identification of law
with the positive norm has commonly been interpreted as a typical
Young Hegelian period piece directed against historical value-rela-
tivism.2 9 Cornel West, for example, has recently adopted this posi-
tion: "What upsets Marx about Hugo's 'historicism' is that it seems
to preclude the possibility of objectivity and validity in ethics. [Wie
see Marx implicitly defending objectivism, in his Hegelian way,
against Hugo's extreme nihilism."
280
Yet Marx's position in the summer of 1842 also had a non-
'Hegelian Kantian side to it:
Is philosophy to assume... different principles for each country?... Is
there no universal human nature as there is a universal nature of the
plants and stars? Philosophy asks what is true, not what is valid...; its
metaphysical truths do not know the boundaries of political geography; its
political truths know too well where the "borders" begin to confuse the il-
lusory horizon of the particular Welt- and Volksanschauung with the true
275. FRIEDRICH ENGELS & KARL MARX, DIE HEILIGE FAIILIE, ODER KnITIK DER
KRITISCHEN KRiTIK, in 2 MEW 207-08 (1957 [1845]). Soon thereafter Marx was also
scorning Proudhon's petty bourgeois sentimentality concerning spousal love. Letter from
Marx to Pavel Annenkow (Dec. 28, 1846), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at 451, 461.
276. HooK, supra note 121, at 142. Some recent lengthy intellectual biographies of
Marx continue this tradition of neglect. See, e.g., JERROLD SEIGEL, MARX's FATE: THE
SHAPE OFALIFE (1978); MURRAYWOLFSON, MARX: ECONOMIST, PHILOSOPHER, JEW: STEPS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DOCTRINE (1982). In what is perhaps the most primitive
analysis, PAUL KAGI, GENESIS DES HISTOUISCHEN MATERIALISMUS 120 (1965), limits
himself to concluding that Marx did not want to know anything about the Historical
School of Law.
277. See, e.g., H. ADAMIs, MARX IN HIS EARLIER WRITINGS 59-60 (1940); DAVID
MCCLELLAN, KARL MARnc HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT 48 (1973); MARCO DUICHIN, IL PRIMO
MARX. MOMENTI DI UN ITINERARIO INTELLETTUALE (1835-1841) at 93-94 (1982).
278. See, e.g., LUKACS, GESCHICHTE UND KLASSENBEWUBITSEIN, supra note 154, at
120 n.3; CORNU, supra note 238, at 281-82.
279. See Pietro Ichino, La concezione del diritto nelle opere giovanili di Marx,
PROBLEMI DEL SOCIAISMO (n.s.) No. 43, at 1173, 1176 (1969); Wolf Paul, Der aktuelle
Begriffmarxistischer Rechtstheorie, in PROBLEME DER MARXISTISCHEN RECHTSTHEORIE 72,
81 (Hubert Rottleuthner ed., 1975).
280. CORNEL WEST, THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF MARXST THOUGHT 25 (1991).
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horizon of the human spirit.25 '
Although Marx was surely in some senses a Hegelian at the time,
who perceived the philosophically ideal state as the embodiment of
Sittlichkeit and reason, rather than glorifying the existing state, he
sought at every turn to show how far removed it was from that ideal.
In attacking Hugo's extreme naturalism, Marx, rather than using
Hegelian conceptualism, adopted the language of Spinozian and
Kantian rationalism. Marx's vindication of Kant vis-h-vis Hugo was
prompted by the latter's excentric claim to being a Kantian despite
his having dropped the prerequisite on the validity of which Kant
made his moral law-the categorical imperative-depend. Whereas
Kant derived the rational necessity (Vernunftnotwendigkeit) of
individual legal institutions from the fact that everyone, in order to
exercise his reasonable will, must be externally free and possess a
secured legal sphere for his action, Hugo sought to show that no
legal institution was necessary in order to live in conformity with
the categorical imperative. 2
According to Hasso Jaeger, Marxs "unrelenting attitude" to-
ward rationalism and positivist historicism-the latter being as
absurd and abstract as the former's ethical ideal of human nature-
presaged his later position that what rules the history of institutions
is the totality of relations of production, an antagonistic totality
owing to its universal and concrete historicity. In his critique of
Hugo, Marx thus indirectly suggested the prelude to his later cri-
tique of classical political economy (Smith and Ricardo) as well as of
historically oriented positivistic German economists such as Roscher
who were students of Savigny: neither the former-on account of
their ahistorical rationalism-nor the latter could do justice to the
totality of antagonistic elements which, within the dialectical
movement of history, determined the relations of production.283
Whereas Jaeger sees Hugo merely as a negative object of cri-
281. Karl Marx, Der leitende Artikel in Nr. 179 der Kdlnischen Zeitung, in 1:1 MARX
[&] ENGELS, GESAhITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 172, 179 (1842).
282. See generally 1 GESAMIELTE SCHRIFTEN VON KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, supra note 238, at 180, 326 (editorial material by Franz Mehring); MAXIMILIEN
RUBEL, KARL MARY- ESSAI DE BIOGRAPHIE INTELLECTUELLE 42-43 (1957). Alice Soon &
Eugene Kamenka, Karl Marx's Analysis of Law, 1 INDIAN J. PHIL. 17, 28 (1959), go so far
as to assert that the human reductionism of Marx's very early work, which sees "all
human institutions as reflections of the human essence, robs law of any specifically legal
content and makes it indistinguishable from morality." Consequently, Marx was reduced
to using Kants categorical imperative to reject any law based on privilege without being
able to produce a positive legal rule or concept.
283. Hasso Jaeger, Savigny et Marx, 12 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 65, 73,
75-76 (1967). RICCARDO GuAsTINI, MARM DALLA FILOSOFA DEL DIRITTO ALLA SCIENZA
DELLA sOCIETA: IL LESSICO GIURIDICO MARXIANO (1842-1851) 60 (1974), repeats this claim
with regard to vulgar political economy.
1993]
508 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
tique that provided Marx with the occasion to think through his
views on the law and society, two historians of ideas have sought to
revalue Hugo himself as a positive model for Marx's development.
Donald Kelley has argued that "Hugo's work... has not been fully
appreciated.., for Marx's 'materialist' line of thought" despite the
fact that as a member of the vanguard in the "deliberate campaign
against old-fashioned natural law philosophy... [and] a-pioneer in
the assault not only on idealism... but also on the whole jusnatur-
alistic' syndrome... Hugo seemed opposed to the very same sort of
idealist fallacy as the young Marx .... ." Kelley concedes that the
young Marx "overlooked" the strengths of the Historical School of
Law, but attributes this failing to the fact that: 'Vhat really
irritated Marx were the political implications of a philosophical
appeal to historical experience."28 Kelley casts Hugo as pivotal in
promoting the elaboration of the social question as it moved from
property to class conflict; it was in this debate between historical
realists and philosophical idealists that Marx began to forge his own
position in which "[plolitical economy was jurisprudence demysti-
fled-and demoralized (but not depoliticized)."285 Given the fact that
Hegel explored the relationship between wealth and poverty in civil
284. Donald Kelley, The Science of Anthropology: An Essay on the Very Old Marx, 40
J. HIST. IDEAS 245, 249, 250 (1984). Inconsistently, Kelley's interest in Marx's relationship
to Hugo lies in his attempt to show that Marxs preoccupation with anthropology in his
late years suggests that Marx had begun to transcend the economic and class oriented
materialist conception of history associated with "crypto-Hegelian abstraction" such as
surplus value. Id. at 261-62. A reading of Marx's late correspondence as well as the fact
that Marx was also preparing works such as the Communist Manifesto and Capital for
republication (in addition to working on the second volume of Capital) cast considerable
doubt on this interpretation; so do Marxs anthropological notebooks, in which he
ridiculed Maine and Austin from a class-based position. THE ETHNOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS
OF KARL MARX 328-30 (Lawrence Krader ed., 1972). That Marx also spent his last years
engrossed in such subjects as chemistry and mathematics merely underscores that he
remained what he had always been-a polymathic bookworm: "I am a machine,
condemned to devour them [books] and then, throw them, in a changed form, on the
dunghill of history." Letter from Marx to Laura & Paul Lafargue (Apr. 11, 1868), in 43
KARL MARx & FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 10 (1988). See also Letter from
Marx to Kugelmann (Mar. 6, 1868), in 32 MEW, supra note 5, at 539 (Marx describing his
ability to "choke down" masses of statistical and other "stuff" that would malke others
sick).
285. DONALD KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 243-51, 263 (1990) [hereinafter THE HUMAN MEASURE]; see also Donald
Kelley, The Metaphysics of Law: An Essay on the Very Young Marx, 83 AM. HIsT. REV.
350, 360-61 (1978). Kelley erroneously characterizes Marx's anti-Hugo as "his first major
published work." KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE, supra, at 249. In fact, Marx's articles on
freedom of the press, which appeared three months earlier in the Rheinische Zeitung,
were also more important. Karl Marx, Die Verhandlungen des 6. Rheinischen Landtags,
Erster Artikel: Debatten iiber Prefl3freiheit und Publikation der Landstdndischen
Verhandlungen supra note 271.
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society from a different perspective at greater length and with much
deeper philosophical insight,25 and given his profound and enduring
impact on Marx, the significance that Kelley attributes to Marx's
brief encounter with Hugo is misplaced.
Norman Levine has gone even farther, maintaining that "the
roots of historical materialism are to be found in the German
Historical School of Law, in the legal sociology of... Savigny
and... Hugo." Marx's original contact with them was, to be sure,
"not a happy one" insofar as he "attacked them as puppets of the
Brandenburg monarchy .... " But ironically in defending Hegel's
view of property as an eternal right and perceiving "the attempt by
Savigny and Hugo to derive law from sociology as an assault by his-
tory and accident upon the universality of reason... Marx refuted a
historical interpretation of law and defended an idealistic one." By
offering "the historical interpretation of law and property as expres-
sions of given societies," Hugo in effect set Marx on the road to his-
torical materialism. 7
In contrast, Riccardo Guastini has taken the position that
Marxs Hugo critique was itself a version of apriorism with a logical
structure similar to Hugo's-the only difference being that Marx
made his a priori (reason) serve progressive political ends. If natural
law jurisprudence is seen as conceiving of the law as a static system
based on a criterion of validity relative to the content of the norms,
which are validated by reference to a meta-normative principle, then
to regard Marx's anti-Hugo as the basis of Marxs legal thought
would be tantamount to classifying the mature Marx as a natural-
law thinker.u
Marx has been accused of many things, but excessive modesty
is not one of them. Why then did he never reprint this early article?
Marx himself offered a hint seventeen years later in the preface to
his first major political-economic work. In an autobiographical note
he stated that: "My major subject was jurisprudence, which however
I studied only as a subordinate discipline alongside philosophy and
history. In the year 1842/43, as editor of the 'Rheinische Zeitung,' I
was for the first time embarrassed by having to join in a discussion
about so-called material interests." Marx then mentioned a number
286. GEORG W. F. HEGEL, JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE 231-34, 257 (1967 [1805-1806])
("Factories, manufactories found their existence precisely on the misery of a class");
HEGEL, §§ 244-45, 253, supra note 151, at 201-02, 205-06; GEORG LuKAcs, DER JUNGE
HEGEL: (BER DIE BEZIEHUNGEN VON DIALEKTiK TJND OKONOMIE, in 8 GEORGE LUKACS,
WERKE 398-419,451-93 (1967 [1948]); SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN
STATE 93-98, 145-54 (1974 [1972]).
287. Norman Levine, The German Historical School of Law and the Origins of
Historical Materialism, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 431, 431, 444, 445 (1987).
288. GUASTIN, MARX, supra note 283, at 66-67.
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of these issues that were debated in the Rhenish parliament such as
wood theft, the Mosel peasants, free trade, and tariffs, which "gave
the first occasions for my occupation with economic questions."
Significantly, Marx did not even allude to his article on the
Historical School of Law or the debate on the reform of the Prussian
divorce law. Instead, he admitted that in 1843, when "the good will
'to go on' frequently outweighed knowledge of the subject," he had
realized that he knew too little to be able to evaluate the newest
French theories of socialism and communism, and therefore used
the demise of the Rheinische Zeitung "to withdraw from the public
stage into the study."289
Further light is shed on Marx's later distance to his piece on the
Historical School of Law by his failure even to announce its inclu-
sion in a projected multi-volume collection of his essays that he
began preparing in 1850 and that was to incorporate thirteen other
articles from the Rheinische Zeitung-including one on the divorce
law debate. 9" Thus however appropriate it may be for his other
contributions to that newspaper, the interpretive injunction not to
regard them as mere Hegelianism applied to current events 291 ap-
pears singularly inapplicable to the Philosophical Manifesto.
F. Marx's Contribution to the Divorce Law Debate
Although Marx appears never to have occupied himself with
Hugo again,292 several months later he contributed to the divorce law
289. Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, in 2:2 MARX [& ENGELS,
GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) 99-100 (1980 [1859]). In describing Marx at the time of his
collaboration at the Rheinische Zeitung, Treitschke was wrong in asserting that already
in 1842 Marx was preparing his transition to communism through "rigorous economic
studies." HEINRICH TREITSCHKE, 5 DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE Im NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUND-
ERT 201 (7th ed. 1920).
290. KARL MARX, GESAivmELTE AUFSATZE, in 1:10 MARX [&] ENGELS, GEsAMiTAUS-
GABE (MEGA) 494-97 (1977 [1851]). "That does not, however, permit the conclusion that
only they and no other contributions were planned for the 'Gesammelten Aufstitze' from
the 'Rheinischen Zeitung.'" Among the articles of the Rheinischen Zeitung that Marx
wanted to include, possibly without changes, in the .Gesammelte Aufsditze was Der
Ehescheidungsgesetzentwurf. Id. 1:10 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), supra
note 99, at 1021-22. Nevertheless, Marx apparently strove for completeness of
republication even though his views had changed. See 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUS-
GABE (MEGA), supra note 99, at 978.
291. Heinz Lubasz, Marx's Initial Problematic: The Problem of Poverty, 24 POL.
STUD. 24, 27 (1976).
292. In the final years of his life, when he was too sick to complete the second and
third volumes of Das Kapital but well enough to study ancient history, Russian economic
works, physics, differential calculus, anthropology, and ethnology, he made a note to him.
self to "[s]ee Hugo's Naturrecht or similar title (have forgotten it)." THE ETHNOLOGICAL
NOTEBOOKS OF KARL MARX supra note 284, at 427. On Marxs reading, see MAXIMILIEN
RUBEL & MARGARET MANALE, MARX WITHOUT MYTH: A CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY OF His
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debate. His role in publicizing the secret government proceedings
was direct, intentional, and spectacular. On October 20, 1842, five
days after becoming editor-in-chief of the Rheinische Zeitung,293 he
created a political sensation by publishing the draft. The preamble
set forth its clear intention to pave the way for the influence of
Christianity to cure the evils of the abuses of the ALR that had
weakened the sanctity of marriage and excessively facilitated di-
vorce. Among the grounds for divorce that it eliminated was the bate
noire of Christian conservatives-mutual agreement.294 Marx him-
self believed that his obstinacy in refusing to name the person who
leaked the draft was the chief reason for the government's ulti-
mately suppressing the newspaper several months later.295
Marx made his first contribution to the divorce law debate in
an editorial footnote appended to a two-part article on the subject in
November 1842. In that article, a "Rhenish jurist" had argued that
the ALR bore testimony to the lax morality prevailing at the end of
the eighteenth century; consequently, the divorce law should not be
revised so much as destroyed and replaced-but not by one con-
structed in the spirit of the Historical School, which merely made
cuts here and there and added bits and pieces, preparing a passable
ragout from anything that was old. Moreover, the author objected to
the derogation of judicial power created by conferring on the clergy
the sole authority to attempt mandatory reconciliation. Finally, the
Rhenish jurist believed that the draft still permitted too many
grounds for divorce. 96
LIFE AND WORK 312-28(1976 [19751).
293. Alice Soon & Eugene Kamenka, Karl Marx on the Law of Marriage and Divorce,
QUADRANT, June 1969, at 17, 21, erroneously state that Marx became editor on Nov. 14,
1842 and published his editorial footnote on the divorce draft the next morning.
294. Entwurf einer Verordnung iiber Ehescheidung, vorgelegt von dem Ministerium
fur Revision der Gesetze im Juli 1842, RHEINIscHE ZEITuNG, No. 293, Oct. 20, 1842,
Supp., at 1, col. 1.
295. Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (Jan. 25, 1843), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at
414 ("if the police nose smells something un-Christian, un-Prussian, the newspaper is not
permitted to appear"). The censor during the Rheinische" Zeitung's last months found it
difficult to censor the newspaper because it was so ideological (Tendenzblatt) that two-
thirds of it should have been stricken, which would have meant that it would not have
appeared at all. If, on the other hand, the censorship had been stricter than that of other
papers, censorship in general would have been undermined because it was supposed to be
just and uniform. During the paper's remaining months the censor's tack included
permitting the paper's tendencies to show themselves nakedly so as to alienate the public.
The "abstruse and callous dialectic" of articles with a scholarly tone he also passed
through because they made the newspaper more hated. Letter of v. Saint Paul to the
Councillor Bitter in the Ministry of the Interior (Feb. 9, 1843), in 1 RHEINIscHE BRIEFE
UND AKTEN, supra note 187, at 428-29.
296. W., Der Entwurf zum neuen Ehegesetz. Von einem rheinischen Juristen,
RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, No. 317, Nov. 13, 1842, Supp., at 1, col. 3; RHEINIScHE ZEITUNG,
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In his note Marx also commented on an earlier piece in the
newspaper-which he characterized as representing "Old-Prussian
jurisprudence"-that had speculated on whether the purpose of the
draft law was to introduce certain rules derived from religious views
that were repulsive to common sense and harmful to the national
welfare. Although the author opposed the abolition of judicial
authority to grant divorces based on insuperable aversion, he did
concur in the draft's elimination of divorce based on mutual agree-
ment in the case of childless marriages; the latter ground could not,
he charged, be justified even from the standpoint of the Protestant
conception of marriage.297
In contrast with the viewpoints of Rhenish and Old-Prussian
jurisprudence, which were bogged down in debating the individual
grounds of divorce, Marx sought to vindicate a general critique from
the standpoint of the philosophy of right. In good Hegelian fashion,
Marx stressed the primacy of developing the "concept of marriage"
and its consequences. Although both articles had rejected the injec-
tion of religion into the law, neither had examined whether the
"essence of marriage" was in and of itself religious; consequently,
neither was able to develop how the consistent legislator would have
to act. The essence of marriage was the appropriate starting point
because it provided the standard for determining whether the legis-
lator was acting consistently in treating "human Sittlichkeit" or
"spiritual sacredness" as the essence of marriage; only then would
the choice between "loyal submission to the nature of the relation-
ship" or "passive obedience to commands" become clear. If the inten-
tion of the religious legislator was to polemicize not against the
dissolution of worldly marriage but against the worldly essence of
marriage and to purify it of this worldliness, then the critics were
deceiving themselves if they believed that they could refute the
religious legislator by showing that individual divorce grounds con-
tradicted the worldly essence of marriage.98
No. 319, Nov. 15, 1842, Supp., at 1, col. 1. Although the author conceded that prohibiting
divorce on the ground of desertion might seem hard, he added that the husband was still
protected against desertion by a right of coercion vis-A-vis his wife, which could be
extended if necessary. The ALR did not apply to the Rhine provinces, which were subject
to the Napoleonic Code, which still permitted divorce mutually agreed upon by the
spouses but otherwise discriminated against wives. See HUBRICH, supra note 157, at 209-
19; BLASIUS, supra note 167, at.34.
297. W., Bemerkungen iber .den Entwurf einer Verordnung itber Ehescheidung,
vorgelegt von dem Ministerium far Revision der Gesetze im Juli 1842,, RHEINISCHE
ZEITUNG, No. 310, Nov. 6, 1842, Supp., at 1, col. 3, at 2, col. 2.
298. Karl Marx, Der Ehescheidungsgesetzentwurf: Kritik der Kritik, in 1:1 MARX [&]
ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 6, at 260. As it appeared in the
RHEINIScHE ZEIrUNG, No. 319, Nov. 15, 1842, Supp., at 2, col. 1, it bore no title; the
editorial staff of the newspaper appeared as author. In preparing this article for (aborted)
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Marx then criticized Rhenish jurisprudence for not understand-
ing that by dividing marriage into a spiritual and a worldly essence
it not only did not abolish the contradiction between the conscience
of the individual and the legal consciousness of the citizen, but cre-
ated one in addition to unresolved collisions between these spheres
of life. The religious legislator, in contrast, was at least consistent in
elevating what it perceived as religious truth to the only power in
the real world; Rhenish jurisprudence merely separated jurispru-
dence and philosophy. The Old-Prussian jurists, who largely sup-
ported the status quo, committed a different mistake: they failed to
understand that the ALR was based on an abstraction of under-
standing (Verstandesabstraktion), which was in itself without
content but adopted the natural, legal, moral content as external
material, which it then tried to arrange according to an external
model rather than according to the immanent laws of the objective
(gegensteindlich) world. Not having understood the essence of the
ALR, these jurists could not understand the new draft law either;
they mistakenly saw bad customs as a proof of bad laws. 99
Marx's closing appeal for a self-critical critique was as opaque
and oblique as his critique of the ALR, which had an anti-Kantian
Hegelian ring to it. It remained to be seen whether the lead article
he anonymously published a month later would provide the stan-
dards and criteria he found lacking in others' analyses, thus ena-
bling him to offer his own evaluation of the draft law itself rather
than mere critiques of critiques. In the same issue that carried that
continuation piece, Marx, in an effort to stave off a government ban,
reprinted a book review-that Savigny himself had slipped into an
official newspaper-that praised the draft law as the most effective
support of Christian morality.00
Summarizing the position of the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx
noted that it agreed with the draft law to the extent that it deemed
the ALR unsittlich, the number and frivolity of divorce grounds
impermissible, and divorce procedures undignified; it objected to the
draft because it did not reform the ALR sufficiently, treated mar-
riage as a religious rather than as a sittlich institution, and was
both too hard and too yielding. While Marx concurred in the oppo-
nents' criticism of one of these defects, he could not approve of their
"unconditional apology of the earlier system." The reason for his
republication in 1850, Marx corrected one typographical error. 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS,
GEsAAMITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 99, at 1052.
299. Marx, 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 263.
Marx was working with Hegel's explication of Verstand as a mode of thought unable to
comprehend reality as dialectical. HEGEL, PHANOMENOLOGIE, supra note 237, at 102-29.
300. Die preu3ische Eherechts-Reform, RHEINIScHE ZEITUNG, No. 353, Dec. 19, 1842,
Supp., at 1, col. 2; 1 VON GERLACH, supra note 184, at 323.
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disagreement was that they focused on the "unhappiness" of spouses
whom the new law would bind against their will, forgetting that a
divorce also separated families; such an individualistic eudemonian
view overlooked the fact that the children and their property could
not be divided according to their arbitrary convenience and whims.
Marx conceded that if marriage were not the basis of the family, it
would be as little subject to legislation as friendship. 3 1 But implic-
itly taking Hegel's viewpoint,0 2 Marx accused supporters of the ALR
of overlooking "the will of the marriage, the sittlich substance of this
relationship.""'
In a memorable Hegelianism that presumably endeared Marx
to the censors looking over his shoulder, if not to his later self,
3 4
Marx lectured the other disputants that "[tihe legislator... does not
make laws, he does not invent them, he only formulates them, ex-
presses the internal laws of spiritual relationships in conscious posi-
tive laws." Consequently, since the legislator would be acting arbi-
trarily if it substituted its whims for the essence of the matter, the
legislator had the right to regard it as arbitrary when private per-
sons-who were not forced to marry-sought to vindicate their
caprices in opposition to that essence. And just as the legislator did
not invent marriage, neither did private persons-as little as swim-
mers did the laws of gravity-who therefore had to obey the law. 5
Thus an extravagantly idealistic naivet6 vis-a-vis the state
went hand in hand with an empty organic communitarianism--'the
concept and the essence are bigger than both of us spouses'--and an
apparent empirical ignorance of the social conditions that did in fact
massively "force" women to marry. 6 Such uncharacteristic deficien-
cies either capture the sort of Marx Marx was in 1842 or suggest the
price of deflecting censorship.07
Marx's insistence on obedience to the law made little if any
sense in a debate that centered not on resistance to the law but on
what the substance of the grounds of divorce should be. And it was
301. On the basis of this argument Marx logically must have opposed eliminating
mutual consent as a ground of divorce for childless couplei.
302. HEGEL, § 163, supra note 151.
303. Marx, in 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS GESMaITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at
287-88. Again, this piece bore no title as originally published in the Rheinische Zeitung,
No. 353, Dec. 19, 1842, at 1, col. 1.
304. A quarter-century later he informed Engels that he was "pleasantly surprised"
that there was no reason to be ashamed of their youthful Holy Family. Letter from Marx
to Engels (Apr. 24, 1867), in 31 MEW, at 290.
305. Marx, 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 288.
306. ENGELS, supra note 141, at 74-75; MEEFELD, supra note 75, at 33.
307. In any event, it was absurd for the re-discoverer of Marxs article to claim that it
had revealed "all the defects and all the contradictions" of the draft. David Riazanov, La
doctrine communiste du mariage, in PARTISANS, No. 32/33, at 71, 73 (1966 [19261).
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precisely with regard to the content of the law that Marx failed most
woefully. For all his talk about essences, he offered no criteria at all
for judging what the essence of marriage might be. He compounded
this failing when he finally introduced Hegel formally into the de-
bate as the author of the claim that marriage as a sittlich relation-
ship was, qua concept, indissoluble. Although true marriage was
thus indissoluble, since no marriage entirely corresponded to its
concept, real marriage was dissoluble. Marx faithfully reproduced
the contents of § 163 of Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts, but proved
unable to push the discussion any further than Hegel's platitudes. If
anything, he intensified the mystification by means of the following
analogy: Just as in nature dissolution (death) appears automatically
where an existence ceases to correspond to its determination, and
just as world history decides whether a state has become so at vari-
ance with the idea of the state that it no longer deserves to exist, so
too "the state decides the conditions under which an existing mar-
riage has ceased to be a marriage."3 °8 Marx's attempt to cast the con-
scious decisionnaking of a monarchy in the same mould as biologi-
cal processes and the post festum spontaneous results of the interac-
tions of millions of individual and collective events called world
history seems, even from a Hegelian vantage point, almost inept.
Yet Marx continued to remain silent on what that "essence"
was that would enable the state to issue a death certificate for a
marriage.30 9 In his first and only nod to democracy, Marx added that
only if the law was the "conscious expression of the will of the peo-
ple" could the legislator scientifically measure the existence of a
sittlich relationship against its essence. In a halfhearted effort at
application-the question of whether divorce should be made easier
or more difficult-however, Marx reverted to empty Hegelianism,
urging the legislator to honor the "profound sittlich essence" of
marriage by recognizing that it was strong enough to sustain many
collisions. By his admonition that "softness vis-h-vis the wishes of
the individuals" might easily turn out to be "hardness vis-A-vis the
essence of the individuals" 31 Marx insured that the Rheinische
Zeitung could not be branded a principled. critic of the regressive
draft law. 1
308. Id. at 288-89.
309. See EUGENE KAMENKA, THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM 33 (1962).
These winged words of Marx made their way into an East German novel; GOW TER DE
BRuYN, BURIDANs ESEL 135 (1987 [19681).
310. Marx, 1:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAAITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 289.
311. As an example of a subsequent principled critique of the draft law from the
standpoint of the ALR (that was not subject to the same censorhip), see tUber die Reform
der preussischen Ehegesetze, in DEUTSCHES BORGERBUCH FOR 1845, at 313 (G. Pfittmann
ed., 1845).
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As with all of Marx's politically explosive contributions to the
Rheinische Zeitung, it is very difficult to sort out what in Marx's
divorce pieces represented his own views and what was merely part
of an extended cat-and-mouse game with the political censors312 or
designed to accommodate potential political supporters. As Marx
explained to one of the newspaper's managers in August 1842, an
attack on a bedrock institution could easily bring about suppression
of the paper. At the same time such articles might alienate "liberal
practical men," who had assumed the painstaking role of fighting for
freedom within constitutional limits, by "demonstrating their con-
tradictions to them from the comfortable easy chairs of abstrac-
tion."313 Amusingly, in an (unsuccessful) effort to persuade the gov-
ernment to rescind its decision to ban the newspaper, Marx was able
to emphasize that the Rheinische Zeitung had been the only news-
paper to defend the main principle of the draft divorce law3 4 And on
Christmas day 1842 Marx included a news item in the Rheinische
Zeitung that commended the draft law for making the sacredness of
marriage the principle of its revision rather than instrumentally
judging divorce from the perspective of "the bourgeois legal order or
even bourgeois economy": "Marriage was not invented as a civil,
private-law institution for the sake of the better ordering of wealth
and legal relations.... Law is above such external utilitarian con-
siderations.""5
312. See Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, in 19 MEW 96 (1879). For a humorous account
of how Marx once tricked the censor, see GESPRACHE MIT MARX UND ENGELS 5-6 (Hans
Magnus Enzensberger ed., 1981). On the Prussian state's suppression of the Rheinische
Zeitung, see GUSTAV MEYER, Die Anfdnge des politischen Radikalismus im vormirzlichen
Preuflen, in RADIKALISMUS, SOZIALISMUS UND BORGERLICHE DEMOKRATIE 7, 35-52 (Hans-
Ulrich Wehler ed., 1969 [1913]).
313. Letter from Marx to Dagobert Oppenhein (Aug. 25, 1842), in 27 MEW, supra
note 12, at 409-10; see also Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (July 9, 1842), in id. at 405.
While Marx was editor-in-chief, the paper was subject to a second round of censorship by
the provincial chief executive. Letter from Marx to Kugelmann (Jan. 30, 1868), in 32
NEW, supra note 5, at 536 (Marx's curriculum vitae). For a detailed discussion of the
massive Prussian censorship, see REINHART KOSELLECK, PREU13EN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND
REVOLUTION: ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG UND SOZIALU BEWEGUNG VON 1791
BIS 1848, at 415-34 (1989 [1967]).
314. Karl Marx, Randglossen zu den Anklagen des Ministerialrescripts, in 1:1 MARX
[&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 349, 353 (Feb. 1843). See also
letter from Marx to Justus von Schaper (Nov. 12-17, 1842), in 3:1 MARX [&] ENGELS,
GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 5, at 33; 1 RHE1NISCHE BRIEFE UND AKTEN, supra
note 187, at 338-40. A doctoral dissertation on the Rheinische Zeitung, which was
published shortly before Marx's authorship of the piece on divorce reform became known,
confirmed that the newspaper had dealt with this "ticklish question with high sittlich
seriousness," without ever stooping, as other liberal papers did, to demagogically
exploiting "the lower popular instincts" by calling for a relaxation of marital bonds.
KONIG, supra note 190, at 62.
315. RHEINISCHE ZE1TUNG, No. 359, Dec. 25, 1842, at 2, col. 2. Two months later,
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Marx's oppositional tactics also included preemptive censorship
not only of his own articles but also of those of other contributors. In
particular, he was engaged in a running battle with a group of
Berlin Young Hegelians (die Freien), including Bruno Bauer and
Max Stirner, who demanded that he play va banque with the news-
paper. 316 Marx, preferring to sacrifice a few "Berlin windbags," re-
fused to permit authors to "smuggle communist and socialist dogmas
into casual theater reviews" because it was "unsittlich."317 Although
Marx continued to combat die Freien,1 5 who accused him of oppor-
tunism, after a few months he resigned as editor, having grown
weary of his own "bowing, scraping, tergiversating, and hair-split-
ting.,
319
What antagonized die Freien was presumably that Marx, by
removing the focal point from the legal and practical plane to that of
legal philosophy, seemed to dull the current political point. Even if
Marx's position is characterized as tactical concealment of his objec-
tions to the draft law in the form of mere reservations, 20 such a
pragmatic approach alone would undermine the claim that Marx's
analysis rose to the level of a programmatic "realistic, namely his-
torical-societally oriented critical theory of law" or that Marx used
an "immanent normative analytic procedure" as the basis of his
"transcendent social critique of ideology" which unmasked legal
when the newspaper was living on borrowed time, it cast some doubt on the sanctity of
marriage in an article mocking the advertisements for marriage partners in a commercial
newspaper in Amsterdam, in which "the whole world is offered for sale"-including her-
ring and love. From the blatantly chauvinist advertisements, which commercially reified
women, the author speculated that "perhaps Prussia needs instead of a new divorce law a
draft law on marital partnership." Holldndische Liebe und Liebeswerbungen, RHEINISCHE
ZEITUNG, No. 59, Feb. 28, 1843, at 1, col. 1, 2, col. 3.
316. See generally Mayer, supra note 312, at 57-86. Reviewing the role of the
Rheinische Zeitung five years later, Bruno Bauer charged that in order to thwart the
draft law, the newspaper had praised "the existing legal system, which, at the time when
the Enlightenment of the preceding century had already lost its hold and had dissolved
into reaction by its own weakness, had drawn to its close and viewed marriage from the
point of view of its usefulness to the state." The newspaper, in other words, gave up the
struggle before* it had begun. 1 BRUNO BAUER, VOLLSTANDIGE GESCHICHTE DER
PARTHEIKAiPFE IN DEUTSCHLAND WAHREND DER JAHRE 1842-1846, at 94,96 (1964 [1847]).
317. Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (Nov. 30, 1842), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at
411-13. See also Letter from Engels to Franz Mehring (end of April 1895), in 39 MEW,
supra note 259, at 473.
318. 1:1:1 MEHG, supra note 97, at Ix-lxi (editorial remarks by Rjazanov). On the
settling of accounts, see FRIEDRICH ENGELS & KARL MARX, DIE HEILIGE FAMILIE; KARL
MARx & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, DIE DEUTSCHE IDEOLOGIE, in 3 MEW 176-221 (1958 [1845-
461).
319. Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (Jan. 25, 1843), 27 MEW, supra note 12, at
415.
320. 1:1:1 MEHG, supra note 97, at lxi (editorial comments by Rjazanov). Rjazanov,
however, exaggerated by characterizing Marxes article as a "fundamental critique."
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practice as the "false consciousness... of false societal relations."32'
Marx's concern for the consequences of divorce on children
3 22
may in part account for his insistence on mobilizing the *state to deal
with social problems. Although Marx, like Savigny, apparently ad-
vocated limiting spouses' discretion to divorce each other, unlike
Savigny, he derived this obligation from the worldly essence of mar-
riage rather than from its character as a supra-individual institu-
tion. In this sense his defense of marriage as a worldly institution
may have been motivated by his view at that time of marriage as an
necessary element of a survival strategy for the underclasses during
industrialization when the right to settlement and thus to partici-
pate in poor-law relief programs depended on married status.323 This
speculation is, to be sure, undercut by the fact that the otherworldly
character of Marx's discussion of marriage as a worldly institution
strongly suggests that he had not yet reflected on the economic
structures that forced women into marriage. Moreover, the fact that
the "devout... Marxist,"324 August Bebel, as the leader of German
Social Democrats' (unsuccessful) opposition to the repeal of the ALR
divorce provisions at the end of the century, took the position that it
was unsittlich to expose children to constantly warring parents,325
suggests that Marx did not long espouse the view he appears to have
presented in 1842.26
That Marx's understanding of society soon underwent rapid
change is obvious from the fact that in 1842 he still accepted an
individualistic socioeconomic order in which the family was assigned
important tasks of social reproduction that, according to Marx's
later views, would be communalized in a post-capitalist society;
there relationships that had taken the form of marriage would cease
to be the objects of legislation.327 The pitiless denunciations that
Marx (and Engels) soon fired at the prostitution of women in mar-
321. Paul, supra note 279, at 80-83. Paul appears to have arrived at this conclusion
by conflating the divorce law draft with the other legislation that Marx criticized in 1842
in other articles.
322. Marx shared this concern with the leading pandectist supporter of the draft,
who, to be sure, expressed it ironically; Puchta, supra note 187, at 11-12.
323. See BLASIUS, supra note 167, at 62-64.
324. GORDON CRAIG, GERAANY 1866-1945, at 266 (1980 [1978]).
325.4 STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE OlBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DES REICHSTAGS, IX.
LEGISLATURPERIODE, IV. SESSION 1895/97, at 2939D-2940A.
326. But Christopher Lasch has a century and a half later advocated making a con-
stitutional amendment of it by prohibiting all couples with children under twenty-one
from divorcing. Who Owes What to Whom?, HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 43, 48 (discussion
contribution by Lasch).
327. See Friedrich Engels, Grundsaitze des Kommunismus, in 4 MEW 363, 377 (1959
[1847]) (precursor of Communist Manifesto); Thilo Ramm, Die kilnftige Geselischaftsord.
nung nach der Theorie von Marx und Engels, in 2 MARXISMUSSTUDIEN 77, 98 (1957).
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riage and the family--[t]he bourgeois sees in his- wife a mere in-
strument of production"-in the Economic-Philosophical Manu-
scripts and the Communist Manifesto underscored .the scope and
depth of the transformation of his altered world view.328
G. Marx as Forerunner of Lola-Lola?
Ich kann Ihnen ohne alle Romantik versichern, daft ich von Kopf bis zu
Fuji und zwar allen Ernstes liebe.
3 29
-Karl Marx
Ich bin von Kopf bis Furl aufLiebe eingestellt, Das ist meine Welt und sonst
gar nichts.330
-Marlene Dietrich
In sharp contrast to his contemporaneous pieces in the
Rheinische Zeitung on socioeconomic issues, Marx's intervention into
the debate on divorce demonstrably failed to adhere to his own
methodological guideline of the time as he articulated it to one of the
newspaper's managers: "The true theory must be made clear and
developed within concrete conditions and with regard to existing
relations."331 Although the future Marx was only embryonically
visible even in the former writings, the development of his under-
standing of poverty hinged in no crucial way on a mechanical appli-
cation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right; Marx was able to see the
empirical world in ways that would have been inaccessible to some-
one confined to Hegelian categories. 32
328. KARL MAax & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFEST DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI, in
4 MEW at 459, 478-79 (1848); MARX, supra note 20, at 534-35. Later Engels advocated
divorce as a blessing especially if people were spared having to "wade through the the
useless dirt of divorce proceedings." ENGELS, supra note 141, at 83.
329. "I can assure you without any romanticism that I love from head to foot and
indeed in all seriousness." Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (Mar. 13, 1843), in 27 MEW,
supra note 12, at 417 (shortly before his marriage to Jenny von Westphalen).
330. "From head to foot I'm attuned to love, That's my world, and otherwise nothing
at all." THE BLUE ANGEL: A FILi BYJOSEFVON STERNBERG 77 (1968 [1930]).
331. Letter from Marx to Dagobert Oppenheim (Aug. 25, 1842), in 27 MEW, supra
note 12, at 409. Thus it was not the case that in all of his articles "Marx treated current
questions of the day as concrete phenomenal forms of general problems." D. ROSENBERG,
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER OKONOMISCHEN LEHRE VON MARx UND ENGELS IN DEN VIERZIGER
JAHREN DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTs 40 (Wilhelm Fickenscher trans., 1958). Lukdcs, too,
exaggerated the forward-looking aspects of Mars divorce article. GEORG LUKACS, Zur
philosophischen Entwicklung des jungen Marx, 1840-1844, in SCHRIFTEN ZUR IDEOLOGIE
UND POLITIK 506, 524, 526 (1967 [1954]).
332. For Marx's anonymous articles from the Rheinische Zeitung, see Die
Verhandlungen des 6. Rheinischen Landtags, Erster Artikel: Debatten fiber Pressefreiheit
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In contrast, the Marx-to-be was nowhere to be found in the
divorce pieces, which not only were devoid of empirical investigation,
but also slavishly followed Hegel. In particular, whereas Marx ad-
umbrated a class-based framework for understanding legislation
and state administration regarding the poor, his approach to the
state in its regulation of family life was uncritical-except for his
materialist analysis of the role of religion. Here he showed the way
to the other contributors to the newspaper by demanding that they
criticize religion in their critiques of political affairs (rather than the
other way round) because religion, as the theory of an inverted real-
ity, would collapse on its own with the dissolution of that reality
33
Marx's breakthroughs to independence of thought regarding
the so-called social question on the one hand and the family on the
other seem, then, to have been asynchronous. By the same token, his
detached, quasi-academic, and indecisive commentary on marriage
deviated so conspicuously from the aggressively oppositional and
sovereignly contemptuous tone for the powers that be that marked
Marx as a dissident in matters touching on poverty and censor-
ship 34 that it raises the possibility that Marx had reason to believe
that the king-whose personal involvement in the reform led him to
regard press criticism as a personal attack-and the Prussian gov-
ernment, especially after his disclosure of the draft law, would toler-
ate no further insubordination in this area. 35 It was therefore no
wonder that a half-century later, when the dying Engels sought to
rescue from anonymity, oblivion, and the public domain "the main
things from Marx's presocialist period," he fastened on the articles
on the wood theft law, the condition of wine peasants, and freedom
of the press, apparently forgetting even the existence of those on
divorce and Hugo. 36
Ironically, then, despite her misconceived critique of Marx's
und Publikation der Landstindischen Verhandlungen; Verhandlungen des 6. Rheinischen
Landtags, Dritter Artikel: Debatten ilber das Holzdiebstahlsgesetz, in id. at 199 (Oct. 25-
Nov. 2, 1842); Rechtfertigung des tt-Korrespondenten von der Mosel, in id. at 296 (Jan.
15-20, 1843). For an excellent discussion of Marx's articles on the social question, see
Lubasz, supra note 291, at 28-34.
333. Letter from Marx to Ruge (Nov. 30, 1842), in 27 MEW, supra note 12, at 412.
334. See Marx, Die Verhandlungen des 6. Rheinischen Landtags, Erster Artikel:
Debatten dber Pre/freiheit und Publikation der Landstiindischen Verhandlungen.
335. See KONIG, supra note 190, at 63.
336. Letters from Engels to Richard Fischer (Apr. 5, 15, & 18, 1895), in 39 MEW,
supra note 259, at 459, 466, 471; Letter from Engels to Franz Mehring (end of April, May
9, 1895), id. at 474, 476. In the biography of Marx that Engels wrote for the
Handw6rterbuch der Staatswissenschaften he did not include these pieces in what he
termed "the most complete possible list' of Marx's published writings. Friedrich Engels,
Heinrich Karl Marx, in 22 MEW 337, 342 (1963 [1892]). It is unclear whether Engels had
ever been aware of Marx's authorship of the articles in question.
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analysis of female workers, MacKinnon may have unwittingly put
her finger on a diremption between Marx's analysis of political econ-
omy and love. In one of his relatively few letters to his wife written
later in life (while she was in Germany in 1856), Marx self-mock-
ingly portrayed their emotional relationship as a sanctuary from
societal relations (despite the fact that the Marx household was an
eminently political and public one)." '
Bad as your portrait is, it performs the best services for me, and I now un-
derstand how even "the Black Madonnas," the most reviled portraits of the
mother of God, could find their imperturbable admirers, and even more
admirers than the good portraits. In any case, none of these Black
Madonna pictures has ever been more kissed and ogled and adored than
your picture, which to be sure is not black but cross, and in no way reflects
your dear, sweet, kissable, "dolce" face. [I] kiss you from head to foot, and I
fall before you on my knees and moan: "Madame, I love you." And indeed I
do love you, more than the Moor of Venice ever loved.... Who of my many
slanderers and adder-tongued enemies has ever reproached me with feel-
ing a vocation to play the lover's role in a second-rate theater? And yet it
is true. Had the scoundrels possessed the wit, they would have painted
"the relations of production and of commerce" on the one side and me at
your feet on the other. Look to this picture and that-they would have
written underneath. But stupid scoundrels they are and stupid they will
remain, in seculum seculorum.... I feel like a man again because I feel a
great passion, and the manifoldness in which study and modern education
entangle us, and the skepticism with which we necessarily carp at all sub-
jective and objective impressions are calculated to make us all small and
weak and whining and undecided. But love, not for Feuerbachian Man,
not for Moleschottian metabolism, not for the proletariat, but rather love
for the sweetheart and in particular for you makes the man into a man
again.338
337. See MONZ, supra note 21, at 361 (after the revolution of 1848 many refugees
congregated in Marxis house).
338. The passage reads in the original:
Schlecht, wie Dein Portrit ist, leistet es mir die besten Dienste, und ich begreife
jetzt, wie selbst "die schwarzen Madonnas", die schimpfiertesten Portrdts der
Mutter Gottes, unverwiistliche Verherer finden konnten, und selbst mehr
Verehrer als die guten Portrnts. Jedenfalls ist keines dieser schwarzen
Madonnabilder je mehr gekiift und angeiugelt und adoriert worden als Dein
Photograph, das zwar nicht schwarz ist, aber sauer, und durchaus Dein lebes,
siiJes, kiiBliches, "dolce" Gesicht nicht widerspiegelt. [IWch kiisse Dich von Kopf
bis FuJ3, und ich falle vor Dir auf die Knie, und ich st6hne: "Madame, ich liebe
Sie." Und ich liebe Sie in der Tat, mehr als der Mohr von Venedig je geliebt
hat.... Wer von meinen vielen Verleumdern und schlangenzuingigen Feinden
hat mir je vorgeworfen, daB ich berufen sei, eine erste Liebhaberrole auf einem
Theater zweiter Kasse zu spielen? Und doch ist es wahr. HEitten die Schufte
Witz besessen, sie hitten "die Produktions- und Verkehrsverhiltnisse" auf die
eine Seite gemalt und mich zu Deinen FUBen auf der andern. Look to this pic-
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These emotions 331S-stripped of the mature Marx's irony-are of
a piece with the voluminous lyric love poetry that, as an eighteen-
year-old, he had composed for Jenny von Westphalen two decades
earlier3 0 as well as with the exuberantly passionate love letters from
her to him from the same period and even later.31 They also prefig-
ure the "demonstrative pathos" of the dying widower, contemplating
the harbor of Algiers and the outlying snow-topped mountains from
his hotel room, whose thought was "to great part absorbed by remi-
niscence of my wife, such a part of my best part of life!"
342
ture and to that-htten sie darunter geschrieben. Aber dumme Schufte sind es
und dumm werden sie bleiben, in seculum seculorum.... Ich fithle mich wieder
als Mann, weil ich eine groBe Leidenschaft fiihle, und die Mannigfaltigkeit,
worin uns das Studium und moderne Bildung verwicklen, und der
Skeptizismus, mit dem wir notwendig alle subjektiven und objektiven
Eindrficke bemanglen, sind ganz dazu gemacht, uns alle klein und schwach und
quingelnd und unentschieden zu machen. Aber die Liebe, nicht zum
Feuerbachschen Menschen, nicht zum Moleschottschen Stoffwechsel, nicht zum
Proletariat, sondern die Liebe zum Liebchen und namentlich zu Dir, macht den
Mann wieder zum Mann.
Letter from Karl Marx to Jenny Marx (June 21, 1856), in 3:8 KARL MARX &] FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, GESAMITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 2, at 30-31 (1990).
339. KONZLI, supra note 4, at 337, in yet another wilful interpretation, sees the letter
as one that could have been written only by "a youth at the end of his years of pu-
berty... who in the daily life of his marriage does not really live his feelings, his love."
340. 1:1 MARx [&] ENGELS, GESAMITAUSGABE (MEGA), supra note 116, at 477-612
(1836). Among Manes poems, see, e.g., An Jenny: Sonnette: "Sieh ich k6nnte tausend
Blicher ftillen, und nur 'Jenny' schrieb ich stets hinein." Id. at 607. See generally William
Johnston, Karl Marx's Verse of 1836-1837 as Foreshadowing of his Early Philosophy, 28 J.
HIsT. IDEAS 259 (1967).
341. Letters from Jenny von Westphalen to Karl Marx (May 10, 1838, June 24, 1838,
ca. 1839-40, Mar. 24, 1846), in 3:1 MARX [&] ENGELS, GESAMTAUSGADE, supra note 5, at
331, 332, 337, 517; (Aug. 10, 1841), in MEW Supp. pt. 1, supra note 20, at 641.
342. Letter from Marx to Engels (Mar. 1, 1882), in 35 MEW, supra note 13, at 46
(quotation written by Marx in English). Marx himself was aware that he had begun losing
his grip on grammar and syntax; Letter from Marx to Engels (Mar. 28-31, 1882). Id. at 51.
